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Abstract
This thesis studies the eﬀect of catastrophe (CAT) bonds as innovations in a ﬁnancial market. It
provides a new and alternative approach to the description of CAT bonds, by utilizing an agent-
based CAPM to analyse the behaviour of CAT bonds in a ﬁnancial-market setting that comprises
key features of an insurance industry. First, a model of CAT bonds as new assets in the single-
period CAPM is developed. In this model, a CAT bond price is determined by a market clearing
condition. The eﬀects of CAT bonds on the ﬁnancial market are discussed. Conditions under which
investors include new assets in their portfolios to increase utility are established. The premium and
coupon of a CAT bond are determined, which provides an equilibrium theoretical foundation of
the premium calculation principle from actuarial science. The notion of transferable insurance risk
is developed and conditions for the transferability of catastrophe risk from the insurance industry
to the ﬁnancial market by means of CAT bonds are established. In a second step, CAT bonds
are introduced in an agent-based multi-period CAPM with investors holding heterogeneous beliefs
regarding future payoﬀs of assets. The minimum premium and coupon are determined. The notion
of transferable risk is adapted to an agent-based framework. The concept of perceived Pareto
superiority is introduced. Stochastic diﬀerence equations are derived to describe the co-evolution
of asset and CAT bond prices. The changes in the market price of risk are analysed. The concept
of a perfect forecasting rule is generalized to CAT bonds. Finally, a compound Poisson process
that describes the evolution of insurance losses related to catastrophe risk is introduced. The loss
that CAT bonds cover at each time period is simulated and discussed according to two diﬀerent
scenarios. By applying the loss process, the eﬀects of CAT bonds on the ﬁnancial market are
simulated in terms of investors' behaviour and market risk.
v
Chapter 1
Introduction
Catastrophic events such as ﬂoods, earthquakes and droughts threaten people's lives,
properties, and economies. They cause many deaths and have severe negative ﬁnan-
cial impacts on the global economy every year. The frequency of disasters and
corresponding damage has increased signiﬁcantly, since 1994. As shown in Figure
1.0.1, the total number of reported disasters has been increasing since 1974. In terms
of ﬁnancial costs, catastrophic losses have increased from $58.78 billion in 1976 to
$380.09 billion in 20111, over a six-fold increase. Relevant insured losses have climbed
signiﬁcantly as a result. Given these circumstances, catastrophe bonds (CAT bonds)
were designed in the mid-1990s to improve reinsurance capacity and reduce the neg-
ative impacts on the (re-)reinsurance industry, such as the availability and price of
insurance policies [137]. In the following Section 1.1, CAT bonds and their role in
the market are discussed.
1The annual value of economic damage was calculated in 2014 by considering the inﬂation rate
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Figure 1.0.1: Total economic damage and total number of disasters on all continents
(1965-2014)
('All continents' includes Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and Oceania.) Data source: Emer-
gency Events Database (EMN-DAT), Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
(CRED), [Online], Available at: http://www.emdat.be/disaster_trends/index.html
1.1 CAT bonds market
CAT bonds are usually issued by (re-)insurance companies2 and used to transfer
potential catastrophe risk to the ﬁnancial market. Unlike corporate bonds issued
by (re-)insurance companies, CAT bonds are isolated from issuers' ﬁnancial posi-
tions such as changing proﬁts or obligations [137]. Unlike traditional ﬁnancial in-
struments, CAT bonds' payoﬀs are not connected with ﬁnancial factors that aﬀect
market volatility such as interest rates or economic policies. CAT bonds' payoﬀs,
as insurance-linked securities, are linked to speciﬁc insured losses from catastrophic
events. Hence, a CAT bond contract has a default term: once a pre-deﬁned catas-
trophic event occurs, the bond holder may lose the coupon partially or as a whole
2CAT bonds are issued by governments to prevent economic loss resulting from possible natural disasters.
2
Figure 1.1.1: CAT bonds issuing size (1997-2014)
Data resource: Aon Benﬁeld [7, 8, 9, 10, 11]
and even the principal. However, because CAT bonds cover a ﬁnal threshold of in-
sured losses, only a signiﬁcant catastrophic event will trigger the default terms such
as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 [122]. Because the default of CAT bonds can only
be triggered by severe catastrophic events, CAT bonds are regarded to have zero
correlation with the ﬁnancial market and therefore attract investors' attention [52].
CAT bonds are regarded as ideal ﬁnancial investments to diversify portfolio risk and
have become increasingly popular since 2005 [122]. Figure 1.1.1 displays the issuing
size of CAT bonds from 1997 to 2014. In the ﬁrst quarter of 2016, the issuance of
CAT bonds reached $2 billion, the highest amount on record, and a 35% increase
compared to the previous record set in the ﬁrst quarter of 2015 [54].
CAT bonds are prominent in the US market and have gradually become more
popular in Japan and Europe. Currently, more countries are oﬀering CAT bonds
to mitigate the costs of severe natural catastrophes and raise reconstruction funds
3
Figure 1.1.2: CAT bonds related transactions
(Transactions happen in order: 1, 2, ..., 6.) Source: Swiss Re Capital Markets [138]
to decrease potential economic losses [122]. For example, since 2006, Mexico has
sold a series of three-year CAT bonds in the market to raise hundreds of millions of
dollars to cover catastrophe risks [122]. China issued its ﬁrst CAT bonds in 2015
and raised $50 million for protection [14]. Chile's government is considering CAT
bonds to be used as protection from catastrophe risks. Chile suﬀered a devastating
earthquake that killed more than 500 people and caused around $30 million of losses
in 2010 [122]. An overview of CAT bond-related transactions is given in Figure 1.1.2.
When a (re-)insurance company intends to use CAT bonds to transfer catastrophe
risk, they ﬁrst set up a special purpose vehicle (SPV) and the (re-)insurance company
is named as a sponsor. The SPV is a legal entity independent of the sponsor, which
ensures CAT bonds to be isolated from any obligations of the sponsor company,
thus protecting the rights of CAT bond holders. The role of the SPV is to issue
CAT bonds. The relationship between the SPV and sponsor can be described by an
insurance contract. The sponsor cedes the ﬁnal threshold of its insured loss from a
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pre-deﬁned catastrophe to the SPV and passes a certain premium to it (as depicted
in Procedure 1 in Figure 1.1.2). The SPV promises to cover this loss once the pre-
deﬁned catastrophic event occurs. The SPV then issues CAT bonds to investors
(often institutional investors) in the ﬁnancial market to raise money for the coverage
of possible losses (see Procedure 2 in Figure 1.1.2). The duration of CAT bonds
is usually deﬁned as 12 months with an average coupon rate of 7% - 9% (in 2016),
much higher than the one-year US Treasury rate of 0.8% (in 2016) or corporate bonds
[87]. If the default term is triggered, investors will lose part or all of their coupon
and possibly their principal. If the default term is not triggered, investors receive
coupons as risk compensation and get their principal back at maturity. After selling
CAT bonds, the SPV then invests the funds received from investors and the sponsor
into a risk-free asset, such as money market funds or Treasury bills (Procedures 3
and 4 in Figure 1.1.2). If a pre-agreed event happens, the SPV will use the gross
return of this fund to cover the insurance loss and use the remaining money to pay
back investors; if no such event occurs, this money is used to pay for the coupons
and investors' principal [138].
1.2 Previous research on CAT bonds
Existing research on CAT bonds focuses primarily on pricing. A small number
of papers have also examined the economic beneﬁts of CAT bonds (e.g., Barrieu
and Louberge [15], Kish [87]). Pricing-related research on CAT bonds has spanned
diﬀerent ﬁelds, namely ﬁnancial economics, ﬁnancial mathematics, and actuarial
science. An introduction into research in these ﬁelds, followed by a discussion is
5
provided later.
As noted above, CAT bonds can be considered as reinsurance contracts that pro-
tect sponsors (re-insurance companies) from the risks of potential natural disasters
by transferring this risk to the ﬁnancial market. In actuarial science, professionals
focus on how to set premiums for CAT bonds. The premium, in the insurance in-
dustry, is generally regarded as the price of the insurance policy and is calculated by
the premium calculation principle
premium=expected loss+risk load, (1.2.1)
where risk load is a load for risk margin and expenses. As introduced in Section 1.1,
the SPV receives a certain amount of the premium and issues CAT bonds to raise
money for coverage of the sponsor. The premium rate of the bond is risk compensa-
tion for investors; thus, the coupon rate of a CAT bond is the sum of the premium
rate and risk-free rate [70]. Actuarial research considers the premium to be the main
determining factor of a CAT bond's value. Almost all CAT bond-related research
from actuarial science has focused on how to stipulate the premium based on the
premium calculation principle (1.2.1). For example, Lane uses an empirical approach
to determine how the 'pricing mechanism' of insured risk has been set by markets.
He uses the Cobb-Douglas production function as a market utility function to mea-
sure insured risk, Furthermore, he employs the conditional expected loss (CEL) and
probability of ﬁrst dollar loss (PFL) as variables to describe the respective severity
and frequency of insured loss. By applying the Cobb-Douglas production function
to CEL and PFL as variables, the premium formula then becomes
6
Premium = γ(PFL)α × (CEL)β.
Lane [94] then ascertains γ, α and β, according to insurance-linked securities (ILS)
market data from 1999. Similarly, Major and Kreps [105] choose a log-linear function
to demonstrate the relationship between the premium and expected loss by conduct-
ing empirical analysis. Bodoﬀ and Gan [23] use a linear function of expected loss
to describe the market price of CAT bonds. In addition, they use this function and
past data to study the eﬀects of various perils and zones on CAT bond prices. (For
similar research, see Berge [17] as cited in Galeotti et al. [70]; Lane and Mahul [95];
and Dieckmann [60]. Galeotti et al. [70] compare and test the accuracy of diﬀer-
ent premium calculation models for CAT bonds and examine the empirical validity
of the models. Unlike the above methods, which ﬁt empirical data to determine
the relationship between the premium, the expected loss, and the risk load, Wang
[146] applies probability transforms of Wang's [145] probability transform to extend
the Sharpe ratio to evaluate risk with a skewed distribution. This allows for an
evaluation of CAT bonds returns that are skewed distributed.
The study of CAT bonds from the perspective of actuarial science focuses mainly
on premium valuation. This is so because in actuarial science, the premium for a
reinsurance contract determines the value of a contract. As CAT bonds are regarded
as reinsurance contracts, researchers in actuarial science then take the premium that
the (re-)insurance company passes to issue CAT bonds as the value of CAT bonds.
However, the premium itself cannot determine the ﬁnal value of a CAT bond. This
is so because CAT bonds are traded in the ﬁnancial market, so that the valuation of
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CAT bonds is also aﬀected by the ﬁnancial market as Wang [146] point out.
As ﬁnancial instruments, CAT bonds have attracted interest in the ﬁnancial lit-
erature with regard to pricing. The no-arbitrage pricing method is commonly used
to assign fair prices to ﬁnancial derivatives, such as options and futures. By that
method, the price of an option equals the price of the portfolio, which replicates the
payoﬀ of the option at maturity. Cox and Pederson [48] show that with exposure to
catastrophe risk, the market is incomplete, which contradicts the requirement for the
arbitrage pricing model that the market should be complete. In addition, Aase [1]
states that arbitrage pricing with the assumption of unpredictable jumps at random
time points results in many equivalent martingale measures and hence no unique
price. Due to market incompleteness, models that are based on no-arbitrage pricing,
such as the Black-Scholes (BS) model, are not appropriate for valuing CAT bonds.
In the literature, two main approaches have been applied to solve these prob-
lems. One is Merton [111] who assumes that the risk caused by a jump process can
be diversiﬁed away. The BS model assumes that the underlying stock returns are
represented by a stochastic process with a continuous sample path. He states that
changes in stock prices can be modelled via a jump process reﬂecting the impact of
information that causes stock price changes of extraordinary magnitude. Hence he
changes the continuous stochastic process in the BS model to a continuous jump
process and shows that the BS solution is not valid, in this instance. Then he shows
proves that no portfolio can eliminate the risk caused by the jump process. Hence,
the BS cannot provide fair option prices. In other words, one cannot price options
via a jump process because an arbitrage opportunity will be created.
Merton [111] solves this problem by deriving a pricing formula under the assump-
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tions of the CAPM. In the CAPM, the beta coeﬃcient measures the sensitivity of
the expected excess returns of assets to the expected excess return of the market.
If the jump process is caused by information that only aﬀects speciﬁc companies or
industries, rather than the whole market, then the beta of the asset return caused
by the jump process is 0. Therefore, the expected excess return rate caused by the
jump process is simply a risk-free rate. Under the assumption that jump risk is
non-systematic, Merton [111] is able to generate a solution related to option prices.
Yet, as he points out, this solution holds only as long as the CAPM holds; if the
CAPM does not hold, the solution is invalid. He also derives another solution from
Ross [123]. Both solutions are based on the assumption that the jump component
of a risk process can be diversiﬁed away.
Vaugirard [143] follows Merton [111] and adapts a framework with underlying
state variables to describe the market price of natural risk. He assumes that investors
are neutral towards jump risk in line with Merton's [111] assertion that risk caused
by the jump process can be diversiﬁed away. Vaugirard [143] shows the existence of
well-deﬁned arbitrage-free prices for CAT bonds by computing a ﬁrst-passage time
distribution. He also applies a numerical analysis to demonstrate the sensitivity of
insurance-linked bond prices to risk exposure. Following Vaugirard's [143] model,
Nowak and Romaniuk [115] extended it to develop a general valuation formula to
price more types of CAT bonds; Lai, Parcollet and Lamond [92] add the eﬀect of
currency exchange risk to this pricing formula.
In addition to Merton [111], another method that is used to cope with the prob-
lems caused by jump processes when the no-arbitrage pricing is applied is Cox and
Ross [47]. Cox and Ross [47] ﬁnd explicit option valuation formulas by assuming
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that the jump amplitude (i.e. the coeﬃcient to describe a Poisson process) is a non-
random function at a jump. Following their method, Lee and Yu [96] study the eﬀect
of interest rates to the CAT bond price and discuss hazard, basis and default risks.
They use a Monte Carlo simulation to estimate CAT bond prices and conclude that
both moral hazard and basis risk may drive down CAT bonds prices substantially.
As an alternative approach to this literature, Baryshnikov, Mayo, and Taylor [16]
price CAT bonds as threshold bonds that trigger default in the event of catastrophe.
They point out that it is incorrect to apply traditional securities pricing methods
to CAT bonds because they assume that the underlying contingent processes are
log-normal distributed. They price CAT bonds as defaultable bonds so that the
CAT bond price is the expected value of the discounted payoﬀ of CAT bonds fol-
lowing the catastrophic event. They use a compound Poisson process to describe
catastrophic events' happening and deﬁne a continuous payoﬀ process. To the best
of my knowledge, their contribution is the ﬁrst paper to connect CAT bond pricing
to catastrophic event processes. It has signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced subsequent studies.
For instance, Burnecki, Kukula, and Taylor [36] following on previous results, use a
numerical analysis to demonstrate that there is a relationship between CAT bond
prices and the threshold level and time to expiry. They also demonstrate how CAT
bond prices change due to diﬀerent claim distributions. However, their ﬁndings in-
dicate that the method proposed by Baryshnikov, Mayo, and Taylor [16] depends
largely on the precise determination of the claim (disaster) arrival process and the
claim distribution, which is quite practical. Similarly, Ma and Ma [101], Schmidt
[129], Jiang and Dassios [53] also use a (compound) Poisson process to describe the
ﬂow of claims-related catastrophe risk in their research.
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Contrary to researchers who add additional assumptions to deal with the in-
completeness of markets created by catastrophe risk in order to use arbitrage-free
pricing, researchers such as Aase [1] and Cox and Pederson [48] apply equilibrium
theory to solve the pricing problems that the no-arbitrage pricing method cannot
cope with. Aase [1] proposes a scenario in which CAT bonds are issued by insurers
who are seeking protection as reinsurance contracts; on the other side, investors re-
quire compensation for bearing this catastrophe risk by holding CAT bonds. He then
applies the aggregation theorem of Rubinstein [125], which claims that under certain
conditions, even though the market may be incomplete, equilibrium prices will be
determined as if they were determined in a complete (Arrow-Debreu) market. So
equilibrium prices of CAT bonds, which optimise insurers risk sharing intention and
provide the relevant compensation for investors, are obtained. Aase [1] provides an
idea on how to value and analyse CAT bonds by considering the insurance industry
and ﬁnancial market. Cox and Pederson [48] apply the representative agent tech-
nique 3 used to price uncertain cash-ﬂows in an incomplete market setting to derive
an equilibrium price formula of bonds linked to a catastrophe occurrence. They then
recast the equilibrium valuation formula as a standard form of risk-neutral expec-
tation by removing the form of utility function and aggregate endowment process
applied in the representative-agent technique. It shows that pricing CAT bonds in
the equilibrium environment not only solves the incomplete market problems that
the no-arbitrage pricing method faces but can also provide a pricing formula that
corresponds to the no-arbitrage pricing framework. The research from Aase [1] and
Cox and Pederson [48] provide a foundation for this thesis' main theme.
3See Huang and Litzenberger [82], Karatzas [86], Magill and Quinzii [104], or Panjer et al [117] for details on the
theory of the representative agent.
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1.3 Research Motivation
The discussion above showed that much of the research on CAT bonds thus far is
mainly concerned with pricing and comes either from actuarial science or ﬁnance.
There are still a number of problems that are unsolved in the literature. With regard
to the pricing of CAT bonds, actuarial science claims that the premium for a CAT
bond contract determines its value. Researchers in the ﬁeld of ﬁnance, however,
price CAT bonds as ﬁnancial instruments traded in the ﬁnancial market. Given the
characteristics of a CAT bond, as proposed by Wang [146], any valuation needs to
consider the insurance and the ﬁnancial market to ensure a comprehensive analysis of
them and hence a proper valuation. Research by Aase [1] is a good starting point on
this issue. He describes how insurers are willing to pay a risk premium for protection
while, on the other side, investors require compensation for bearing this catastrophe
risk by holding CAT bonds. Thus, this scenario can be applied in a model of CAT
bonds to allow for an analysis of the insurance industry and the ﬁnancial market as a
whole. In addition, as Baryshnikov, Mayo and Taylor [16] point out, most research in
the ﬁnance literature prices CAT bonds by assuming that they are already traded in
the market. It raises questions on conditions under when issuers are willing to issue
CAT bonds and under what conditions investors in a ﬁnancial market are willing
to purchase them. The advantage of CAT bonds, especially to diversify investors'
portfolios' risk, is mentioned frequently. However, the question of how investors
behave in a ﬁnancial market with CAT bonds has not been addressed.
This thesis applies an agent-based CAPM to study the behaviour of investors in
a ﬁnancial market in which ordinary ﬁnancial securities such as stocks, are traded
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alongside CAT bonds. The model allows for a comprehensive analysis of both the
ﬁnancial and the insurance markets. Decisions on the premium that (re-)insurance
companies pass to the issuer, the promised payoﬀ of a CAT bond, and the appropriate
issuing size of CAT bonds are discussed. The market prices of CAT bonds are
determined in temporary market equilibria in which supply and demand for CAT
bonds are equilibrated. The reasons why investors are willing to purchase CAT bonds
and include them in their portfolios are discussed. To this end, a mechanism that
explains how and when catastrophe risk can be successfully transferred to a ﬁnancial
market is developed. By constructing an agent-based CAPM with CAT bonds in a
setting that comprises an insurance market, this thesis ﬁlls a research gap on CAT
bonds. The model allows for an analysis of the design of CAT bonds as well as the
behaviour of CAT bonds' investors.
1.4 Thesis organization
This thesis consists of 6 chapters. Chapter 1 gives an introduction to the state of
current research on CAT bonds. It includes a brief introduction to CAT bonds and
its market, previous research on CAT bonds, and research motivation.
In Chapter 2, CAT bonds are considered as innovations in a traditional CAPM.
In this static two-period model, the eﬀect of introducing a CAT bond to the ﬁnancial
market is discussed. Under certain conditions, the market price of risk will increase
after the introduction of the bond as a new asset. It is shown that in such a case
investors will include this new asset into their portfolios to increase their utility. The
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premium that is passed from a (re-)insurance company and the coupon of a CAT
bond are determined by taking into account the issuer's constraints and investors'
requirements. The premium formula veriﬁes the premium calculation principal from
actuarial science with a constraint on the admissible risk load for the ﬁnancial market.
A new concept, called transferable insurance risk, is introduced to allow this thesis to
analyse the conditions under which catastrophe risk is transferable from the insurance
industry to the ﬁnancial market by means of CAT bonds.
Chapter 3 reviews an agent-based CAPM with heterogeneous beliefs which among
others was developed by Böhm and Chirella [24], Brock and Hommes [30], Chiarella
and He [41, 42] and Wenzelburger [147]. It discusses arbitrage opportunities in this
model as well as the valuation of redundant assets. In Chapter 4, CAT bonds are
introduced in the agent-based CAPM with investors holding heterogeneous beliefs.
The design of a CAT bond is developed and a premium that is passed from (re-
)insurance companies and a promised payoﬀ to investors is determined. An example
illustrating how an issuer determines the coupon and premium before issuing CAT
bonds is provided. In each time period, investors have heterogeneous beliefs regard-
ing future payoﬀs of assets. The concept of perceived Pareto superiority is introduced
to explain why investors will include CAT bonds in their portfolios. The notion of
transferable risk is generalised to the agent-based CAPM. Stochastic diﬀerence equa-
tions that describe the co-evolution of stock and CAT bond prices are developed and
discussed. These prices are, in essence, driven by the way investors form forecasts
about the future evolution of the markets. Following on from Wenzelburger [147],
a perfect forecasting rule for future asset prices is derived which allows for ratio-
nal expectations for one of the investors as a special case of a generally non-linear
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stochastic dynamic system.
In Chapter 5, the compound Poisson process typically used to describe the evo-
lution of insurance losses related to catastrophic events is introduced. Two diﬀerent
ways of how CAT bonds cover loss are simulated and discussed. By applying the loss
process, the eﬀects of CAT bonds on the ﬁnancial market are simulated in terms of
investors' behaviour and market risk. Finally, a number of conclusions are given in
Chapter 6.
In summary, this thesis provides a new and alternative approach for the descrip-
tion of CAT bonds, using an agent-based CAPM to analyse investors' behaviour
when CAT bonds are introduced as innovations in a ﬁnancial-market setting that
comprises key features of an insurance market.
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Chapter 2
CAT bonds in the CAPM
2.1 Introduction
In recent decades, ﬁnancial markets have seen a signiﬁcant increase in the types
of ﬁnancial innovations available. Allen and Gale [4], Tufano [141], and Piazza
[119] have discussed the advantages of innovations to ﬁrms and governments. There
is also increasing academic research on modeling ﬁnancial innovations. Allen and
Gale [4], Rahi [121], and Demange [57] have studied the design of innovations from
the issuer side. (For more information on research of ﬁnancial innovations please
read the survey article of Duﬃe and Rahi [63]). Allen and Gale [4] and Rahi [121]
study securitization in terms of maximising the issuer's proﬁt. Demange [57] takes
private information into account. Some researchers have studied the eﬀect of ﬁnancial
innovations on markets. Biais et al. [19] show that loss-making issuers bring more
risk to investors and hence increase instability in ﬁnancial markets. Wenzelburger
[151] shows that the introduction of put options decreases market risk. Simsek
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[136] deﬁnes speculative variance as a portfolio's risk. When traders disagree on
beliefs, ﬁnancial innovations increase the speculative variance. In addition to risk
changing, the literature also studies how new assets aﬀect market equilibrium and
investors' welfare. Diamond [59]claims that adding new assets to a one-commodity
model cannot lead to a new equilibrium if everyone is worse oﬀ than in the previous
equilibrium. Hart [76] uses an example to show that adding a new asset will make
all agents worse oﬀ in an equilibrium. However, Elul [67] uses a general equilibrium
model with incomplete markets to show that it is possible to introduce a new asset
to make every agent better-oﬀ under certain constraints. Cass and Citanna [38] have
similar results.
This chapter will provide an alternative and novel way to design CAT bonds and
explore how CAT bonds aﬀect market equilibria and investors' welfare. CAT bonds
can typically not be replicated with traded ﬁnancial assets in the market [48]. In
the literature, Mayers [109], Breeden [28], and Grossman and Shiller [73] show that
equilibria exists in incomplete markets with agents having non-traded endowments.
Oh [116] shows that in incomplete markets with non-traded endowments, the re-
lationship between the risk of the asset and the expected returns are positive, so
investors have higher expectations on returns if the asset is riskier. Unlike Oh [116],
Wenzelburger and Koch-Medina [88] establish the existence of CAPM equilibria with
non-traded assets in a more general setting. The chapter will also follow Wenzel-
burger and Koch-Medina [88] in applying the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
to study how an issuer, namely a (re-)insurance company, can design CAT bonds,
how insurance risk is transferred to the ﬁnancial market, and when investors include
CAT bonds into their portfolio. Section 2.2 introduces the formulation of the CAPM
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and core theorems developed by Böhm and Chiarella [24], and Wenzelburger [150].
Section 2.3 explores the trading conditions of innovations in the model and derives
a CAPM equilibrium with innovations and determines the equilibrium price of inno-
vations. Based on the framework developed in Section 2.3, CAT bond contracts are
designed in Section 2.4, by considering the issuer (seller) and the investors (buyers)
following the idea of Aase [1]. Unlike innovations in Allen and Gale [4] are designed
to increase proﬁt for issuers, CAT bonds are designed to transfer issuers' potential
insurance risk from catastrophic events to the ﬁnancial markets. The promised pay-
oﬀ and premiun are decided in Subsection 2.4.1. Subsection 2.4.2 then studies the
issuance conditions for CAT bonds. The risk load that is constrained by conditions
in the ﬁnancial markets is discussed in Subsection 2.4.3. The last Subsection 2.4.4
illustrates a special case with linear mean-variance preference.
2.2 Prerequisites
Markowitz's portfolio selection model [108] demonstrates how mean-variance op-
timisers select optimal portfolios. The model ﬁrstly determines a set of eﬃcient
portfolios which provide the maximum expected return with a given risk or the min-
imum risk by giving an expected return. This set is called the `eﬃcient frontier of
risky assets'. Portfolios that lie on the eﬃcient frontier are called eﬃcient portfolios.
They provide the best risk-return combinations. Markowitz [108] deﬁnes a line in a
mean-variance panel, that starts from the risk free rate (0, rf ) and is tangent with
the eﬃcient frontier is the capital allocation line (CAL) (see Figure 2.2.1), Portfolios
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Figure 2.2.1: Capital allocation line (CAL)
Source: Bodie el at. [22]
along this CAL provides the highest reward-to-volatility ratio as this CAL has the
highest slop among capital allocation lines.The optimal portfolio is determined by
the tangent point at which the CAL is tangent to the eﬃcient frontier. Diﬀerent
individuals with diﬀerent risk aversions will choose their own mixture between the
optimal portfolio of risky assets and risk-free assets. Therefore the separation prin-
ciple is developed; that is the portfolio choice problem can be separated into two
independent steps. The ﬁrst step is to determine the optimal mix of risky assets,
i.e., the optimal portfolio of risky assets, which is independent of individual prefer-
ences. The second step is to determine the optimal amount of funds invested into
the risk-free asset, which depends on individual preferences.
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe [131], Lintner [99]
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and Mossion [112] and based on the Markowitz portfolio theory assumes that indi-
viduals are alike as much as possible, including the fact that they all agree on the
same estimation of mean and co-variances of asset returns. The optimal portfolio
will turn out to be the market portfolio  a summation of all assets based on an
equilibrium argument. Individuals with diﬀerent risk aversion will choose diﬀerent
mixtures of market portfolio and risk-free assets for their portfolios. In the CAPM,
the beta of an asset is deﬁned as the ratio of the covariance between the risky asset
and the market portfolio to the variance of the market portfolio. The beta coeﬃcient
thus measures the volatility, or systematic risk, of a risky asset in comparison to the
market as a whole. The security market line (SML) in the panel of betas and asset
returns show a linear relation between beta coeﬃcients and asset returns. Therefore,
the expected excess rate of return of a risky asset is proportional to the market risk
premium and the price of this risky asset can be calculated. This is how the CAPM
value risky assets.
Böhm and Chrila [24] and Böhm and Wenzelburger [26] explain the CAPM from
another point of view and unveil a number of its hidden features. They endow
each investor with a utility function and discuss the demand behaviour of investors.
Following this model framework, Chrilla et al [43, 44] study investors' behaviour with
heterogeneous beliefs.
The next section will adopt the CAPM framework introduced in Böhm and
Chiarella [24] and Wenzelburger [150] and some well-known results on the CAPM.
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2.2.1 Model setting
Consider a two-period model in which an investor need to transfer initial wealth
into the future. Investment opportunities consist of K risky assets and one risk-free
bond. All prices and payoﬀs are denominated in a non-storable consumption good
that serves as the numeraire. The K risky assets are characterised by stochastic
payoﬀs q = (q1, . . . , qK), where qk ≥ 0 denotes the payoﬀ per unit of the k-th asset.
The risk free bond pays a constant return Rf = 1 + rf > 0 per unit. A portfolio is
given by a vector (x, y) ∈ RK × R. The vector x = (x1, . . . , xK) ∈ RK represents
the portfolio of risky assets, where xk (k = 1, . . . , K) denotes the number of shares
of the k-th risky asset and the scalar y describes the number of risk-free bonds. The
total stock of risky assets is xm ∈ RK+ and is referred to as the market portfolio of
the economy.
The initial wealth of a typical investor consists of w0 > 0 units of the consumption
good and it is assumed that consumption takes place in the second period only.
Assume for simplicity that there are no short-sale constraints. If p = (p1, . . . , pK) ∈
RK denotes the price vector of the risky assets, the investor's budget constraint is
w0 = y + 〈p, x〉,
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the scalar product on RK . Second-period wealth is w1 = Rfy +
〈q, x〉. Substituting for y, the investor's second period wealth associated with the
portfolio of risky assets x ∈ RK takes the form
w1 = Rfw0 + 〈q −Rfp, x〉.
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Deﬁne the vector of expected payoﬀs and the covariance matrix of the payoﬀs by
q¯ = E[q] and Σ = (Σlk) ∈MK , respectively, where Σlk := Cov[ql, qk] is the covariance
between the l-th and the k-th asset. Σ is a symmetric K×K matrix. To ensure that
none of the assets are redundant, we assume in addition that Σ is positive deﬁnite,
meaning that all eigenvalues are strictly positive.
Let pi := E[q] − Rfp be the vector of expected excess returns. The expected
second-period wealth associated with a portfolio of risky assets x ∈ RK and its
standard deviation are given by
E[w1] = µw(w0, pi, x) := Rfw0 + 〈pi, x〉
and
V ar[w1] = σw(x) :=
√
〈x,Σx〉
respectively. The investment behaviour of a typical investor is described by risk
preferences that depend on expected future wealth and its standard deviation only.
Assumption 1. An investor is characterised by a utility function U : R × R+ → R,
which is a function of the mean µ and the standard deviation of future wealth σ, and
a probability distribution for future payoﬀs. The utility function U is continuously
diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing in µ, strictly decreasing in σ, and strictly quasi-
concave. The probability distribution is characterised by a vector of expected payoﬀs
q¯ ∈ RK+ and a positive deﬁnite covariance matrix Σ.
Relative to the CAPM literature, the importance of Assumption 1 lies in the fact
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that the probability distribution for future payoﬀs may be arbitrary, so long as its
ﬁrst two moments are ﬁnite. With Assumption 1, the portfolio selection problem of
an investor takes the form
max
x∈RK
U(µw(w0, pi, x), σw(x)). (2.2.1)
The solution to (2.2.1) is an optimal portfolio of risky assets x∗. To establish the
existence and uniqueness of x∗, the concept of a limiting slope is needed. In the
µ− σ plane, the slope of any indiﬀerence curve of U is given by the marginal rate of
substitution between risk and return
MRS(µ, σ) = −
∂U
∂σ
(µ, σ)
∂U
∂µ
(µ, σ)
,
which measures the risk aversion of the investor characterised by U . The limiting
slope of the indiﬀerence curve starting in (Rfw0, 0) is deﬁned as
ρU = sup
{
MRS(µ, σ) : (µ, σ) ∈ R× R+ s.t. U(µ, σ) = U(Rfw0, 0)
}
.
Intuitively, the limiting slope is the steepest slope of an indiﬀerence curve.
2.2.2 Two-fund separation theorem
The two-fund separation theorem dates back to Tobin [140] and Lintner [99]. It states
that the solution to the optimisation problem (2.2.1) will be a mean-variance eﬃcient
portfolio. Recall to this end the classical mean-variance optimisation problem of
maximising expected future wealth, given a prescribed level of risk σ. Formally, it is
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given by
max
x∈RK
µw(w0, pi, x) s.t. σw(x) ≤ σ. (2.2.2)
Following Markowitz [108], Böhm and Chiarella [24] formulate a unique portfolio
that solves (2.2.2)
xeff(σ, pi,Σ) =
σ√〈pi,Σ−1pi〉Σ−1pi. (2.2.3)
The portfolio (2.2.3) has the highest expected second-period wealth, given the upper
bound σ for the standard deviation of second-period wealth. This is the reason why
the portfolio xeff(σ, pi,Σ) is referred to as (mean-variance) eﬃcient. The eﬃcient
frontier in terms of wealth describes the loci of all eﬃcient risk-return combinations.
It is formally deﬁned by a straight line
σ 7→ µw(w0, pi, xeff(σ, pi,Σ)) = Rfw0 + ρσ, (2.2.4)
where the slope ρ =
√〈pi,Σ−1pi〉 is referred to as the price of risk. The eﬃcient
frontier is used to formulate the two-fund separation theorem as follows.
Theorem 1. Under the hypotheses of Assumption 1, let w0 and 0 6= pi ∈ RK with√〈pi,Σ−1pi〉 < ρU be arbitrary. Then there exists a unique solution x∗ ∈ RK to the
problem (2.2.1). The solution is the eﬃcient portfolio
x∗ = xeff(σ∗, pi,Σ), (2.2.5)
σ∗ = arg max
σ≥0
U(Rfw0 +
√
〈pi,Σ−1pi〉σ, σ)
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that determines the optimal level of risk the investor is willing to assume and
µ∗ = Rfw0 +
√
〈pi,Σ−1pi〉σ∗
her expected level of future wealth.
Note that the optimal level of risk σ∗ is equal to the standard deviation of the
optimal portfolio (2.2.5), i.e., σ∗ = σw(x∗) and that the optimal risk-return char-
acteristics (σ∗, µ∗) of the investor lies on the eﬃcient frontier µ = Rfw0 + ρσ. The
situation of Theorem 1 is illustrated in Figure 2.2.2.
It will turn out to be useful subsequently to deﬁne the investor's willingness to
assume risk by
V ar(w0, ρ) := arg max
σ≥0
U(Rfw0 + ρ σ, σ), ρ ∈ [0, ρU), (2.2.6)
so that optimal risk is σ∗ = V ar(w0, ρ) with the price of risk being ρ =
√〈pi,Σ−1pi〉
as before.
2.2.3 CAPM equilibrium
Consider now an asset market with i = 1, . . . , I investors whose preferences over
risk and return are all characterised by Assumption 1. Suppose that investors know
the true probability distribution of the future payoﬀs, which are characterised by
vector of mean payoﬀ q¯ and the covariance matrix Σ. Let w
(i)
0 be the initial wealth
of investor i and V ar(i) denote her willingness to assume risk, as deﬁned in (2.2.6),
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Figure 2.2.2: Oﬀer curves.
derived from a utility function U (i) which obeys Assumption 1. A CAPM equilibrium
may now be deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. A CAPM equilibrium consists of a price vector p∗ ∈ RK and a portfolio
allocation x
(1)
∗ , . . . , x
(I)
∗ ∈ RK of risky assets such that the following holds:
(i) Each x
(i)
∗ , i = 1, . . . , I is individually optimal, i.e.it solves the utility maximisa-
tion problem
max
x∈RK
U (i)(µw(w
(i)
0 , pi∗, x), σw(x)),
where pi∗ = q¯ −Rfp∗ is the expected equilibrium excess return;
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(ii) The allocation is feasible, i.e. it satisﬁes the market clearing condition for risky
assets
I∑
i=1
x(i)∗ = xm.
Following Wenzelburger [150] we may now deﬁne aggregate willingness to assume
the risk of all investors by the sum
φ(ρ) =
I∑
t=1
ϕi(w
(i)
0 , ρ), ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯), (2.2.7)
where ρ¯ = min {ρU i : i = 1, . . . , I} is the minimum of all limiting slopes ρ(i)U , with
ρ
(i)
U denoting the limiting slope of U
(i). Then
σmax = sup{φ(ρ) : ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯)}
is the upper bound of risk that investors are collectively willing to accept. The
upper bound σmax may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. Setting σm =
√〈xm,Σxm〉, this yields
the following existence result, which is developed by Wenzelburger [150].
Theorem 2. [Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibria] Assume that aggregate willing-
ness to assume risk φ : [0, ρ¯)→ R+ is continuous with respect to ρ. Given (q¯,Σ) and
endowments w10, . . . , w
I
0, the following holds:
(i) For every xm ∈ RK+ with 0 < σm < σmax there exists a CAPM equilibrium with
p∗ = 1Rf
(
E[q]− ρ∗
σm
Σxm
)
(2.2.8)
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and
xi∗ =
V ari(wi0,ρ∗)
σm
xm, i = 1, . . . , I,
where ρ∗ ∈ [0, ρ¯) is a solution to φ(ρ) = σm;
(ii) If φ is strictly monotonically increasing, then the equilibrium is uniquely deter-
mined.
Proof. See Appendix A.
While Theorem 2 will be the workhorse of this chapter, it is convenient to have
the following more amenable pricing formula for one particular risky asset k (k =
1, . . . , K).
Corollary 1. The equilibrium price of the k-th asset (k = 1, . . . , K) takes the form
pk∗ = 1Rf
(
E[qk]− ρ∗σmCov[qk, em]
)
, (2.2.9)
where em = 〈q, xm〉 is the market payoﬀ.
Proof. In coordinate form, formula (2.2.8) reads
pk∗ = 1Rf
(
E[qk]− ρ∗σm
K∑
l=1
Σklxlm
)
= 1
Rf
(
E[qk]− ρ∗σmCov[qk, em]
)
,
noting that Σkl = Cov[qk, ql] and em =
∑K
l=1 qlxlm.
Corollary 1 may be used to evaluate any payoﬀ e that can be replicated with
a portfolio of one risk-free and K risky assets so that e = 〈q, xe〉 + Rfye. The
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evaluation V(e) with respect to this ﬁnancial structure is simply deﬁned to be the
price of the replicating portfolio (xe, ye). Using the fact the price of the risk-free
bond was normalised to 1, Corollary 1 yields
V(e) = 〈p∗, xe〉+ ye
= 1
Rf
(
E[e]− ρ∗
σm
Cov[e, em]
)
.
It is well-known that the existence of CAPM equilibria requires that aggregate
bond holdings in equilibrium may be negative. This implies that some investors
may have to issue bonds. In our setting, the budget constraint for investor i is
wi0 = y
i
∗ + 〈p∗, xi∗〉 so that aggregate bond holdings becomes
I∑
i=1
yi∗ =
I∑
i=1
wi0 − 〈p∗, xm〉 =
I∑
i=1
wi0 − V(em). (2.2.10)
Thus, aggregate bond holdings amounts to the diﬀerence between aggregate initial
wealth and the market value of the market payoﬀ.
Example 1. Consider investors with linear mean-variance preferences. The utility
function of investor i is U i(µ, σ) = µ − 1
2ai
σ2, where ai > 0 describes her risk
tolerance. Her willingness to assume risk is ϕi(wi0, ρ) = a
iρ. Using (2.2.7), aggregate
willingness to assume risk becomes the linear function
φ(ρ) = (a1 + · · ·+ aI)ρ.
It follows from Theorem 2 that ρ∗ = σma1+···+aI so that the CAPM equilibrium takes
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the form
pk∗ = 1Rf
(
E[qk]− 1a1+···+aICov[qk, em]
)
, k = 1, . . . , K
with
xi∗ =
(
ai
a1+···+aI
)
xm, i = 1, . . . , I.
The valuation of the market payoﬀ becomes
V(em) = 1Rf
(
E[em]− 1a1+···+aI V ar[em]
)
and hence is independent of initial endowments wi0. Aggregate bond holdings (2.2.10)
are thus negative, whenever aggregate wealth is less than the market value of the
market payoﬀ.
2.3 Innovations in the CAPM
Before studying CAT bonds in the CAPM, a generalised model with innovations will
be discussed in this section. Subsection 2.3.1 gives the set up of the new market
when one type of innovations is introduced. In this thesis, an INNOVATION is
understood as a non-redundant asset. Then, in Subsection ??, the conditions that
the innovations can be issued into the market are discussed. This subsection gives
the setting of a market with innovations following Wenzelburger and Koch-Medina
[88].
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2.3.1 Model setting
This subsection introduces the model setting when a type of innovations is introduced
into a ﬁnancial market based on the CAPM formulation in Section 2.2. The setup
builds on Wenzelburger and Koch-Medina [88] but is simpliﬁed in assuming that
investors' endowments are fully tradable.
In this context, an innovation is introduced to an existing market in which one
risk-free and K risky assets are traded. If q0 denotes the stochastic payoﬀ of such
an innovation, the ﬁnancial structure of the market is the augmented payoﬀ vector
q+ = (q0, q1, . . . , qK). We assume that the innovation alters the payoﬀs of neither
the incumbent assets qk, k = 1, . . . , K, nor the risk-free return Rf . The vector of
expected payoﬀs then becomes q+ = (q¯0, q1, . . . , qK) and the new covariance structure
is represented by a symmetric (K + 1)× (K + 1) matrix
Σ+ =
 Σ b>
b V ar(q0)
 , (2.3.1)
where b = (b1, . . . , bK) is the vector of the covariance of stocks and innovation with
bk = Cov[q0, qk], k = 1, . . . , K,
represents the covariance of stock qk and the innovation q0.
Since by assumption, the payoﬀ of the innovation cannot be replicated with a
portfolio of theK incumbent assets, the new covariance matrix Σ+ is positive deﬁnite,
so that its inverse is well deﬁned. Hence, with the innovation added to the market,
the ﬁnancial structure changes to (q+,Σ+).
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The innovation is assumed to be in positive net-supply, x0 > 0, so that its total
payoﬀ becomes Q0 = x0 · q0. The new market portfolio is x+m = (x0, xm) ∈ RK+1, the
new market payoﬀ becomes e+m = em +Q0, and the market risk is σ
+
m =
√
V ar[e+m].
Under this environment, the conditions on if innovations can be issued into the
ﬁnancial market are discussed in the following subsection.
2.3.2 The trading condition
This subsection discusses the conditions that enable innovations to be traded in the
market, i.e. investors are willing to purchase the innovations. Investors will trade
innovations only if they are not worse oﬀ by including these innovations in their
portfolios. So the trading condition of innovations requires that at least one investor
is better oﬀ by including innovations into their portfolios. Before discussing if the
innovations are preferred by investors, a new concept - Pareto-superiority - is deﬁned
in the CAPM environment to describe the situation that one portfolio is preferred
by the other one in terms of risk-return allocations.
Deﬁnition 2. Pareto-superiority
An allocation of risk and return
{
(µ
(1)
1 , σ
(1)
1 ), · · · , (µ(I)1 , σ(I)1 )
}
is Pareto-superior
to an allocation of risk and return
{
(µ
(1)
2 , σ
(1)
2 ), · · · , (µ(I)2 , σ(I)2 )
}
if
U (i)(µ
(i)
1 , σ
(i)
1 ) ≥ U (i)(µ(i)2 , σ(i)2 ) for all i = 1, . . . , I
with at least one inequality being strict.
Deﬁnition 2 is the standard deﬁnition of Pareto-superiority in microeconomics.
If the risk allocation with innovations is Pareto-superior to the allocation without
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innovations, then at least one investor will purchase the innovations. It implies
innovations are preferred and hence will be traded in the ﬁnancial market. By
the model setting, investors are holding homogenous beliefs, so they have the same
expected mean and variance on innovation' payoﬀs. In this case, if one investor
is willing to purchase innovations to gain a higher utility, other investors must be
willing to purchase them too. This can be explained by the Two-fund separation
theorem 1, at equilibrium, all investors will hold a portion of the market portfolio,
which contains all risky assets in the market. Therefore a new eﬃcient frontier will
be formed. Mathematically, it can be expressed as,
µ+w = Rfw0 + ρ
+σ+,
with new slope (market price of risk) deﬁned as
ρ+ =
√
〈pi+, (Σ+)−1pi+〉.
Therein,pi+ = (pi, τ) := q+ − Rfp+ is the vector of excess returns of the market
augmented by the innovation, p+ = (p0, p
+
1 , . . . , p
+
K) is the price vector of risky assets
at equilibrium, and p0 denotes the price of innovations. Figures 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 show
that if the slope of the new eﬃcient frontier in the market with innovations is higher
than in the original market without innovations, investors will end with higher utility
as Proposition 1 states.
However, whether or not an investor will use the innovation to decrease the risk
of her future wealth will depend on her preferences. This observation is illustrated in
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Figure 2.3.1: Aggregate willingness to consume risk is increasing with market price of
risk
Figure 2.3.2: Aggregate willingness to consume risk is decreasing with market price of
risk
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Figure 2.3.1. An investor whose willingness to assume risk is increasing in the price
of risk, will use an innovation to invest into a riskier portfolio, thereby increasing
her exposure to risk. An investor whose willingness to assume risk is decreasing in
the price of risk will use the innovation to reduce the risk of her asset holdings. The
standard case with linear mean-variance preferences U(µ, σ) = µ − 1
2a
σ2, where a
denotes the risk tolerance, is illustrated in Figure 2.3.1. The willingness to assume
risk is proportional to the price of risk, ϕ(w0, ρ) = aρ, and therefore increasing in
the price of risk. The case with a decreasing risk exposure is illustrated in Figure
2.3.2 and obtained for U(µ, σ) = −e−aµ − σ. For more discussion see Wenzelburger
[150].
Proposition 1. If the price of risk of the market with the innovation, ρ+, is higher
than in the market without the innovation, ρ, the optimal portfolio with innovations
is preferred to the portfolio without innovations. Mathematically, it is
U(µ+∗ , σ
+
∗ ) > U(µ∗, σ∗),
where the inequality is strict whenever ρ+ > ρ. And vice versa.
Proof. If ρ+ ≥ ρ, the slope of the eﬃcient frontier for the market with the innovation
is steeper than that the slope of the eﬃcient frontier without the innovation. The
two-fund separation theorem now implies that the utility level U(µ+? , σ
+
? ) the investor
will attain when including the innovation into his portfolio will ceteris paribus be as
least as high as the level U(µ?, σ?) of the optimal portfolio without the innovation.
35
Proposition 1 also implies that if the market price of risk ρ+ in the market with
innovations is equal to the original ρ, that is ρ+ = ρ, then there is no diﬀerence for the
investor to hold innovations in his portfolio or not. So there is a lack of motivation
for this investor to trade innovations in the market. Therefore, if all investors are in
the same situation, then the demand of innovations will be equivalent to zero.
Based on CAPM assumptions, Deﬁnition 2 and Proposition 1, a relation between
the market price of risk and Pareto superiority can be generated in the following
Proposition.
Corollary 2. In the standard CAPM, if ρ+ > ρ, the risk-return allocation in the
new market with innovations is Pareto-superior to the risk-return allocation in the
original market and vise versa.
Proof. Based on the CAPM assumptions, all investors hold the same beliefs on the
future payoﬀs. By the two fund-separation theorem 1, at equilibrium, every investor
will hold a portion of market portfolio that contains all of risky assets in the market.
In other words, every investor will hold a mixture portfolio along the capital market
line (CML). If the slop of CML in the new market ρ+ is higher than the original one
ρ , then all investors have a higher utility therefore, according to the Deﬁnition 2,
the risk-return allocation in the new market with innovations is Pareto-superior to
the risk-return allocation in the original market.
If Proposition 2 is satisﬁed, the innovations are preferred by the investors and
hence traded in the market.
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The following Proposition shows the mathematical condition to ensure ρ+ > ρ.
Proposition 2. Let pi+ = (pi, τ) and Σ+ =
Σ b>
b V ar(q0)
 be given, where Σ+ is as-
sumed to be positive deﬁnite. Then the price of risk of the market with the innovation,
ρ+, is higher than in the market without the innovation, ρ. In particular,
(ρ+)2 = ρ2 +
(τ − 〈b,Σ−1pi〉)2
rc − 〈b,Σ−1b〉 ≥ ρ
2,
where the inequality is strict whenever τ 6= 〈b,Σ−1pi〉.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 or Corollary 2 shows the condition to identify if the innovations are
preferred by investors. If innovations are preferred by investors, innovations will be
traded in the ﬁnancial market.
2.3.3 CAPM Equilibrium
The above subsection has discussed situations when investors are willing to purchase
innovations. When the innovations are traded in the market, this subsection will
investigate the existence and of unique market equilibrium with innovations. In
addition, the equilibrium price of innovations is given and the original risky asset
prices changes is discussed.
By the Theorem 2, the existence and uniqueness of CAPM equilibria with inno-
vations is now straightforward.
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Proposition 3. Let all hypothesis of Theorem 2 be satisﬁed and assume, in addition,
that σm < σ
+
m < σmax and that aggregate willingness to assume risk φ(ρ) is strictly
increasing in ρ. Then there exists a uniquely determined CAPM equilibrium with
p+∗ =
1
Rf
(
q¯+ − ρ+∗
σ+m
Σ+x+m
)
and
x(i)+∗ =
V ar(i)(w
(i)
0 ,ρ
+∗ )
σ+m
x+m, i = 1, . . . , I,
where ρ+∗ ∈ [0, ρ¯) solves φ(ρ+∗ ) = σ+m.
The proof of Theorem 3 is immediate from Theorem 2. Following this, the propo-
sition below shows the relation of the risk of the portfolio and the market price of
risk.
Lemma 1. Assume that in the standard CAPM, investors' aggregate willingness to
assume risk φ(ρ) is strictly increasing in ρ, if the risk of the portfolio with innovations
σ+∗ , is larger than the risk of the portfolio without innovations, σ∗, the market price of
risk with innovations, ρ+, is higher than the market price of risk without innovations,
ρ, and vise versa.
Proof. Under the standard CAPM setting, the assumption that investors' aggregate
willingness to assume risk φ(ρ) is strictly increasing in ρ ensures that the increasing
of aggregate consumed risk σ = φ(ρ) leads to the increasing of ρ. So σ+∗ > σ∗ leads
to ρ+ > ρ.
38
By the Lemma 1 and Corollary 2, the following corollary can be generated on the
relation of portfolio risk changes and Pareto-superiority.
Lemma 2. Assume that in the standard CAPM, investors' aggregate willingness to
assume risk φ(ρ) is strictly increasing in ρ, if the risk of the portfolio with innova-
tions, σ+∗ , is larger than the risk of the portfolio without innovations, σ∗, then the
risk-return allocation in the new market with innovations is Pareto-superior to the
risk-return allocation in the original market without innovations.
Proof. This can be achieved directly by Corollary 2 and Lemma 1.
This Lemma will be used in the next subsection to generate innovations issuing
conditions.
Using the market payoﬀ of the market with the innovation, e+m = em+Q0, Proposi-
tion 3, yields the equilibrium price p0∗. This result is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 3. (i) The equilibrium price of the innovation is p0∗
p0∗ = 1Rf
(
E[q0]− ρ
+∗
σ+m
Cov[q0, e
+
m]
)
;
(ii) The equilibrium price of the k-th incumbent asset (k = 1, . . . , K) is
p+k =
1
Rf
(
E[qk]− ρ
+∗
σ+m
Cov[qk, e
+
m]
)
.
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Corollary 3 reveals that the CAPM equilibrium price of the innovation obeys the
usual principle. It is obtained by subtracting a risk premium from the discounted
expected payoﬀ, where the premium depends on the payoﬀ's correlation with the
market payoﬀ, e+m, and the market price of risk ρ
+
∗ .
Corollary 3 also shows that the introduction of an innovation has two eﬀects on
the CAPM equilibrium prices of the incumbent assets. The ﬁrst and most obvious
eﬀect is a price change which is due to a change in the correlation structure of the
ﬁnancial market from Cov[qk, em] to Cov[qk, e
+
m]. The second eﬀect is caused by the
risk-taking behaviour of the investors which changes the ratio ρ∗/σm to ρ+∗ /σ
+
m . The
interplay between these two eﬀects determines whether the price of an incumbent
security rises or falls after the introduction of the innovation.
Lemma 3. (i)The price change of the k-th risky asset (k = 1, . . . , K) is
p+k∗ − pk∗ = 1Rf
((
ρ∗
σm
− ρ+∗
σ+m
)
Cov[qk, em]− ρ
+∗
σ+m
Cov[qk, Q0])
)
,
where em = 〈q, xm〉 is the market payoﬀ of the incumbent assets;
(ii)Aggregate bond holdings of investors take the form
I∑
i=1
y(i)+∗ =
I∑
i=1
y(i)∗ + V(em)− V+(e+m).
Proof. Lemma (i) follows from Corollaries 1 and 3, noting that e+m = em+Q0. Lemma
(ii) follows from formula (2.2.10).
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The equilibrium allocation of risky assets changes because of the price change and
the fact that investors will allocate funds to the innovation. Lemma 3 (ii) shows that
the change in aggregate bond holdings amounts to the change in the valuation of the
market payoﬀ. That is, aggregate bond holdings are reduced whenever the value,
V+(e+m), of the new market payoﬀ, e+m, at new prices is higher than the value, V(em),
of the old market payoﬀ, em, at the old prices. In such a situation the innovations
are ﬁnanced by a reduction in bond holdings and risky asset holdings if the all risky
asset price changes in Lemma 3 (i) are not zero. If the price changes are zero, the
innovations are ﬁnanced by the reduction in bond holdings. The following example
explains the above discussions in a special case.
Example 2. For linear mean-variance preferences as in Example 1, one has
V+(e+m)− V(em) = 1Rf
(
E[Q0]− 1a1+···+aICov[Q0, e+m]
)
= p0x0m.
The investment into the innovation is thus completely ﬁnanced by a reduction of the
investment in risk-free bonds.
The total amount of funds, p0x0m, invested in the innovation is determined by the
price of the innovation given in formula (i) of Corollary 3. The resulting valuation
formula follows from the linearity of the pricing formula and is stated in the following
corollary.
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Corollary 4. The total amount of funds p0x0m invested into the innovation is
V+(Q0) = 1Rf
(
E[Q0]− ρ
+∗
σ+m
Cov[Q0, e
+
m]
)
.
Observe from Corollary 4 that positive equilibrium prices with innovations obtain,
whenever the covariance of the innovation with the market, Cov[Q0, e
+
m], is either
negative or, if positive, suﬃciently small. This Corollary will be used in the next
subsection to derive positive asset prices.
2.3.4 Innovation issuance
After the discussion of the trading conditions of new assets in the CAPM and the
situation of the CAPM equilibrium with innovations, this subsection discusses the
conditions under which the innovations can be issued into the ﬁnancial market. The
Subsection 2.3.2 has discussed the condition that make innovations tradable in the
ﬁnancial market. However, that condition can not guarantee innovations can be
traded successfully in the market in the CAPM. It is well known that the properties
of CAPM equilibrium allow for arbitrage opportunities. It implies the situation that
risky asset (including innovations) prices are not positive may exist.
The following example shows that arbitrage opportunities exist in the CAPM
following the method of Philip and Jonathan [66].
Example 3. [Arbitrage opportunity] This example takes the valuation formula of
innovations in Corollary 4 as an example to derive arbitrage opportunities. The
valuation formula can be rearranged as
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V(Q0) = 1Rf
[
E[(Q0)]− ρ
+∗
σ+m
Cov[Q0], e
+
m
]
= 1
Rf
(
E[Q0]− ρ
+∗
σ+m
(
E[Q0 · e+m]− E[Q0]E[e+m]
))
= 1
Rf
(
E[Q0]− ρ
+∗
σ+m
(
E[Q0 · e+m]− E[Q0]E[e+m]
))
= 1
Rf
E
(
Q0 − ρ
+∗
σ+m
(
Q0 · e+m −Q0 · E[e+m]
))
= E
[
Q0
(
1− ρ+∗
σ+m
(
em − E[e+m]
))]
/Rf , (2.3.2)
which is the same form as formula (5)1 in Philip and Jonathan [66]. According to
Philip and Jonathan [66], an arbitrage opportunity can be found based on formula
(2.3.2). For example, if e+m > E[e
+
m] +
σ+m
ρ+∗
or prob(e+m > E[e
+
m] +
σ+m
ρ+∗
) > 0 and let the
payoﬀ Q0 =
[
ρ+∗
σ+m
(e+m − E[e+m])− 1
]−1
> 0, then the valuation of Q0 that is V(Q0)
or in other words p0x0m will be −1 < 0 , which creates an arbitrage opportunity.
Following Theorem 1 in Philip and Jonathan [66], if the market portfolio generates
suﬃciently large returns in some states, that is, prob(e+m > E[e
+
m] +
σ+m
ρ+∗
) > 0, there
exists an arbitrage opportunity.
This example shows that arbitrage opportunities exist. It also shows the price of
innovations can be negative. In this case, this innovation cannot rise positive money.
It also has no meaning economically. Therefore, to ensure innovations have positive
prices is essential. According this example, any risky asset price can be negative. So
another condition that ensures innovations can be issued and traded in the market
successfully is to set all risky assets prices are non-negative.
1See Philip and Jonathan [66] p. 237.
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Using Corollary 3, however, it is not diﬃcult to see that asset prices are positive
whenever the equilibrium price of risk ρ+∗ satisﬁes
E[e] > ρ
+∗
σ+m
Cov[e, e+m] (2.3.3)
for all payoﬀs e = q0, q1, . . . , qK . Condition (2.3.3) places an upper bound on the
equilibrium price of risk. Following Levy [97], deﬁne the essential risk of of a payoﬀ
e by
Cov[e,e+m ]
E[e]
and the maximum price of risk by
ρmax :=
σ+m
max
{
Cov[q1,e
+
m ]
E[q1]
, . . . , Cov[qK ,e
+
m ]
E[qK ]
, Cov[q0,e
+
m ]
E[q0]
} . (2.3.4)
It then follows from (2.3.3) that all asset prices are positive, whenever ρ+∗ < ρmax.
The upper bound ρmax is determined by the asset with the highest essential risk.2
These ﬁndings yield the following condition for the positivity of equilibrium asset
prices, see also Wenzelburger and Koch-Medina [88].
Lemma 4. Suppose that aggregate willingness to assume risk φ is increasing in ρ.
Then equilibrium asset prices of the CAPM with the innovation are positive, if and
only if
φ(ρmax) > σ
+
m ,
2 A reasonable approximation for the upper bound is the asset with the highest coeﬃcient of variation
√
V ar[q]
E[q]
of those assets that correlate positively with the market.
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where ρmax :=
σ+m
max
{
Cov[q1,e
+
m ]
E[q1]
,...,
Cov[qK ,e
+
m ]
E[qK ]
,
Cov[q0,e
+
m ]
E[q0]
} .
Proof. The price of the k-th asset is
p+k∗ =
1
Rf
(
E[qk]− ρ
+∗
σ+m
Cov[qk, e
+
m]
)
Hence p+k∗ > 0 if and only if
E[qk] >
ρ+∗
σ+m
Cov[qk, e
+
m] = ρ
+
∗ Cor[qk, e
+
m]
√
V ar[qk]. (2.3.5)
Equation (2.3.5) holds automatically if Cor[qk, e
+
m] ≤ 0. If Cor[qk, e+m] > 0, (2.3.5) is
satisﬁed if E[qk]√
V ar[qk]Cor[qk,e
+
m ]
> ρ+∗ . An analogous argument applies for the innovation.
Since in equilibrium φ(ρ+∗ ) = σ
+
m , the assertion now follows from the monotonicity
of φ.
Lemma 4 states that asset prices remain positive, whenever investors are willing
to assume the new market risk σ+m for a suﬃciently low price of risk. Whether or
not an innovation can be introduced into the market without creating an obvious
arbitrage opportunity will thus depend on investors' preferences over risk and return.
Therefore according to the Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, the following theorem is
generated to deﬁne the conditions of innovations issuance.
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Theorem 3. [Issuance conditions]Under the hypotheses of Proposition 3, let
q+ = (q0, q) and Σ
+ =
Σ b>
b V ar(q0)

with
b =
(
Cov[q0, q1], · · · , Cov[q0, qK ]
)
be given. Assume, in addition, that the following holds:
(i) V ar[Q0] > −2Cov[em, Q0];
(ii) Aggregate willingness to assume risk φ(ρ) is increasing in ρ.
(iii) φ(ρmax) > σ
+
m with ρmax :=
σ+m
max
{
Cov[q1,e
+
m ]
E[q1]
,...,
Cov[qK ,e
+
m ]
E[qK ]
,
Cov[q0,e
+
m ]
E[q0]
} .
Proof. Condition (i) Market risk with innovations is
(σ+m )
2 = Cov[em +Q0, em +Q0] = σ
2
m + 2Cov[em, Q0] + V ar[Q0].
So if, and only if, V ar[Q0] > −2Cov[em, Q0], the market risk with innovations is
larger than the market risk without innovations.
Condition (i) ensures market risk in the market with the innovation is larger than
market risk in the market without the innovation, i.e., σ+m > σm. Condition (ii)
assumes aggregate willingness φ(ρ) is increasing in the price of risk, so based on con-
dition (i), the equilibrium price of risk ρ+∗ in the market with the innovation is higher
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than the equilibrium price of risk ρ∗ in the market without it.3 Based on Lemma
2, the CAPM equilibrium with the innovation, pertaining to (q+,Σ+) is Pareto su-
perior to the CAPM equilibrium without the innovation, pertaining to (q,Σ). All
investors are willing to trade and include the innovations in their portfolios. Condi-
tion (iii) ensures this model is economically meaningful by assuming all asset prices
are positive based on Lemma 4.
2.4 CAT bonds in the CAPM
This section is going to use the framework of the CAPM with innovations that is
developed from Section 2.3 to design CAT bonds. In this thesis, a CAT bond is an
insurance-linked asset designed in the spirit of Canabarro et al. [37].
As Figure 2.4.1 illustrates, this bond is issued by a new agent in period 0, also
referred to as a sponsor. This sponsor may be thought of as an insurance or re-
insurance company that wants to raise funds from the ﬁnancial markets in order
to cover the costs of certain insurance claims. These claims are triggered by well-
speciﬁed natural catastrophes which may occur within the time span of period 0
and period 1. The accumulated claims are determined by a random variable L and
capped at the maximum coverage Lmax. The CAT bond thus speciﬁes an insurance
contract between the sponsor and those ﬁnancial investors who buy the bond. In
order to administrate the bonds and isolate its ﬁnancial obligations from all other
3It is intuitively clear that φ(ρ) is increasing in ρ whenever suﬃciently many investors increase risk with ρ.
Indeed, it is well known that ϕi(wi0, ρ) is increasing in ρ, if the marginal rate of substitution between risk and return
MRSi(µ, σ) satisﬁes
∂MRSi
∂µ
(µ, σ)σ < 1 for all σ > 0,
e.g., see Hens et al. [77] or Wenzelburger [150].
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obligations of the company, the sponsor sets up a so-called Special Purpose Vehicle
(SPV) to carry the work to issue CAT bonds.
In order to introduce the general design of a CAT bond, the following assumption
is adopted.
Assumption 2. The accumulated insurance claims arising from catastrophic events
between period 0 and 1 are described by a random variable L with the following
properties:
(i)The probability density function of L has compact support, given by [0, Lmax];
(ii)The claim L does not lie in the marketed spaceM;
(iii)The covariance of L with the market payoﬀ em satisﬁes
Cov[L, em] < V ar[L].
The ﬁrst assumption is adopted for notational convenience. As upper bounds for
claims are a priori unknown, the upper limit Lmax is typically set by the designer
of the catastrophe bond. The second one implies that the insurance claims cannot
be replicated with ﬁnancial assets of the ﬁnancial market. It is plausible to assume
that the overall eﬀect of claims that derive from natural catastrophes on ﬁnancial
markets is negative. The third assumption is slightly more general in assuming that
the covariance of the insurance claims with the ﬁnancial market is not larger that
its variance.
Assume xcm (xcm > 0) CAT bonds are issued into the ﬁnancial market, with price
pc and payoﬀ qc. The total payoﬀ of CAT bonds is Qc = qcxcm in period 1. This
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Figure 2.4.1: Cash ﬂows of the SPV.
Sponsor SPV Investors
t=0 θ −→ θ + V+(Qc) ←− V+(Qc)
t=1 L←− (θ + V+(Qc))Rf −→ Qc
payoﬀ is determined as follows. If no speciﬁed catastrophic event occurs that triggers
insurance claims, the total promised payoﬀ C to ﬁnancial investors consists of the
principal V+(Qc) obtained from ﬁnancial investors with a coupon rc so that
C = V+(Qc)(1 + rc). (2.4.1)
If catastrophic events occur as speciﬁed, the funds of ﬁnancial investors will be used
to cover the loss of the sponsor up to the maximum coverage Lmax. Accumulated
claims L will be subtracted from the promise (2.4.1) so that the total payoﬀ to
ﬁnancial investors in period 1 becomes
Qc = C − L. (2.4.2)
A CAT bond is thus a defaultable bond with payoﬀ (2.4.2), where the default is
deﬁned by catastrophic events embodied in the random variable L.
Bondholders will not be asked to pledge additional capital in the second period
and hence will at most lose their principal. Since 0 ≤ L ≤ Lmax, this is guaranteed
whenever the promised repayment C is larger than the maximum loss Lmax, that is
C ≥ Lmax, which is assumed for the remainder of this chapter.
With the introduction of Qc, the market payoﬀ of the ﬁnancial market changes to
e+m = em +Qc
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so that market risk becomes σ+m =
√
V ar[e+m].
The covariance structure of the ﬁnancial market which is augmented by the catas-
trophe bond as the innovation is then represented by a symmetric (K+ 1)× (K+ 1)
matrix as
Σ+ =
 Σ b>
b V ar(qc)
 , (2.4.3)
where b = (b1, . . . , bK) with
bk = Cov[qk, qc], k = 1, . . . , K.
Since by Assumption 2 (ii) the insurance claim L cannot be replicated with ﬁnancial
assets, the new covariance matrix Σ+ is positive deﬁnite and hence invertible.
2.4.1 Promised payoﬀ and premium
This subsection discusses how the SPV decides the promised payoﬀ C of CAT
bonds to investors and the premium θ that the re-insurance company passes to the
SPV in order to have coverage at time 1.
As introduced above, the SPV issues CAT bonds to raise funds and cover losses for
sponsors up to Lmax at time 1. Applying Corollary 4, the amount of funds received
from the ﬁnancial market for Qc is computed as
V+(Qc) = 1Rf
(
E[Qc]− ρ
+∗
σ+m
Cov[Qc, e
+
m]
)
, (2.4.4)
where ρ+∗ is the equilibrium market price of risk, determined in the market for risk
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by equating demand and supply for risk, that is, by φ(ρ+∗ ) = σ
+
m. Inserting (2.4.2),
V+(Qc) is
V+(Qc) = 1Rf
(
C − E[L] + ρ+∗
σ+m
Cov[L, e+m]
)
= C
Rf
− V+(L), (2.4.5)
with
V+(L) = 1
Rf
(
E[L]− ρ+∗
σ+m
Cov[L, e+m]
)
. (2.4.6)
Eq. (2.4.5) shows that the funds of the SPV obtained from ﬁnancial investors will
be equal to the discounted promise C/Rf minus the market valuation (2.4.6) of
the aggregate loss L. It shows that how much funds the SPV can raise is mainly
determined by the promised payoﬀ C and investors' valuation of loss L. To avoid
any none meaningful situations, assume the market valuation of the loss V+(L) is
non-negative. It is obvious from (2.4.5) that the total amount of funds raised in the
ﬁnancial market is positive if, and only if, the promised payoﬀ is C > RfV+(Qc).
If the SPV wants to have Lmax at time 0 by issuing CAT bonds. That is
V+(Qc) ≥ Lmax
C
Rf
− V+(L) ≥ Lmax
C ≥ Rf (Lmax + V+(L)).
It shows the promised payoﬀ should be at least larger than the sum of Lmax and
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RfV+(L). The minimum promised payoﬀ is C = Rf (Lmax + V+(L)) if the SPV
wants to have fund of Lamx at time 1. After receiving the promised payoﬀ, the CAT
bond's price can be deﬁned as below.
Lemma 5. If under the hypotheses of Theorem 4, C = Rf
(
Lmax + V+(L)
)
, then the
price per unit of the CAT bond is
p0 =
Lmax
xcm
,
where xcm is the total amount of bonds issued.
Proof. Observe from (2.4.6) that V+(L) is independent of the promised repayment C.
This is so because market risk is σ+m =
√
V ar[em − L] and hence independent of C
so that the market price of risk ρ+∗ is independent of C. Moreover, the covariance of
the loss with the ﬁnancial market augmented by the catastrophe bond Cov[e+m, L] is
independent of P as well. Setting P = Rf
(
h + V+(L)), the catastrophe-bond price
per unit take the form
p0∗ =
V+(Qc)
xcm
= Lmax
xcm
.
As illustrated in Table 2.4.1, in period 0, the SPV receives the insurance premium
θ from the sponsor and funds V+(Qc) from the ﬁnancial market as given in (2.4.4).
The SPV then invests all of its funds into the risk-free asset. Its proceeds in period
1 are then Rf (V+(Qc) + θ). These funds must be used to repay ﬁnancial investors
and to cover all claims from the sponsor up to the amount of Lmax. The proﬁt made
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by the SPV computes as
ΠSPV = Rf (V+(Qc) + θ)− (Qc + L)
= Rf
(
C
Rf
− V+(L) + θ
)
− C
= Rf (θ − V+(L)). (2.4.7)
As seen from (2.4.7), this proﬁt is deterministic and determined by the diﬀerence
between the insurance premium θ and the market valuation of the hazard risk V+(L).
To ensure that the SPV has non-negative proﬁt, ΠSPV ≥ 0, the insurance premium
θ must be higher than the market valuation V+(L).
Observe from (2.4.6) that V+(L) is independent of the promised repayment C.
This is so because market risk is σ+m =
√
V ar[em − L] and hence independent of C
so that the market price of risk ρ+∗ is independent of C. Moreover, the covariance
of the loss with the ﬁnancial market augmented by the catastrophe bond Cov[e+m, L]
isalso independent of C . As a consequence, the premium θ and the proﬁt of the
SPV (2.4.7) are independent of the promised repayment C so that the SPV will be
able to cover the insurance claim L whenever θ ≥ V+(L). A sponsor who sets up the
SPV to ﬁnance its own hazard risk will set θ = V+(L) because higher premia would
not increase the overall proﬁt of the sponsor.4
2.4.2 CAT bond issuance
This subsection discusses how the insurance risk can be securitised in ﬁnancial
4The sponsor could use the SPV to ﬁnance hazard risks of other insurance companies. Charging θ > V+(L)
would then be proﬁtable. This case, however, is more complex and left for future research.
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products and then is transferred from a (re-)insurance company to the ﬁnancial
market based on the ideas of Aase [1].
For the insurance risk to be transferred, the ﬁrst requirement is that one (re-
)insurance company has the incentive to transfer it to the ﬁnancial market. To
address this condition, a standard assumption that is adopted in insurance economics
to describe the risk-preferences of a (re-)insurer is shown below.
Assumption 3. The sponsor's uncertain future wealth is given by the random variable
wS. Preferences of the sponsor are assumed to be given by a von-Neumann Mor-
genstern utility function US(wS), where US is assumed to be strictly increasing and
strictly concave.
Suppose the (re-)insurance company considers transferring its potential insurance
risk L (0 ≤ L ≤ Lmax) by an reinsurance method. This reinsurance contract needs a
premium θ to cover L. Instead of paying θ, the (re-)insurance company could invest
the same amount into ﬁnancial assets to increase its capital. For simplicity, assume
that the (re-)insurance company is only allowed to invest into risk-free assets. A
(re-)insurance company characterised by Assumption 3 will then insure L for the
insurance premium θ if it is better oﬀ doing so, i.e. if
E[US(wS − L)] < E[US(wS −Rfθ)]. (2.4.8)
In insurance economics, a participation constraint of the form (2.4.8) is standard
except that we allow for gains from a risk-free intertemporal investment.
Note that if the sponsor is risk-neutral and has utility function US(ws) = awS + b
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for some positive constants a and b. In this case the participation constraint (2.4.8)
amounts to
RfV+(L) < E[L]. (2.4.9)
Inserting (2.4.6), we see that (2.4.9) is equivalent to
ρ+∗
σ+m
Cov[L, e+m] > 0.
This violates Condition (ii) of Theorem 4.
So, if a (re-)insurance company's expectation of its utility with paying an insur-
ance contract is higher than its expected utility without re-insuring this risk, this
(re-)insurance company is willing to purchase the reinsurance contract. As this the-
sis is mainly studying the risk transfer mechanism of CAT bonds, this subsection
discusses the conditions on how to transfer an insurance risk by securitising this
risk as ﬁnancial products and make it tradable in the ﬁnancial market. After the
(re-)insurance company is willing to transfer this risk by passing premium θ, there
are still two conditions to be satisﬁed, as Subsection 2.3.4 shows. One is that these
insurance-linked securities are accepted by the ﬁnancial market, i.e. whether they
can be traded in the ﬁnancial market. The other condition is that the introduction
of this product will not create negative prices of other ﬁnancial assets in the market.
Overall, the following deﬁnitions conclude the conditions on how this insurance risk
can be securitised as ﬁnancial products and hence be transferred into the ﬁnancial
market
Deﬁnition 3. [Transferable insurance risk]
An insured risk, represented by a random variable L, can be securitised in an
insurance-linked securities and traded in the ﬁnancial market if the following condi-
tions hold:
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(i) The sponsor is risk-averse and better oﬀ transferring the hazard risk to the
ﬁnancial market by paying premium θ
E[US(wS − L)] < E
[
US
(
wS − θ
)]
.
(ii) The equilibrium allocation of risk and return
{
(σ1+∗ , µ
1+
∗ ), · · · , (σI+∗ , µI+∗ )
}
in the
market with catastrophe bond is Pareto superior to the equilibrium allocation of
risk and return in the market without catastrophe bond
{
(σ
(1)
∗ , µ
(1)
∗ ), · · · , (σ(I)∗ , µ(I)∗ )
}
,
that is,
U (i)(µ(i)+∗ , σ
(i)+
∗ ) ≥ U (i)(µ(i)∗ , σ(i)∗ ) for all i = 1, . . . , I,
where at least one inequality is strict;
(iii) All asset prices (including this insurance-linked security prices) in an equilibrium
with the insurance-linked securities are positive.
Deﬁnition 3 determines three essential conditions on ensuring the insurance risk
is transformed into the ﬁnancial market. The following content will explore how the
insurance risk can be transferred to the ﬁnancial market by means of CAT bonds.
The premium and promised payoﬀ that is achieved from Subsection 2.4.1 are applied.
That is the promised payoﬀ that the insurance company passed to the SPV and the
promised payoﬀ of CAT bonds to the investors are set as

θ = V+(L)
C = Rf (Lmax + V+(L)).
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So that for the condition (i) at Deﬁnition 3, if the (re-)insurance company's utility
satisﬁes
E[US(wS − E(L))] < E
[
US
(
wS −RfV+(L)
)]
.
It means this (re-)insurance company is willing to pass RfV+(L) to transfer its
potential risk E(L).
A prerequisite for the transferability of hazard risk is that the opportunity cost of
the insurance contract RfV+(L) is less than the maximum claim Lmax. Otherwise,
the insurer would be better oﬀ keeping this potential debt L on its balance sheet.
The next Lemma shows that this requirement is met, if the essential risk of the payoﬀ
Lmax − L in the sense of Levy [97], given by
Cov[Lmax−L,e+m]
E[Lmax−L]
is suﬃciently small in relation to market risk. Since Cov[L, e+m] was assumed to be
negative, the essential risk of Lmax − L is positive.
Lemma 6. Under the hypotheses of Proposition 3, the opportunity cost RfV+(L) is
less than the maximum claim Lmax, if and only if the essential risk of the loss L is
suﬃciently small in relation to market risk σ+m, that is:
φ
(
E[Lmax−L]σ+m
Cov[Lmax−L,e+m]
)
> σ+m.
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Proof. Inserting (2.4.6), RfV+(L) < Lmax if and only if
Lmax − E[L] > − ρ
+∗
σ+∗
Cov[L, e+m] =
ρ+∗
σ+∗
Cov[Lmax − L, e+m]
or, equivalently,
E[Lmax−L]σ+m
Cov[Lmax−L,e+m] > ρ
+
∗ .
Using the fact that φ is strictly increasing, the assertion follows.
It remains to establish conditions under which CAT bonds provide a Pareto im-
provement of the risk allocation of the economy as stipulated in Deﬁnition 3. Subsec-
tion 2.3.4 discussed the issuing conditions of innovations. That is in a CAPM setting
the market price of risk must increase so that ﬁnancial investors are willing to accept
the extra risk of adding the innovation to their portfolios. The SPV who manages
the bonds has to ensure that ﬁnancial investors are repaid and the insurance claim
is covered up to the maximum loss under all possible circumstances. The following
theorem now provides conditions under which this is the case so that the insurance
claim L is transferable to the ﬁnancial market by means of issuing CAT bonds.
Theorem 4. The insurance claim L satisfying Assumption 2 is transferable to the
ﬁnancial market in the sense of Deﬁnition 3, if the following conditions hold:
(i) The participation constraint of the sponsor
E[US(wS − L)] < E
[
US
(
wS −RfV+(L)
)]
;
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(ii) The correlation of L with the market payoﬀ of the ﬁnancial assets em satisﬁes
V ar[L] > 2Cov[L, em];
(iii) Aggregate willingness to assume risk φ(ρ) is increasing in ρ and satisﬁes
φ (ρmax) > σ
+
m,
where
ρmax :=
σ+m
max
{
Cor[q0,e
+
m]
E[q0]
, . . . , Cor[qK ,e
+
m]
E[qK ]
} ;
(iv) The essential risk of the loss L is suﬃciently small in relation to market risk
σ+m, that is,
φ
(
E[Lmax−L]σ+m
Cov[Lmax−L,e+m]
)
> σ+m.
Proof. Condition (i) can be achieved directly from the Deﬁnition 3 and the premium
setting achieved in the Subsection 2.4.1, that is θ = RfV+(L).
Condition (ii) follows the result from the Section 2.3, the market risk of a ﬁnancial
market in which catastrophe bonds are traded is the variance of e+m so that
σ+m =
√
V ar[e+m] =
√
σ2m − 2Cov[em, L] + V ar[L]. (2.4.10)
Hence market risk will increase, that is σ+m > σm if and only if Condition (ii)
holds. By the assumption of Condition (iii) that the aggregate willingness to assume
risk φ(ρ) is increasing in ρ and according to Lemma 2, the risk allocation in the new
market with CAT bonds is Pareto superior to the market without CAT bonds. It
implies that investors are willing to hold CAT bonds into their portfolios and hence
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CAT bonds can be traded in the market.
Conditions (iii) and (iv) are achieved from Lemma 4 and Lemma 6 respectively.
The three conditions of the theorem may be interpreted as follows. The ﬁrst one
ensures that one re-insurance company has the intention to transfer its risk by giving
premium. Condition (ii) ensures that market risk is increasing, and with Condition
(iii) together ensures that the market portfolio with CAT bonds is Pareto-superior
to the market portfolio without CAT bonds. So that CAT bonds are traded in the
market. Condition (iii) guarantees that all risky assets have positive prices.
2.4.3 Risk load
For the remainder of the paper, assume that all conditions of Theorem 4 are satisﬁed
so that catastrophe risk L is transferable in the sense of Deﬁnition 3. This subsection
applies the setting C = Rf
(
Lmax+V+(L)
)
to discuss the constraint condition of risk
load from the ﬁnancial market, which gives a complement condition to the literature
in actuarial science.
Consider a zero-proﬁt SPV that sets out to raise enough funds from the ﬁnancial
market to cover all possible losses between date 0 and the maturity date 1 up to
the upper bound Lmax. With the promise C set to Rf
(
Lmax + V+(L)
)
, the payoﬀ
to ﬁnancial investors will always be positive, as they will at most lose the amount
Lmax. Indeed, since
Qc = Rf (Lmax + V+(L))− L ≥ rfLmax +RfV+(L) > 0,
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they will at least receive the interest on their principal and their risk evaluation with
interest. The coupon rate rc is
rc =
Rf (Lmax+V+(L))
Lmax
− 1 = rf + RfV
+(L)
Lmax
, (2.4.11)
in which the ratio
RfV+(L)
Lmax
may be interpreted as an intertemporal insurance-premium
rate for holding CAT bonds instead of safe bonds. Since the insurance premium
paid by the sponsor is set to the ﬁnancial market valuation of the catastrophe risk,
θ = V+(L), it follows from (2.4.6) that this insurance-premium rate takes the form5
RfV+(L)
Lmax
= E[L]
Lmax
− ρ+∗
σ+m
Cov[L,e+m ]
Lmax
. (2.4.12)
In insurance economics, an insurance-premium rate is, in general, deﬁned by the
ratio τ = ϑ
Lmax
, where ϑ denotes the insurance premium and Lmax the cover. The
premium rate is typically assumed to be of the form
τ = E[L]/Lmax + Λ, (2.4.13)
where Λ is interpreted as a load for the risk margin and expenses of the insurance
industry. Galeotti et al. [70] consider a variety of premium calculation formulas
which calculate the risk load Λ using principles from insurance economics. Our
analysis now shows that the risk load Λ is determined by the willingness of ﬁnancial
investors to assume the risk imposed by the claim L. A comparison of (2.4.12) with
(2.4.13) shows that CAPM investors will only assume the additional catastrophe
5 Observe that our insurance-premium rate accounts for the fact that the insurance premium is invested into
risk-free bonds.
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risk, if the risk load satisﬁes
Λ ≥ ρ+∗
σ+m
(
V ar[L]− Cov[L, em]
)
1
Lmax
. (2.4.14)
Otherwise, the proﬁt of the SPV would be negative. Hence, any premium calculation
formula must respect the ﬁnancial market evaluation of the catastrophe risk, which
is embodied by the price of risk ρ+∗ appearing in (2.4.14). This subsection closes with
a remark on an alternative CAT bond design.
Remark 1. Assume that V+(L) is less than the maximum loss Lmax. An alternative
choice for a zero-proﬁt SPV then is to set C = RfLmax, because funds from the
ﬁnancial market are positive, V+(Qc) = Lmax−V+(L) > 0. By Lemma 6, this choice
is possible if the essential risk of Lmax − L is suﬃciently low. The coupon rate is
c = PV+(Qc) − 1 = rf +
RfV+(L)
Lmax−V+(L) .
This coupon rate is higher than (2.4.11) and the minimum total payoﬀ to investors
is rfLmax in the event of a maximum loss L = Lmax. However, total funds received
in period 0 are less than Lmax so that the SPV could cover the maximum loss at
maturity only.
2.4.4 A special example
Consider now investors with linear mean-variance preferences and a risk-neutral
sponsor. Assume, furthermore, that the insurance loss is uncorrelated with the ﬁnan-
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cial market, i.e., Cov[em, L] = 0. The introduction of catastrophe bonds increases
market risk by the hazard risk V ar[L], so that
σ+m =
√
σ2m + V ar[L].
The utility function of investor i is U (i)(µ, σ) = µ − 1
2ai
σ2, where a(i) > 0 is i's risk
tolerance. Since
∑I
i=1 a
(i)ρ+∗ = σ
+
m, the ﬁnancial market valuation of the insurance
claim L is
V+(L) = 1
Rf
(
E[L] + 1
a
V ar[L]
)
, (2.4.15)
where
∑I
i=1 a
(i) = a is aggregate risk tolerance. Formula (2.4.15) shows thatRfV+(L) <
Lmax if, and only if,
V ar[L]
Lmax−E[L] < a.
Hence, a sponsor whose insurance premium is θ = V+(L) has an incentive to transfer
her insurance risk to the ﬁnancial market only, if aggregate risk tolerance of the
ﬁnancial investors is suﬃciently large. The equilibrium price of a CAT bond is
p0 =
Lmax
xcm
.
Since ρ∗
σm
= 1
a
= ρ
+∗
σ+m
and Cov[L, em] = 0, the introduction of the CAT bond has
no eﬀect on asset prices and asset holdings of the incumbent assets, because investor
i's asset holdings are
x(i)+∗ =
a(i)
a
x+m =
 x(i)∗
a(i)
a
xcm
 .
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The orthogonality of em and Qc implies that
V+(e+m) = V(em) + V(Qc) = V(em) + Lmax.
Analogously to (2.2.10), aggregate bond holdings of ﬁnancial investors become
I∑
i=1
y(i)+∗ =
I∑
i=1
w
(i)
0 − V+(e+m) =
I∑
i=1
y(i)∗ − Lmax.
Hence, aggregate bond holdings of ﬁnancial investors are reduced by exactly the
amount Lmax needed to cover the maximal loss of the sponsor. Financial investors
will thus cover the insurance risk by reducing their investment into the risk-free bond
while keeping their original positions of risky assets.
Summarising these ﬁndings, hazard risk in this example will be ﬁnanced by re-
ducing investment into the risk-free bond. In particular, ﬁnancial investors will issue
risk-free bonds whenever their initial wealth is not large enough to bear the costs of
natural hazards.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a novel way of modelling ﬁnancial innovations as new
assets and developed a new model that allows for an analysis of CAT bonds by in-
cluding the insurance industry into the ﬁnancial market. The eﬀect of the innovation
on the ﬁnancial market was analysed and discussed. Under a certain condition, the
market price will increase after the introduction of the new asset and hence investors
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will include the new asset into their portfolios. Under this situation, their utilities
increase. Considering the utility of issuers and the conditions in the ﬁnancial mar-
ket, premium and coupon rates are determined. A new concept, called transferable
insurance risk, was developed and the conditions that allow for a transfer of catas-
trophic risk from the insurance industry to ﬁnancial markets by issuing CAT bonds
were discussed.
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Chapter 3
An Agent-based CAPM
3.1 Introduction
The traditional CAPM developed by Sharpe [131], Lintner [99], Mossion [112], and
Merton [110] assumes all investors are rational mean-variance optimisers, meaning
that all investors analyse securities in the same way and share the same economic
view of the world. In other words, investors' estimations of the probability distribu-
tion of future cash ﬂows from investing in the available securities are identical. That
is, everyone holds homogeneous beliefs regarding the means and variances of each
asset. However, many researchers argue that this assumption contradicts the fact
that individuals have diﬀerent capacities, such as the ability to access and process
information. Some individuals are able to access information and, hence, make a
fairly correct prediction about future prices, while others may have limited capa-
bility and hence have `wrong' estimations of future payoﬀs. Kurz [90] has deﬁned
the term 'rational beliefs', which is compatible with data and satisfying a certain
technical condition. The traditional view such as Muth [114] states that people
who are rational, or have rational behaviour, have rational expectations. The no-
tion of 'rational beliefs' distinguishes between 'rational expectations' and 'rational
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behaviour', implying that agents who are following their rational behaviour (for ex-
ample, maximising their utility) can have diﬀerent predictions (beliefs) for future
payoﬀs of traded assets.
Vissing-Jorgensen [144], provides evidence from survey data that heterogeneous
beliefs in future payoﬀs exist. By using UBS data, she shows that diﬀerent percent-
ages of individual investors have diﬀerent thoughts about the current stock market,
such as the market was over-valuated, undervalued, unsure or fairly valued. In-
vestors' diﬀerent opinions will therefore drive the ﬂuctuations in the market. Brock,
Hommes and Wagener [31] estimate a two-type agent (fundamentalists and chartists)
asset-pricing model, with yearly S&P 500 data to explain how a world-wide stock
market bubble was triggered in the late 1990s.
Agent-based models based on heterogeneous beliefs have attracted the interest
of many researchers. Some researchers have shown the eﬀects of heterogeneity in
ﬁnancial markets. For example, Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens [5] study the ef-
fect of heterogeneous beliefs on asset returns and consider whether these elements
are essential to a pricing model. In their setting, agents have the same preferences
but interpret information diﬀerently or exercise diﬀerent skills to access information.
They show that the ability to obtain or interpret information aﬀects investors' ex-
pected return and, hence, inﬂuences return volatility. Kraus and Smith [89] also
consider two types of investors who have diﬀerent private information and construct
diﬀerent current portfolios by holding diﬀerent beliefs on future stocks prices. In
this situation, they show that the introduction of options increases the uncertainty
of stock prices in the next period and enhances the volatility of stock prices. In
both examples, investors receive diﬀerent information. Research along these lines
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includes Varian [142], Harris and Raviv [75]. In addition to heterogeneous beliefs,
Jarrow Robert [83] diﬀerentiates between heterogeneous and homogeneous beliefs
when short sale constraints are in place in a mean-variance environment.
Zeeman [152] provides an early example of a heterogeneous-agent model. More
examples are provided by Haltiwanger and Waldmann [74], DeLong et al. [56], and
Dacorogna et al. [51]. In terms of asset-pricing, Brock and Hommes [28] investigate
a discounted present value asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs. They
deﬁne that agents can revise their beliefs in each period according to past realised
proﬁts. They show that under a certain condition, heterogeneous agents lead to
chaotic asset price ﬂuctuations. Chiarella et al. [44] believe that asset prices are not
only driven by rational investors but also by `boundedly rational behaviour'. They
present a boundedly rational heterogeneous agent (BRHA) model, which is based
on the traditional one-period CAPM. Investors have heterogeneous beliefs about
future payoﬀs from risky assets and diﬀerent risk preferences. Their expectations
are driven by their observations of past asset returns. Thus asset prices are driven
by investors' diﬀerent expectations. This model can accommodate market features
such as volatility clustering, which standard models with homogeneous beliefs cannot
describe. Similar research (see Li [98], Jouini and Napp [85] and Wenzelburger [151])
applies a similar model to study the eﬀect of put options on the ﬁnancial market.
Chiarella et al. [45] later use an evolutionary CAPM (ECAPM) with heterogeneous
beliefs to study the spillover eﬀects of the rational behaviour of agents.
The next section will introduce the agent-based CAPM with heterogeneous beliefs
developed by Brock and Hommes [30], Böhm and Chiarella [24] and Wenzelburger
[151]. This model will be applied in Chapter 3 to design CAT bonds and analyse the
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interaction of agents with heterogeneous beliefs. The model framework is introduced
in Sections 3.2 to 3.4. In Section 3.5, the concept of a reference portfolio in Wen-
zelburger [147] is introduced, helping to generate an insightful form of the pricing
formula. Section 3.6 provides a framework to price redundant assets based on the
model.
3.2 Model setting
Consider a multi-period model with time period t = 1, .., T . Assume that there areK
risky assets (indexed by k = 1, ..., K ) and one risk-less bond traded in the ﬁnancial
market, where k = 1, .., K represents the kth stock. Deﬁne Rf = (1 + rf ) (rf is
risk-less rate). The risk-less bond pays a return rate Rf at each period t. The risky
assets are traded at prices pt = (p1t, . . . , pKt) ∈ RK+ of period t. The gross return of
risky assets at period t are qt = (q1t, ..., qKt).
Assume that there are I investors in ﬁnancial market indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., I.
They cannot store their consumption goods directly and need to transfer their wealth
across periods. They are characterised by
• a utility function U (i)t : R×R+ → R, which is continuously diﬀerential, strictly
increasing in µ(i), strictly decreasing in σ(i), and strictly quasi-concave.
• a subjective probability distribution v(i)t ∈ Prob(RK) for future cum-dividend
asset prices (gross returns) parameterised by a pair (q
(i)
t , V
(i)
t ) ∈ RK × MK
of conditional mean value of gross return q
(i)
t = E
(i)
t [qt+1] ∈ RK and asso-
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ciated covariance matrix Σ
(i)
t = Π
(i)
kl,t = Covt[q
(i)
k,t+1, q
(i)
l,t+1] ∈ MK with k =
1, ..., K and l = 1, ..., K.
• at each end of period, investors are allowed to adjust their portfolio, based on
their subjective beliefs (q
(i)
t ,Σ
(i)
t ) regarding future gross returns of the assets.
Assume that the gross return is deﬁned by q
(i)
t = p
(i)
t +d
(i)
t+1. Let ((x
(i)
1t , ..., x
(i)
Kt), y
(i)
t ) =
(x
(i)
t , y
(i)
t ) ∈ RK × R be the portfolio held by investor i at period t, where x(i)kt is the
number of risky asset k (k = 1, ..., K) and y
(i)
t is the number of risk-less bond in
portfolio.
Individual i's initial wealth at time t− 1, t = 1, .., T is deﬁned as
w
(i)
t−1 = y
(i)
t−1Rf + 〈q(i)t−1, x(i)t 〉.
Given pt−1, the future wealth is
w
(i)
t = Rfw
(i)
t−1 + 〈q(i)t −Rfpt−1, x(i)t−1〉
= Rfw
(i)
t−1 + 〈pi(i)t , x(i)t−1〉.
Let pi
(i)
t = q
(i)
t −Rfpt−1 be expected vector of excess returns by investor i.
The subjectively expected value of investor i's future wealth at time t is
µ(i)(w
(i)
t−1, pi
(i)
t , x
(i)
t−1) = Rfw
(i)
t−1 + 〈pi(i)t , x(i)t−1〉
with associated subjective variance
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σ(x
(i)
t−1) = 〈x(i)t−1, V (i)t x(i)t−1〉
1
2 .
In each period t, a group of noise traders who demand the random quantity
ξt ∈ RK of shares is active in the asset market. The probabilistic prerequisites
on the exogenous noise and the exogenous dividend process are stipulated in the
following assumption.
Assumption 4. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and {Ft}t∈N an increasing family
of sub-σv-algebras of F .
1. The dividend payments are described by a {Ft}t∈N adapted stochastic process
{dt}t∈N on (Ω,F ,P) with values in D ∈ RK+ .
2. The noise traders' transactions are governed by a {Ft}t∈N adapted stochas-
tic process {ξt}t∈N on (Ω,F ,P) with values in RK, which is uncorrelated with the
dividend process {dt}t∈N deﬁned in 1.
3.3 Two-fund separation theorem
Consider the utility maximisation problem at period t
max
x
(i)
t−1∈RK+1
U (i)(µ
(i)
t (w
(i)
t−1, pi
(i)
t , x
(i)
t−1), σ
(i)
t (x
(i)
t−1)), t = 1, ..., T (3.3.1)
with condition that
71
max
x
(i)
t−1∈RK+1
µ
(i)
t (w
(i)
t−1, pi
(i)
t , x
(i)
t−1), s.t. σ
(i)
t (x
(i)
t−1) ≤ σ(i)t , with t = 1, ..., T (3.3.2)
where σ
(i)
t ≥ 0.
A unique portfolio that solves this problem is eﬃcient at period t:
x
(i)
eff,t(σ
(i)
t , pi
(i)
t , V
(i)
t ) =
σ
(i)
t
〈pi(i)t , (V (i)t )−1pi(i)t 〉 12
(V
(i)
t )
−1pi(i)t , (t = 1, ..., T ). (3.3.3)
which produces the highest expected wealth µ
(i)
wt given an upper bound σ
(i)
t for the
standard deviation of wealth σ
(i)
wt , according to Markowitz [108].
The eﬃcient frontier in terms of wealth at period t is deﬁned by
µ(i)(w
(i)
t−1, pi
(i)
t , x
(i)
eff,t−1) = Rfw
(i)
t−1 + ρ
(i)
t σ
(i)
t , (3.3.4)
where ρ
(i)
t = 〈pi(i)t , (V (i)t )−1pi(i)t 〉 12 is the price of risk holding by investor i in period
t. It is used to formulate a two-fund separation theorem which dates back to Tobin
[140] and Lintner [99].
Theorem 5. Two-fund separation theorem
Investor's utility function U (i) : R×R+ → R, is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly
increasing in µt, decreasing in σt, and strictly quasi-concave. There exists a unique
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eﬃcient portfolio x
(i)
t∗ ∈ RK to the problem (3.3.1). It is
x
(i)
t∗ = x
(i)
eff(σ
(i)
t∗ , pi
(i)
t , V
(i)
t ), (3.3.5)
=
σ
(i)
t∗
〈pi(i)t , (V (i)t )−1pi(i)t 〉 12
(V
(i)
t )
−1pi(i)t (3.3.6)
where
σ
(i)
t∗ = arg max
σit≥0
U (i)(Rfw
(i)
t−1 + ρ
(i)
t σ
(i)
t , σ
(i)
t )
determines optimal risk σt∗.
The following example illustrates a simple case to apply two-fund separation the-
orem.
Example 4. Linear utility function is
U (i) = µ
(i)
t −
1
2a(i)
(σ
(i)
t )
2
where a > 0 denotes risk tolerance. Then the risk σ
(i)
t∗ = a
(i)ρ
(i)
t is a linear and hence
subjective function with limiting slope ρU =∞.
3.4 Temporary equilibrium map
Considering a simple case: the utility function for every investor is linear that is
U (i)(µ
(i)
t , σ
(i)
t ) = µ
(i)
t −
1
2a(i)
(σ
(i)
t )
2.
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with ai is risk aversion of investor i. Accordingly, by understanding the Example 4
the gross-demand function for risky assets at period t is
x
(i)
t = a
(i)(V
(i)
t )
−1piit.
The total amount of risky assets at period t is deﬁned as (x1m, ..., xKm) = xm ∈ RK
and referred to as the market portfolio of the economy. Notation xk (k = 0, .., K)
refers to the total number of kth assets.
The market clearing condition is
I∑
i=1
x
(i)
t + ξt = xm. (3.4.1)
Solving the market-clearing condition (3.4.1) for pt yields a temporary equilibrium
map, which is related to arbitrary beliefs (q
(i)
t , V
(i)
t ) rather than the past price process.
Theorem 6. For solving the market-clearing condition for pt, there exists a uniquely
temporary equilibrium determined by
pt = G(ξt, a
(i), q
(i)
t , V
(i)
t ) =
I∑
i=1
A
(i)
t q
(i)
t − At(xm − ξt), (3.4.2)
where At :=
1
Rf
(∑I
i=1 a
(i)(V
(i)
t )
−1
)−1
and A
(i)
t := a
(i)At(V
(i)
t )
−1 are all well-deﬁned
and invertible.
Proof. By market clearing condition
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I∑
i=1
x
(i)
t + ξt = xm
I∑
i=1
a(i)(V
(i)
t )
−1(q(i)t −Rfpt) = xm − ξt
By solving for pt gives us
pt =
1
Rf
(
I∑
i=1
a(i)(V
(i)
t )
−1
)−1
·
[
I∑
i=1
A
(i)
t (V
(i)
t )
−1q(i)t − (xm − ξt)
]
=
I∑
i=1
a(i)q
(i)
t − At(xm − ξt).
Deﬁne At =
1
Rf
(∑I
i=1 a
(i)(V
(i)
t )
−1
)−1
, A
(i)
t = a
(i)At(V
(i)
t )
−1, i = 1, 2 and At, A
(i)
t are
all well-deﬁned and invertible.
3.5 Reference portfolio
When investors hold heterogeneous beliefs, diﬀerent investors will form their own
eﬃcient frontiers for eﬃcient risky assets and then form their own capital market
lines. Therefore, investors will form diﬀerent optimal risky portfolios and the ag-
gregate of those optimal risky portfolios cannot exactly be market portfolio. So the
term 'market portfolio' shown in the standard CAPM cannot be used when investors
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hold heterogeneous beliefs. In the literature, Jouini and Napp [85] deﬁne consensus
belief (namely average belief) to represent the eﬀect of the aggregated heteroge-
neous beliefs in order to study equilibrium prices in terms of the homogeneous belief
model. Wenzelburger [149] use the preference portfolio to solve the same problem.
This section is going to introduce the concept of the reference portfolio, introduced
by Wenzelburger [147], which will be useful to derive the price formula under the
heterogeneous situation. A reference portfolio is deﬁned as
xref,t =
1
ρt
(Vt)
−1pit, (3.5.1)
where ρt = 〈pit, V −1t pit〉 12 is market price of risk and the risk of the reference portfolio
is σt = 〈xref,t,Vtxref,t〉 and set as 1. The payoﬀ of reference portfolio at time period
t+ 1 is deﬁned as ereft+1 = 〈qt+1, xref,t〉.
This xref,t is an eﬃcient portfolio, which brings the highest Sharp ratio for the
holder in the real market1. The Two Fund Separation Theorem (Theorem 5) shows
that the higher the Sharpe ratio (market price of risk) of a portfolio, the higher the
expected utility of an investment. Hence, xref,t achieves the highest utility in the
market. It indirectly reﬂects the interaction of investors who hold heterogeneous
beliefs and hence ingeniously avoids the diﬃculties associated with those beliefs. If
investors hold homogeneous beliefs, this portfolio is collinear with market portfolio,
which veriﬁes its eﬃcient property. Note that this portfolio is a 'ﬁctitious' portfolio
and may not have any investors who hold it.
Lemma 7. By using the reference portfolio, the temporary equilibrium prices pt sat-
1For more detailed information regarding to the proof, see Wenzelburger [147]
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isﬁes the equation
pt =
1
Rf
[Et[qt+1]− ρtVtxref,t] , t = 0, 1, 2.... (3.5.2)
Proof. This formula is generated using the deﬁnition of reference portfolio (see formula
(3.5.1) to obtain the equation of expected excess return
pit = ρtVtxref,t.
Then, with the deﬁnition of pit = Et[qt+1]−Rfpt, formula (3.5.2) is achieved.
This Lemma 7 helps to derive an expression of the temporary equilibrium price
of the kth asset which is not directly linked with investors' heterogeneous beliefs. It
is shown in the Corollary 5 below.
Corollary 5. A temporary equilibrium price of the kth asset in period t satisﬁes
pkt =
1
Rf
[
Et[qk,t+1]− ρtCovt[qk,t+1, ereft+1]
]
,
where ereft+1 = 〈qt+1, xref,t〉 is deﬁned as a reference payoﬀ. (In the following context,
we use market payoﬀ directly for simpliﬁcation. )
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Proof. By Lemma 7, the kth asset price could be written as
pkt =
1
Rf
[
Et(qk,t+1)− ρt (Vt · xref,t)k
]
,
=
1
Rf
[
Et(qk,t+1)− ρt
K∑
l=1
Covt(qk,t+1, ql,t+1) · xref,lt
]
=
1
Rf
[
Et(qk,t+1)− ρtCovt(qk,t+1,
K∑
l=1
ql,t+1 · xref,lt)
]
=
1
Rf
[Et(qk,t+1)− ρtCovt(qk,t+1, eref,t+1)]
=
1
Rf
[Et(qk,t+1)− ρtCovt(qk,t+1, eref,t+1)] .
3.6 Pricing redundant assets
No arbitrage pricing method here to achieve the price formula of redundant asset
in CAPM.
Deﬁne a redundant asset Γ (one-period maturity) with a payoﬀ qΓ,t+1 at time
t + 1, which can be replicated by a portfolio (xΓ,t+1, yΓ,t+1) constructed by stocks
and risk-free bonds. So qΓ,t+1 = 〈xΓ,t+1, qt+1〉+RfyΓ,t+1. At equilibrium, the unique
evaluation of Γ at time t is pΓ,t = 〈pt, xΓ,t+1〉+ yΓ,t+1. By applying Corollary 5 and
the property that the covariance between risk-free bonds and ereft+1 is 0, this evaluation
of the redundant asset Γ is
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pΓ,t = 〈pt, xΓ,t+1〉+ yΓ,t+1
=
1
Rf
Et [〈xΓ,t+1, qt+1〉]− ρtCovt
[
〈xΓ,t+1, qt+1〉, ereft+1
]
+
1
Rf
Et [RfyΓ,t+1]− ρtCovt
[
RfyΓ,t+1, e
ref
t+1
]
=
1
Rf
Et [〈xΓ,t+1, qt+1〉+RfyΓ,t+1]− ρtCovt
[
〈xΓ,t+1, qt+1〉+RfyΓ,t+1, ereft+1
]
=
1
Rf
[
Et(qΓ,t+1)− ρtCovt(qΓ,t+1, ereft+1)
]
(3.6.1)
Hence, we applied the replicating method in CAPM to get the pricing formula
of any arbitrary asset. It extends the Corollary 5 further to arbitrary payoﬀ in the
market. That is Corollary 6 below.
Corollary 6. Assume a redundant asset Γ (one-period maturity) with an arbitrary
payoﬀ qΓ,t+1, which can be replicated by stocks and risk-free bonds. Under the as-
sumption of no arbitrage opportunity, the equilibrium price of this redundant asset
Γ satisﬁes
pΓ,t = Vt(qΓ,t+1) = 1
Rf
(Et(qΓ,t+1)− ρtCovt(qΓ,t+1, eref,t+1)) .
The following content shows that the arbitrage opportunity exists in multi-period
CAPM. Amending the method from Philip and Jonathan [66], the valuation formula
(3.6.1) can be rearranged as
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pΓ,t =
1
Rf
(Et[qΓ,t+1]− ρtCovt[qΓ,t+1, eref,t+1])
=
1
Rf
[Et[qΓ,t+1]− ρt (Et[qΓ,t+1, eref,t+1]− Et[qΓ,t+1]Et[eref,t+1])]
=
1
Rf
Et [qΓ,t+1 − ρt (qΓ,t+1eref,t+1 − qΓ,t+1Et[eref,t+1])]
=
1
Rf
Et [qΓ,t+1 (1− ρt(eref,t+1 − Et[eref,t+1]))] . (3.6.2)
This formula (3.6.2) can be applied to show that the arbitrage opportunity exists. For
example: if eref,t+1 > Et[eref,t+1] +
1
ρt
, (in other words, prob(eref,t+1 > Et[eref,t+1] +
1
ρt
) > 0) and let random payoﬀ be speciﬁc such as
qΓ,t+1 = [ρt(eref,t+1 − Et[eref,t+1])− 1]−1 > 0,
then the price pΓ,t = − 1Rf < 0, which creates the arbitrage opportunity.
This shows the equilibrium prices in CAPM are typically not arbitrage-free.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the agent-based CAPM with heterogeneous beliefs, which
was developed by several authors, including Chiarella et al. [41, 42, 43] and Wen-
zelburger [147, 149]. In particular, Section 3.6 discussed a CAPM-based pricing
formula for redundant assets along with its limitations and arbitrage opportunities.
This model will be extended in the next chapter to include CAT bonds, analyse
investors' behaviour, and investigate the co-evolution of asset and CAT bond prices.
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Chapter 4
CAT bonds in an Agent-based CAPM
Chapter 3 has introduced an agent-based asset pricing model with heterogeneous
beliefs. This chapter will apply this model to design CAT bonds and to analyse
the interaction between investors who hold heterogeneous beliefs on future prices.
Section 4.1 gives the model setting of a market with CAT bonds following the model
setting introduced in Chapter 3. Section 4.2 discusses the design of CAT bonds.
The price of CAT bonds is derived in subsection 4.2.1 then the setting of premium
and promised payoﬀ is discussed in Subsection 4.2.2. An example is provided in
Subsection 4.2.2 showing the way insurance companies set up the SPV to determine
the premium and promised payoﬀ. Section 4.3 focusses on the content of CAT bonds
issuance. In this section, a deﬁnition of perceived Pareto superiority is proposed and
conditions for the transferable risk are developed. The issuing condition for CAT
bonds is concluded in Theorem 7. Wenzelburger's [149] concept of perfect forecasting
rule is introduced in Section 4.4. Stochastic diﬀerence equations are generated to
describe investor behaviour. Using the results of CAT bonds payoﬀs and promised
payoﬀs in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, the catastrophic loss is embedded into the stochastic
diﬀerence equations.
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4.1 Model setting
Based on the model introduced in Chapter 3, when the CAT bonds are issued at time
period t, the vectors of notations in the model shown in Chapter 3 are extended. Let
subscript 'c' denote CAT bonds, 's' denote stocks. To distinguish the market with
CAT bonds from the original market without CAT bonds, superscript '+' is added
to the notations used in the original market.
Let pct denote the equilibrium price of CAT bonds, qct is its payoﬀ, ξct is the noise
trader of CAT bonds and p+st = (p
+
1t, ..., p
+
Kt) denote the equilibrium price of stocks.
The vector q+st = (q
+
1t, ..., q
+
Kt) is the payoﬀ of stocks and ξst is the noise trader of
stocks. The price vector at each time is p+t = (pct, p
+
st), payoﬀ is q
+
t = (qct,q
+
st) and
noise trader is ξ+t = (ξct, ξst).
Investor i's beliefs on the risky asset payoﬀs are
q
(i)+
t = E
(i)
t [q
+
t+1]
and
Σ
(i)+
t =
 V (i)11,t Σ(i)12,t
Σ
(i)
21,t Σ
(i)
22,t
 (4.1.1)
respectively, where Σ
(i)+
t is a positive deﬁnite symmetric (K + 1)× (K + 1) matrix
and well deﬁned with
V
(i)
11,t = V ar
(i)
t [qc,t+1],
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Σ
(i)
12,t = [b
(i)
1t . . . b
(i)
Kt], b
(i)
kt = Cov
(i)
t [qk,t+1, qc,t+1],
Σ
(i)
22,t = V ar
(i)
t [qs,t+1] =
(
Cov
(i)
t [qk,t+1, ql,t+1]
)
kl
, k = 1, . . . , K, l = 1, ..., K.
So Σ
(i)
12,t = (Σ
(i)
21,t)
>are the covariance vectors of stocks and CAT bonds, and Σ(i)22,t is
the covariance matrix of stock payoﬀs.
The subjective expected excess return of risky assets is pi
(i)+
t = E
(i)
t [q
+
t+1]−Rfp(i)+t .
The subjective market price of risk is ρ
(i)+
t = 〈pi(i)+t , (Σ(i)+t )−1pi(i)+t 〉 12 .
The objective covariance Σ+t is given by
Σ+t =
 V11,t Σ12,t
Σ21,t Σ22,t
 , (4.1.2)
where V11,t = V art[qc,t+1], Σ12,t = (Σ21,t)
> = [b1t . . . bKt], bkt = Covt[qk,t+1, qc,t+1], k =
1, . . . , K., V22,t = Σt[qs,t+1] = (Covt[qk,t+1, ql,t+1])kl.
The objective market price of risk is ρ+t = 〈pi+t , (V +t )−1pi+t 〉 12 and the expected
excess return of risky assets is pi+t = Et[q
+
t+1]−Rfp+t .
The reference portfolio is
x+ref,t =
1
ρ+t
(V +t )
−1pi+t ,
Its payoﬀ is deﬁned as
eref+t+1 = x
+
ref,t · q+t+1.
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4.2 Design of CAT bonds
As Chapter 2 has discussed CAT bonds transactions, CAT bonds related transac-
tions in multi-periods are illustrated in Diagram 4.2.1. In each time period, the
sponsor (the re-insurance company) passes premium θt to the SPV  a non-proﬁt
intermediate, to issue CAT bonds. The SPV then raise funds by selling bonds to
investors in the ﬁnancial market. A CAT bond contract promises investors a payoﬀ
of ct subject to no pre-agreed events having occurred, and at maturity investors will
have their principle returned. However, if a speciﬁc event occurs before maturity,
investors will lose their promised payoﬀ and even part of their principle. This is
because the fund will be used to cover the loss of the sponsor at time t + 1. The
total number of CAT bonds issuing at each time is xcm > 0. The total fund used
by the SPV to cover the loss of the sponsor is Lt+1 (0 ≤ Lt+1 ≤ Lmax, Lmax is the
maximum loss that the SPV covers) at time t+ 1. So each CAT bond contract will
cover lt+1 and lt+1 = Lt+1/xm (0 ≤ lt+1 ≤ lmax, lmax is the maximum loss covered in
one CAT bond contract). The payoﬀ qc,t+1 of one CAT bonds contract is deﬁned as
qc,t+1 = ct − lt+1 ≥ 0, (4.2.1)
which requires ct ≥ lmax. The total payoﬀ to investors is Qc,t+1 = qc,t+1 · xcm.
According to this payoﬀ formula (4.2.1), the conditional expected value and its
associated variance1 of a CAT bond payoﬀ are
Et[qc,t+1] = ct − Et[lt+1] (4.2.2)
1The Et[qc,t+1] is for the conditional expectation E[qc,t+1|Ft] and V art[qc,t+1] for conditional second moment
V ar[qc,t+1|Ft].
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Figure 4.2.1: CAT bonds related transactions in a multi-period model
and
V art[qc,t+1] = V art[lt+1], (4.2.3)
respectively. This shows that the mean and variance of the CAT bond payoﬀ is
determined by the mean and variance of the linked catastrophic loss.
4.2.1 CAT bond price
By the Corollary 5 of temporary equilibrium price of the kth asset, the equilibrium
price of CAT bonds in period t must satisfy
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pct =
1
Rf
[
Et[qc,t+1]− ρ+t Covt[qc,t+1, eref+t+1 ]
]
, (4.2.4)
where eref+t+1 = 〈x+ref,t, q+t+1〉 is the payoﬀ of the reference portfolio.
Substituting qc,t+1 (4.2.1) and Et[qc,t+1] (4.2.2) into the above equilibrium formula
(4.2.4), gives
pct =
1
Rf
[
ct − Et[lt+1]− ρ+t Covt[(ct − lt+1), eref+t+1 ]
]
=
1
Rf
ct − 1
Rf
(
Et[lt+1]− ρ+t Covt[lt+1, eref+t+1 ]
)
So the price of CAT bonds is
pct =
1
Rf
ct − Vt(lt+1), (4.2.5)
where
Vt(lt+1) = 1
Rf
[
Et[lt+1]− ρtCovt[lt+1, eref+t+1 ]
]
(4.2.6)
is the valuation of the loss lt+1 at time period t from the ﬁnancial market2.
This price formula (4.2.5) shows the relation bewteen the market price of one
CAT bond contract with its promised payoﬀ ct and the market valuation of the loss
lt+1 that one CAT bond contract may cover. This indicates that the market value
2 This is derived from the Corollary 5.
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of each single period CAT bond contract equals the diﬀerence between the present
value of the promised payoﬀ ct and the market valuation of the insured loss covered
by a CAT bond at maturity. This formula will be used in the next subsection to
determine the premium that the sponsor needs to pass to the SPV and the CAT
bond's promised payoﬀ to investors.
4.2.2 Promised payoﬀ and premium
According to the transactions related to CAT bonds show in the illustration 4.2.1, the
sponsor provides an amount of premium θt to ensure a coverage up to Lmax. The SPV
then issues CAT bonds into the ﬁnancial market with a pre-determined coupon ct of
each CAT bond contract. This implies that to issue CAT bonds, determination of
the minimum premium and coupon for each CAT bond is essential. This subsection
discusses how to decide with the minimum premium and coupon.
Deﬁne Ct = ct · xcm as the total promised payoﬀ to investors at time period t;
Lmax = lmax ·xcm is the total maximum loss that CAT bonds will cover; the loss that
all issued CAT bonds will cover at t + 1 is Lt+1 = lt+1 · xcm (0 ≤ Lt+1 ≤ Lmax), the
total payoﬀ of CAT bonds at maturity is Qc,t+1 = qc,t+1 · xcm = Ct − Lt+13.
The principle, i.e., the total money received from issuing CAT bonds, is denoted
by Vt(Qc,t+1) as this the market valuation of CAT bond payoﬀs Qc,t+1 at time t. By
applying the price formula of CAT bonds (4.2.5), the principle is
3By applying the deﬁnition (4.2.1) of qc,t+1: qc,t+1 = ct − lt+1.
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Vt(Qc,t+1) = pct · xcm
=
1
Rf
(Ct −RfVt(Lt+1))
=
1
Rf
Ct − Vt(Lt+1), (4.2.7)
which equals the discounted total promised payoﬀ minus the market valuation of the
total loss at time t+1. This formula shows that only when the promised payoﬀ Ct is
larger than RfVt(Lt+1), are the investors willing to purchase CAT bonds. Otherwise,
investors will not buy and the SPV will be unable to raise money by issuing CAT
bonds. So the minimum requirement to raise money is when the promised payoﬀ
Ct > RfVt(Lt+1). To avoid a non-meaningful situation, one basic assumption is
necessary, as stated in Assumption 5.
Assumption 5. The market valuation of the total insured loss that CAT bonds will
cover is always positive, that is
Vt(Lt+1) > 0.
This assumption excludes the situation in which the promised payoﬀ is non-
positive. It also implies investors' expected insurance loss covered by one CAT bond
should be larger than the value of ρ+t Covt[lt+1, e
ref+
t+1 ]. That is
Et[lt+1] ≥ ρ+t Covt[lt+1, eref+t+1 ],
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by applying the formula of Vt(lt+1) (4.2.6).
As Figure 4.2.1 shows, the SPV invests the fund from sale of CAT bonds into
risk-free assets. At maturity, the gross value of this fund should cover any loss up to
Lmax. For a simple analysis, assume all the money required to cover the loss is from
issuing CAT bonds. So, mathematically, the requirement to generate a positive fund
by selling CAT bonds is
Vt(Qc,t+1) ≥ 1
Rf
Lmax. (4.2.8)
Substituting (4.2.7) into the inequality formula (4.2.8) gives the minimum require-
ment of the promised payoﬀ Ct to all CAT bonds investors
Ct −RfVt(Lt+1) ≥ Lmax
Ct ≥ Lmax +RfVt(Lt+1). (4.2.9)
This formula satisﬁes the minimum requirement of Ct to ensure investors are
willing to purchase CAT bonds, Ct > RfVt(Lt+1). Formula (4.2.9) shows that if the
SPV requires Lmax at maturity, the promised payoﬀ should be larger than the sum
of the total money the SPV wants to raise and the minimum requirement of the
promised payoﬀ. So the minimum promised payoﬀ that the SPV needs to set is
Ct,min = Lmax +RfVt(Lt+1)
if the SPV wants to have Lmax at t+ 1 from issuing cat bonds.
Therefore, for each CAT bond contract, the promised payoﬀ to the investor is
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ct ≥ lmax + RfVt(lt+1). The minimum promised payoﬀ of each contract should
satisfy ct,min = lmax +RfVt(lt+1).
As the illustration shows, after raising enough money, the SPV needs to use this
fund to cover the loss (if a speciﬁc event happens) and use the rest of the money to
pay it back to investors at maturity. Note that, at period t, the SPV also receive the
premium from the sponsor. The SPV invests all the funds received into the risk-free
asset, and at maturity, the realised fund in period t+ 1 is Rf (θt + Vt(Qc,t+1))4.
At time t + 1, the SPV allocates money to the sponsor to cover any loss and
payoﬀs to investors, that is (Lt+1 + Qc,t+1) in total. So at time t + 1, the proﬁt of
SPV is denoted as
Πt+1 = Rf [(θt + Vt(Qc,t+1))]− (Lt+1 +Qc,t+1). (4.2.10)
By substituting the valuation Vt(Qc,t+1) formula (4.2.7) and Qc,t+1 = Ct − Lt+1 into
the above formula, the promised payoﬀ can be canceled and formula 4.2.10 rewritten
as
Πt+1 = Rfθt + Ct −RfVt(Lt+1)− Ct
= Rf (θt − Vt(Lt+1)) .
This gives the relation between SPV proﬁt and the premium and market valuation
of loss. It shows that the proﬁt of the SPV has a zero correlation with the promised
4From the materials, the SPV dismisses after its function at each fund raising. The remaining proﬁt will be passed
back to the sponsor. The sponsors can be a non-proﬁt charity. To consider a simple case, this thesis assumes that
the sponsor is (re-)insurance company that set up a SPV for all of fund raising.
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payoﬀ, but correlates instead with the premium from the sponsor and the ﬁnancial
market valuation of the insurance loss. To ensure the SPV receive a non-negative
proﬁt i.e. avoid bankruptcy, the sponsor must at least pass a minimum premium
θt = Vt(Lt+1) to the SPV. That is because
Πt+1 ≥ 0
θt ≥ Vt(Lt+1).
This inequality deﬁnes the minimum premium.
In conclusion, the requirements of promised payoﬀ and premium are achieved
below

Ct ≥ Lmax +RfVt(Lt+1)
θt ≥ Vt(Lt+1)
(4.2.11)
For each CAT bond contract, the promised payoﬀ must satisfy ct ≥ lmax+RfVt(lt+1).
The following illustrates how the SPV designs CAT bonds by applying the above
results.
Example 5. Assume a (re-)insurance company intends to issue CAT bonds to diversify
its catastrophic risk and set up a SPV. This example shows how the SPV decides
the premium θt and coupon ct of each CAT bond contract.
By applying the results derived previously as formula (4.2.11) shows, the SPV
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needs to estimate the market value of loss Vet (Lt+1)5. The requirements of premium
θt and total promised payoﬀ Ct are

Ct ≥ Lmax +RfVet (Lt+1)
θt ≥ Vet (Lt+1).
The SPV can also set minimum values, that is

Ct = Lmax +RfVet (Lt+1)
θt = Vet (Lt+1)
. (4.2.12)
For each CAT bond, if no pre-agreed event occurs, the coupon is ct = lmax +
RfVet (lt+1).
However, the SPV faces a situation in which its estimation may not be exactly
equal to the real value in the market and may lead to an unsuccessful bond issuance.
The following shows why this approximation value matters.
According to the formula of Vt(Qc,t+1) (4.2.7), the total money that the SPV can
receive by issuing CAT bonds is
Vt(Qc,t+1) = 1
Rf
Ct − Vt(Lt+1).
Substituting for the Ct that the SPV sets, the received money is
5Methods of the estimation will not be discussed in this thesis.
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Vt(Qc,t+1) = 1
Rf
(Lmax +RfVet (Lt+1)−RfVt(Lt+1))
=
1
Rf
Lmax + (Vet (Lt+1)− Vt(Lt+1)) . (4.2.13)
Substituting for Ct and θt set by the SPV, the realised proﬁt Πt+1 of the SPV (4.2.10)
is
Πt+1 = Rf (θt + Vt(Qc,t+1))− (Lt+1 +Qc,t+1)
= Rf
(
Vet (Lt+1) +
1
Rf
Lmax + (Vet (Lt+1)− Vt(Lt+1))
)
− Ct
= Rf
(
Vet (Lt+1) +
1
Rf
Lmax + (Vet (Lt+1)− Vt(Lt+1))
)
− (Lmax +RfVet (Lt+1))
= Rf (Vet (Lt+1)− Vt(Lt+1)) . (4.2.14)
From formulas (4.2.13) and (4.2.14), if the estimated value exceeds larger than the
real value, that is Vet (Lt+1) ≥ Vt(Lt+1), the SPV raises Vt(Qc,t+1) or more and will
be able to cover Lmax and obtain a non-negative proﬁt. If Vet (Lt+1) < Vt(Lt+1),
the SPV cannot raise money from the ﬁnancial market then contracts between the
sponsor, the SPV and investors cannot be implemented. This problem can be solved
with further research on the determination of the market valuation and the amount
of additional funding or reserve required in advance.
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4.3 CAT bond issuance
Section 4.2.2 has discussed how the SPV sets the premium charged to the sponsor,
and the promised payoﬀ to investors in order to raise the required money. However,
such conditions are not enough to ensure a successful CAT bond issuance. A proper
decision about the premium and the promised payoﬀ is crucial during the preparation
stage for issuing CAT bonds. This section, together with the result from Subsection
4.2.2, will discuss the conditions that decide a successful CAT bond issuance.
Chapter 2 has discussed the conditions under which CAT bonds can be issued
in a single period CAPM. In that environment, investors hold homogeneous beliefs
about future payoﬀs of ﬁnancial products. A series of concepts to study CAT bonds
issuing conditions such as transferable risk, Pareto superiority have been introduced
in Chapter 2. This section will follow a framework similar to that in Chapter 2 and
investigate the issuing conditions for the agent-based CAPM with heterogeneous
beliefs.
4.3.1 Transferable insurance risk
This subsection demonstrates how an insurance risk can be transferred from (re-
)insurance companies to the ﬁnancial market by means of a ﬁnancial innovation.
Firstly, the (re-)insurance company must have the intention to purchase this ﬁ-
nancial innovation to transfer its potential risk, assuming an re-insurance company
has utility Us(ws,t) at time t as the Assumption 3 deﬁnes in Chapter 2, where ws,t
is the value of the company's asset. This (re-)insurance company has its potential
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insurance risk Lt+1(0 ≤ Lt+1 ≤ Lmax) at time t + 1. Assuming that there is one
ﬁnancial innovation that can transfer this risk into the ﬁnancial market by charging
premium θt, then the (re-)insurance company is willing to purchase this ﬁnancial
innovation to transfer its potential risk as long as the expected utility of purchasing
it is higher than covering this risk itself.6 Mathematically, it is:
Et[Us(ws,t+1 −Rfθt)] > Et[Us(ws,t+1 − Lt+1)].
Therefore, if the (re-)insurance company uses this ﬁnancial innovation to transfer
its risk, it will lose the opportunity cost of θt; that is, the gross value of investing θt
into risk-free assets. If the (re-)insurance company decides to cover loss by itself, it
will face the uncertain loss Lt+1 at time t+ 1. Consequently, if the above inequality
holds, then the (re-)insurance company is willing to use this innovation to transfer
its risk.
However, how can this innovation be traded in the ﬁnancial market? The following
content will discuss the trading condition for this innovation.
Chapter 2 has deﬁned Pareto superiority to describe the state of innovations
preferred by investors and which are, hence, traded in the market. However, under
the environment of the agent-based CAPM heterogeneous beliefs, this concept is no
longer applicable. This is because investors' beliefs are no longer the same as the
market objective means and variances of asset payoﬀs, so the notion of perceived
Pareto superiority is deﬁned below to describe the situation in which innovations are
preferred by at least one investor.
6Let us assume that there is only one way for a (re-)insurance company to reinsurance its potential risk for
simplicity.
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Deﬁnition 4. [Perceived Pareto superiority]
Consider the situation in which a new ﬁnancial innovation is introduced into the
ﬁnancial market. The original market is set as market 1 and the new market with
innovations is market 2. An allocation of risk and return
{(µ(i)1t , σ(i)1t ), · · · , (µ(I)1t , σ(I)1t )}
in market 1 is Perceived Pareto Superior to an allocation of risk and return
{(µ(i)2t , σ(i)2t ), · · · , (µ(I)2t , σ(I)2t )}
in market 2 if the utility of market 1 is larger than the utility of the market 2
U (i)(µ
(i)
1t , σ
(i)
1t ) ≥ U(µ(i)2t , σ(i)2t ) for all i = 1, ..., I
with at least one inequality being strict.
If one investor perceives a higher utility by having this innovation in his portfolio,
the innovation will be traded in the market. As investors have diﬀerent beliefs on
future payoﬀs, they will form their own eﬃcient frontiers; therefore, they form their
own capital market lines (CML) of the market. The following proposition describes
the relation of the perceived slope of CML and utility, which can be used to discover
whether innovations are preferred in the market.
Proposition 4. The optimal portfolio in the market with innovations (denoted by mar-
ket 1) is preferred to the portfolio in the market without innovations (denoted by
market 2) at time period t for individual i,
U (i)(µ
(i)
1t , σ
(i)
1t ) ≥ U(µ(i)2t , σ(i)2t ),
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if the market price of risk in market 1 is higher than in market 2
ρ
(i)
1t > ρ
(i)
2t .
This proposition shows that if the perceived market price of risk (slope of CML)
in the market with innovations is higher than in the market without innovations,
then investor i believes that he will have a higher utility by having this innovation;
therefore, he will buy it at time t.
Similarly to Chapter 2, Chapter 3 also shows that arbitrage opportunities exist in
the agent-based CAPM. In that case, asset prices may be negative after introducing
this innovation. Therefore, to make this model economically meaningful, ensuring
all asset prices (including this innovation) are positive is essential.
By considering the above discussion, the conditions for the insurance risk that
can be transferred by means of a ﬁnancial innovation are deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 5. [Transferable insurance risk ] The potential insurance risk Lt+1 (0 ≤
Lt+1 ≤ Lmax) can be transferred by a ﬁnancial innovation that charges insurance
company premium θt to the ﬁnancial market if the following conditions hold:
(i) The (re-)insurance company is willing to transfer its risk Lt+1 if
Et[Us(ws,t+1 −Rfθt)] > Et[Us(ws,t+1 − Et(Lt+1))].
(ii) The risk-return allocation at equilibrium
{
(σ
(1)+
t∗ , µ
(1)+
t∗ )...(σ
(I)+
t∗ , µ
(I)+
t∗ )
}
in the
market with this innovation is perceived Pareto superior to it in the market without
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this innovation
{
(σ
(1)
t∗ , µ
(1)
t∗ )...(σ
(I)
t∗ , µ
(I)
t∗ )
}
.
(iii) The introduction of this innovation will not lead to negative risky asset prices
In Deﬁnition 5, condition (i) shows that the (re-)insurance company is willing to
transfer its potential insurance risk Lt+1 by paying θt. Conditions (ii) and (iii) ensure
this innovation can be introduced and traded in the ﬁnancial market. Condition (ii)
can be regarded as the trading condition. This means at least one investor would
like to include this innovation in his portfolio and, hence, this innovation is traded
in the market. Condition (iii) ensures the model is meaningful by introducing this
innovation.
The deﬁnition of how the insurance risk can be transferred into the ﬁnancial
market by an innovation will help to decide the issuing conditions of CAT bonds in
the next subsection.
4.3.2 Issuance conditions
This subsection will discuss conditions in which CAT bonds can be issued successfully
to the ﬁnancial market based on framework of transferable insurance risk, as deﬁned
in subsection 4.3.1, and the result of the minimum premium and promised payoﬀ
achieved from Subsection 4.2.2.
Subsection 4.2.2 has discussed the minimum premium θt and promised coupon ct
of each CAT bond contract, which ensure the SPV is able to play its role and raise
the required money. In that subsection, Example 5 shows how the SPV sets these
values, based on discussion of the minimum premium and promised payoﬀ, that is
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
θt = Vet (Lt+1)
Ct = Lmax +RfVet (Lt+1)
or ct = lmax + RfVet (lt+1) for each CAT bond contract. This subsection will apply
these results to discuss the issuing conditions for CAT bonds.
Subsection 4.3.1 deﬁnes the issuing condition that ﬁrstly, the re-insurance com-
pany is willing to use CAT bonds to transfer its risk. If its expected utility of pur-
chasing CAT bonds is larger than its expected utility without purchasing them, the
re-insurance company then would like to use. Thus, applying the result of minimum
premium above, if the following inequality meets
Et [Us (ws,t+1 −RfVet (Lt+1))] > Et [Us(ws,t+1 − Lt+1)] .
Then the (re-)insurance company will to use CAT bonds to transfer its risk. The
(re-)insurance company then need to set up a SPV to issue CAT bonds and pass it
a minimum premium at time t in order to receive a coverage of Lt+1 up to Lmax at
time t+ 1.7
The following content discusses the conditions required to ensure that CAT bonds
are issued into the ﬁnancial market.
Introducing CAT bonds into the ﬁnancial market may aﬀect stock prices. Chapter
2 assumes that the price is not aﬀected. This subsection examines the case where the
stock prices may change. The literature identiﬁes two ways in which stocks prices
change. However, there is as yet, nothing on how stock prices are aﬀected by CAT
7In this thesis, the operational cost such as administration fees for setting up a SPV are not considered.
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bonds. Further work is needed. This thesis is a start and assumes that stock prices
in the new market change as 8
p+st = pst + ςt,
where ςt is a 1×K vector that ςt = {ς1t, ς2t, ..., ςKt} and ςkt (k = 1, 2, ..., K ) denotes
the kth stock price change. So the payoﬀ of stocks in the market is
q+st = qst + ζt,
where ζt is a 1×K vector that ζt = {ζ1t, ζ2t, ..., ζKt} and ζkt (k = 1, 2, ..., K ) denotes
the kth stock payoﬀ change.
In this setting, investors' beliefs about the stock payoﬀs stocks at t+ 1 are giben
by
Et(q
(i)+
s,t+1) = Et(q
(i)
s,t+1) + ζ
(i)
t ,
Σ
(i)+
22,t = Σ
(i)
st ,
where ζ
(i)
t is a 1 × K vector that ζ(i)t = {ζ(i)1t , ζ(i)2t , ..., ζ(i)Kt} and ζ(i)kt (k = 1, 2, ..., K )
denotes the investors' expectation in the kth stock payoﬀ change.
As discussed in Subsection 4.3.1, if one investor perceives a higher utility by
including CAT bonds in his portfolio at equilibrium, then he will buy CAT bonds in
the market. CAT bonds, therefore, are traded in the market. In this case, Proposition
4 implies this investor perceives a higher market price of risk (i.e. the slope of the
8In this way, the variance of payoﬀ is the same as in the market without CAT bonds, which makes calculations
easier.
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CML). By applying the price of stocks, the following proposition provides conditions
for which the perceived market price of risk with CAT bonds will be higher than in
a market without CAT bonds.
Proposition 5. [Perceived market price of risk ] The perceived market price of risk for
the investor i in the market with CAT bonds is higher than in the original market
without CAT bonds, hence
ρ
(i)+
t > ρ
(i)
t , i = 1, 2, ...I
provided
2〈pi(i)ct ,Σ(i)12,tpi(i)+st 〉+ 2〈pi(i)t , V (i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)〉
+〈(ζ(i)t −Rf ςt), V (i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)〉+ 〈pi(i)ct ,Σ(i)11,tpi(i)ct 〉 ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The above proposition ensures CAT bonds are traded in the market. However,
as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5, to make this model economically meaningful, the intro-
duction of CAT bonds should not make any asset prices non-positive. The following
proposition provides conditions for positive asset prices in the market with CAT
bonds.
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Proposition 6. [Positive asset prices] In the market with CAT bonds, if the conditional
expected value of the kth asset payoﬀ is larger than value of ρ+t Covt[q
+
k,t+1, e
ref+
t+1 ], that
is
Et[q
+
k,t+1] > ρ
+
t Covt[q
+
k,t+1, e
ref+
t+1 ],
then price of this kth asset is positive.
Proof. By Corollary 5, the kth risky price in the market with CAT bonds, is
p+kt =
1
Rf
[
Et[q
+
k,t+1]− ρ+t Covt[q+k,t+1, eref+t+1 ]
]
.
To ensure a positive risky asset price,
p+kt > 0
Et[q
+
k,t+1] > ρ
+
t Covt[q
+
k,t+1, e
ref+
t+1 ]
Considering a (re-)insurance company with utility Us(ws,t) at time t where ws,t
is its asset value and it has uncertain insurance loss Lt+1 (0 ≤ Lt+1 ≤ Lmax), the
following theorem demonstrates how this insurance risk can be transferred to the
ﬁnancial market by means of CAT bonds by applying the results of premium and
promised payoﬀ.9 This theorem will apply the result that the minimum premium θt
9As noted above, this thesis does not consider any costs such as administration costs or management fees that
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that the company passes to the SPV is
θt = Vet (Lt+1),
and the minimum promised payoﬀ for each CAT bond contract set by the SPV is
Ct = Lmax +RfVet (Lt+1),
where Lt+1 (0 ≤ Lt+1 ≤ Lmax) is insured loss at time t + 1 and Vet (Lt+1) is the
estimation of the market valuation of possible loss at time t+1 deﬁned as
Vet (Lt+1) =
1
Rf
[
Et[Lt+1]− (ρet )+Covet [Lt+1, eref+t+1 ]
]
.
Theorem 7. The insurance risk Lt+1 (0 ≤ Lt+1 ≤ Lmax) can be transferred from the
(re-)insurance company through issuing CAT bonds if the following conditions hold:
(I)The utility of the (re-)insurance company at time t satisﬁes
Et [Us (ws,t+1 −RfVet (Lt+1))] > Et [Us (ws,t+1 − Lt+1)]
(II) Individual i (i=1,...,I) has the belief that the conditional covariance of ﬁnan-
cial assets payoﬀ Σ
(i)+
t is positive deﬁnite.
(III)The conditional expected value of every kth asset payoﬀ satisﬁes
Et[q
+
k,t+1] > ρ
+
t Covt[q
+
k,t+1, e
ref+
t+1 ],
(IV)The new market is perceived Pareto superior to the original market if
are generated by setting up and managing the SPV.
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2〈pi(i)ct ,Σ(i)12,tpi(i)+st 〉+ 2〈pi(i)t , V (i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)〉+ 〈(ζ(i)t −Rf ςt), V (i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)〉 ≥ 0,
where ςt = p
+
st − pst, ζ(i)t = E[q(i)+st ]− E[q(i)st ].
Proof. Condition (I) is achieved directly by following Deﬁnition 5 and the setting of
premium θt of CAT bonds. Condition (II) is to ensure that the CAT bonds are
ﬁnancial innovations that cannot be replicated in the market. Condition (III) is
from Proposition 6 to ensure positive asset prices. Condition (IV) is derived from
Deﬁnition 4 Propositions 4 and 5. Deﬁnition 4 and Proposition 4 imply that when
investor's perceived market price of risk in the market with CAT bonds is higher than
in the market without CAT bonds, the risk-return allocation in the market with CAT
bonds is Pareto-superior to the market without CAT bonds. Then Condition (IV)
can be achieved directly according to Proposition 5.
Theorem 7 demonstrates that conditions in which a (re-)insurance company can
transfer an insurance risk successfully by issuing CAT bonds into the ﬁnancial mar-
ket. Condition (I) ensures that the insurance company is willing to transfer its insur-
ance risk after comparing the conditional utility of purchasing CAT bonds with the
utility without purchasing CAT bonds. Condition (II) ensures that the CAT bonds
cannot be replicated by any assets in the market. In other words, the insurance risk
cannot be replicated by any ﬁnancial asset in the ﬁnancial market. Therefore, CAT
bonds can be designed as innovations and are issued to the ﬁnancial market. Con-
dition (III) ensures that the introduction of CAT bonds will not lead negative asset
prices to make this model meaningful. Condition (IV) ensures at least one investor
perceives that the CAT bond will bring higher return rates therefore purchase it.
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4.4 Stochastic diﬀerence equations
This section will study investor behaviour in the market in relation to CAT bonds
and how their interactions aﬀect asset prices. In the literature, Grandmont [72]
proposes a forecasting rule to describe how investors form their expectations and,
hence, a complete description of the evolution of asset prices can be achieved. Some
researchers apply a genetic algorithm as a learning and expectation device to update
investors' beliefs, see Marimon [106], Arifovic [12, 13], Bullard and Dufy [33]. This
section will apply the concept of a perfect forecasting rule that is introduced by
Wenzelburger [147] to depict rational expectations for investors who can correctly
predict the ﬁrst and second moments of future payoﬀs. In the literature on agent-
based models with heterogeneous beliefs, researchers usually assume that there are
only two investors in the market, see Haltiwanger and Waldmann [74], Brock and
Hommes [30] and Wenzelburger [148]. This section will therefore assume that there
are only two investors in the ﬁnancial market. Let us assume investor i = 1 is a
trend follower, while investor i = 2 is an expert who can make perfect forecasts
regarding the future payoﬀs of stocks. In addition, for easier calculation, we assume
that there is only one type of stock (that is K = 1) and CAT bonds that are traded
in the ﬁnancial market.
Subsection 4.4.1 gives the price formulas of CAT bonds and stocks in the ﬁnancial
market under these two assumptions. The price formulas reveal an inderdependence
concerning the heterogeneity of investors. Subsection 4.4.2 will apply the price for-
mulas to show the existence of perfect forecasting rules for ﬁrst and second moments,
and then develop dynamic diﬀerence equations to describe investors' behaviour. The
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diﬀerence equations will be linked to the catastrophic loss that is transferred to the
market by CAT bonds.
4.4.1 Price formulas
Under the assumption that there is only one type of stock in the market, the covari-
ance matrix for future payoﬀs can be reduced to
Σ
(i)
t =
(
V
(i)
11,t Σ
(i)
12,t
Σ
(i)
12,t V
(i)
22,t
)
.
That is, the covariance matrix of stocks becomes the variance of this one type of
stock.
Based on the assumption that there are only two investors in the market, by
Theorem 6, the equilibrium price of the risky asset pt can be written as
pt = A
(1)
t q
(1)
t + A
(2)
t q
(2)
t − At(xm − ξt) (4.4.1)
with
At =
1
Rf
(
a(1)(Σ
(1)
t )
−1 + a(2)(Σ(2)t )
−1
)−1
, (4.4.2)
A
(1)
t = a
(1)At(Σ
(1)
t )
−1 =
(
I +
a(2)
a(1)
Σ
(1)
t (Σ
(2)
t )
−1
)−1
, (4.4.3)
A
(2)
t = a
2At(Σ
2
t )
−1 =
(
I +
a(1)
a(2)
Σ
(2)
t (Σ
(1)
t )
−1
)−1
. (4.4.4)
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Observe that
A
(1)
t + A
(2)
t =
1
Rf
I,
and that At , A
(1)
t , A
(2)
t are all well deﬁned 2 × 2 matrices, which are invertible.
Speciﬁcally,
At =
 A11,t A12,t
A21,t A22,t
 , (4.4.5)
with
A11,t =
V
(2)
11,t det Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))V
(1)
11,t det Σ
(2)
t
a(2)Rf det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t )
, (4.4.6)
A12,t = A21,t =
Σ
(2)
12,t det Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(1)
12,t det Σ
(2)
t
a(2)Rf det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t )
, (4.4.7)
A22,t =
V
(2)
22,t det Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))V
(1)
22,t det Σ
(2)
t
a(2)Rf det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t )
; (4.4.8)
and
A
(i)
t =
 A(i)11,t A(i)12,t
A
(i)
21,t A
(i)
22,t
 , i = 1, 2
with
A
(1)
11,t =
(a(1)/a(2))
(
V
(1)
22,tV
(2)
11,t − Σ(1)12,tΣ(2)12,t
)
+ (a(1)/a(2))2 det Σ
(2)
t
Rf det(Σ1t + (a
(1)/a2)Σ2t )
,
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A
(1)
12,t =
(a(1)/a(2))(V
(1)
11,tΣ
(2)
12,t − Σ(1)12,tV (2)11,t)
Rf det(Σ1t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t )
, (4.4.9)
A
(1)
21,t =
(a(1)/a(2))(V
(1)
22,tΣ
(2)
12,t − Σ(1)12,tV (2)22,t)
Rf det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t )
, (4.4.10)
A
(1)
22,t =
(a(1)/a(2))(V
(1)
11,tV
(2)
22,t − Σ(1)12,tΣ(2)12,t) + (a(1)/a(2))2 det Σ(2)t
Rf det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t )
. (4.4.11)
In addition, A
(2)
11,t =
1
Rf
− A(1)11,t, A(2)12,t = −A(1)12,t, A(2)21,t = −A(1)21,t, A(2)22,t = 1Rf − A
(1)
22,t.
By substituting the deﬁnitions of A
(1)
t (formula (4.4.4)), A
(2)
t (formula (4.4.3))
and At (formula 4.4.5) into the price formula (4.4.1), the equilibrium price formula
of CAT bonds and stocks can be derived as
pct = A
(1)
11,t(q
(1)
ct −q(2)ct )+
1
Rf
q
(2)
ct +A
(1)
12,tq
(1)
st +A
(2)
12,tq
(2)
st −A11,t(xcm−ξct)−A12,t (xsm − ξst) ,
(4.4.12)
pst = A
(1)
21,t(q
(1)
ct − q(2)ct ) + A(1)22,tq(1)st + A(2)22,tq(2)st − A12,t (xcm − ξct)− A22,t (xsm − ξst)
(4.4.13)
respectively.
The price laws  formulas (4.4.12) and (4.4.13)  show that, at equilibrium, the
price of CAT bonds and stocks are linked to each other by investors' subjective beliefs
regarding the future payoﬀs of stocks and CAT bonds. Both the prices of CAT bonds
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and stocks are aﬀected by investors' beliefs about CAT bonds and stocks and the
noise traders from both markets.
As both investors receive the same information of catastrophic events released
from a particular institute, it is reasonable to assume that both investors have the
same expectations of CAT bond payoﬀs, given information available at time t. Under
this situation, investors' beliefs about CAT bonds are the same; that is
q
(1)
ct = q
(2)
ct = ct − Et(lt+1), (4.4.14)
and
V
(1)
11,t = V
(2)
11,t = V art(lt+1). (4.4.15)
Applying the result from Subsection 4.3 on issuance conditions, when the SPV
wants to rise Lmax by issuing CAT bonds, the promised payoﬀ ct to each CAT bond
contract is
ct = lmax +RfVet (lt+1),
where Vet (lt+1) is the estimated valued and deﬁned by the formula (4.2.6)
Vet (lt+1) =
1
Rf
[
Et[lt+1]− ρetCovet [lt+1, eref+t+1 ]
]
.
So, investors' beliefs about CAT bonds for the ﬁrst moment can be written as
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q
(2)
ct = lmax +RfVet (lt+1)− Et(lt+1)
= lmax − ρetCovet [lt+1, eref+t+1 ].
This shows that the expected value of a CAT bond' payoﬀ is reduced to a CAT
bond's maximum covered loss minus a term. That term is the estimated values of
market price of risk and the correlation of insurance loss and market payoﬀs by the
SPV.
In this case, the CAT bond price formula (4.4.12) and the stock price formula
(4.4.13) can be written as
pct =
1
Rf
q
(2)
ct + A
(1)
12,tq
(1)
st + A
(2)
12,tq
(2)
st − A11,t(xcm − ξct)− A12,t (xsm − ξst) , (4.4.16)
pst = A
(1)
22,tq
(1)
st + A
(2)
22,tq
(2)
st − A12,t (xcm − ξct)− A22,t (xsm − ξst) (4.4.17)
respectively, with
q
(2)
ct = lmax − ρetCovet [lt+1, eref+t+1 ].
This demonstrates that when investors' beliefs about CAT bonds are the same as
the objective mean and variance of CAT bonds, prices of CAT bonds are aﬀected
by the SPV's estimated market values. Both prices are aﬀected by investors' beliefs
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about stocks, the covariance between the insured loss with stocks, the variance of
insured loss and the noise traders (ξct, ξst) from both markets.
Together with forecasting rules for ﬁrst and second moments, equations (4.4.16)
and (4.4.17) form a system of stochastic diﬀerence equations that describe the co-
evolutions of stocks and CAT bonds prices.
4.4.2 Perfect forecasting rules
This subsection will apply price formulas achieved in the 4.4.1 to look into the
existence of perfect forecasting rules for ﬁrst and second moments.
For an easier calculation and clear analysis, the probabilistic prerequisites for the
exogenous noise and the exogenous dividend process are stipulated in the assump-
tions from Wenzelburger [149]. In addition, assume that there is no correlation of
the noise traders with the loss process.
Assumption 6. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and {Ft}t∈N an increasing family
of sub-σv-algebras of F .
(1) Assume that the process of noise traders {ξt}t∈N are governed by an exogenous
i.i.d. process; with Et(ξc,t+1) = Et(ξs,t+1) = 0, V art(ξc,t+1) = V art(ξs,t+1) = 1 and
Covt(ξct,ξst) = 0.
(2) Assume that the dividend payments {dt} is a {Ft}t∈N adapted stochastic pro-
cess, its conditional mean and variance are Et(dt+1) = dt+1 and Vt(dt+1) = 0.
(3) Assume the loss process {Lt} has no correlation with the noise traders from
the stock market Covt(ξs,t+1, Lt+1) = 0.
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Assumption 6 (1) assumes that the mean and variance of the noise traders in both
CAT bonds and stocks market have mean 0 and variance 1. Assumption (2) deﬁnes
the dividend is known at time t (3) deﬁnes that there is no correlation of the insured
loss with the noise traders from the stock market.
So, by formula (4.4.17), the conditional expected value and variance of the stock
price is
Et−1(pst) = A
(1)
22,tq
(1)
st + A
(2)
22,tq
(2)
st − A12,txcm − A22,txsm, (4.4.18)
V art−1(pst) = (A12,t)2V art−1(ξct) + (A22,t)2V art−1(ξst)
= (A12,t)
2 + (A22,t)
2, (4.4.19)
respectively.
The conditional covariance between the stock and the CAT bond is
Covt−1[qst, qct] = Covt−1[(pst + dt), (ct−1 − lt)]
= −Covt−1[lt, pst]. (4.4.20)
as qst = pst + dt and qct = ct−1 − lt.
By substituting the stock price formula (4.4.17) into (4.4.20), one receives
112
Covt−1[qst, qct] = −Covt−1[lt, (A12,t · ξct + A22,t · ξst)]
= −A12,tCovt−1[lt, ξct]− A22,tCovt−1[lt, ξst]
= −A12,tCovt−1[lt, ξct]. (4.4.21)
As the investor i = 2 can make a perfect forecast, its expected mean and vari-
ance for the stock payoﬀ should equal the objective ones. In addition to that, its
expected covariance between the stock and the CAT bond should equal the objective
conditional covariance. Mathematically, they are

(I) q
(2)
st = Et(qs,t+1),
(II) V
(2)
22,t = V art(qs,t+1),
(III) V
(2)
12,t = Covt(qst,qct).
(4.4.22)
As q
(2)
st = p
(2)
st + dt+1, the condition (I) can be rewritten as
p
(2)
st = Et(ps,t+1). (4.4.23)
Hence, according to the conditional expected value of the stock price (formula
(4.4.18)), formula (4.4.23) equals to
p
(2)
s,t−1 = A
(1)
22,tq
(1)
st + A
(2)
22,tq
(2)
st − A12,txcm − A22,txsm.
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Solving for q
(2)
st , the perfect forecasting rule of stock future payoﬀ for the ﬁrst moment
is
q
(2)
st =
1
A
(2)
22,t
(
p
(2)
s,t−1 − A122,tq1st + A12,txcm + A22,txsm
)
. (4.4.24)
As q
(2)
st = p
(2)
st + dt+1,
p
(2)
st =
1
A
(2)
22,t
(
p
(2)
s,t−1 − A(1)22,tq(1)st + A12,txcm + A22,txsm
)
− dt+1,
which is the investor i = 2's perfect forecasting rule for the ﬁrst moment of the stock
future price. This result gives the proposition below.
Proposition 7. The perfect forecasting rule for the ﬁrst moment of the stock payoﬀs
by investor i = 2 is
q
(2)
st =
1
A
(2)
22,t
(
p
(2)
s,t−1 − A122,tq1st + A12,txcm + A22,txsm
)
.
By substituting the forecasting rule (4.4.24) into the stock price formula (4.4.17),
the stock price is constituted by the perfect forecasting rule of stock prices, noise
traders and matrices A12,t, A22,t, that is
pst = p
(2)
s,t−1 + (A12,tξct + A22,tξst). (4.4.25)
This formula shows how investors' beliefs aﬀect the stock price. It is decided by
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investor i = 2's forecasting of the stock price and noise traders from both CAT bonds
and stocks markets. In addition, the extent of noise traders' eﬀects are decided by
both investors' beliefs about the risks of stocks, and the conditional covariance of
CAT bonds and stocks.
The following seeks to identify a perfect forecasting rule for the conditional co-
variance of stocks and CAT bonds and the conditional variance of stocks. By substi-
tuting the conditional variance formula of stocks (4.4.19) and conditional covariance
formula (4.4.21) into conditions (II) and (III) respectively, conditions (II) and (III)
become
(II) V
(2)
22,t−1 = (A12,t)
2 + (A22,t)
2, (4.4.26)
(III) V
(2)
12,t−1 = −A12,tCovt−1[lt, ξct], (4.4.27)
respectively.
Consider a general case in which investors' beliefs regarding to the conditional
covariance of CAT bonds and stocks are not zero; that is V
(1)
12,t 6= V (2)12,t 6= 0. So, from
condition (III), the expression of A12,t can be written as
A12,t = −
Σ
(2)
12,t−1
Covt−1[lt, ξct]
. (4.4.28)
Using this expression of A12,t , the condition (II) can be rewritten as
V
(2)
22,t−1 −
(
Σ
(2)
12,t−1
Covt−1[lt, ξct]
)2
= (A22,t)
2 (4.4.29)
By substituting the deﬁnition of A12,t (4.4.7) and A22,t (4.4.8) into formulas (4.4.28)
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and (4.4.29),simultaneous equations with two arguments Σ
(2)
12,t and V
(2)
22,t are achieved:
− Σ
(2)
12,t−1
Covt−1[lt,ξct]
=
Σ
(2)
12,t det Σ
(1)
t +(a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(1)
12,t det Σ
(2)
t
a(2)Rf det(Σ
(1)
t +(a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t )
±
√
V
(2)
22,t−1 −
(
Σ
(2)
12,t−1
Covt−1[lt,ξct]
)2
=
V
(2)
22,t det Σ
(1)
t +(a
(1)/a(2))V
(1)
22,t det Σ
(2)
t
a(2)Rf det(Σ
(1)
t +(a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t )
.
Solving these two equations by replacing det Σ
(2)
t and det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t )
det Σ
(2)
t = V
(2)
11,tV
(2)
22,t − Σ(2)12,tΣ(2)21,t
and
det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t ) =
(
V
(1)
11,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
11,t
)(
V
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
)
−
(
Σ
(1)
12,t +
a(1)
a(2)
Σ
(2)
12,t
)(
Σ
(1)
21,t +
a(1)
a(2)
Σ
(2)
21,t
)
,
respectively. Several results are achieved.
Proposition 8. The perfect forecasting rule for the second moment and the covariance
are calculated under three situations. Deﬁne (a(1)/a(2)) = D, V
(1)
11,t = V
(2)
11,t = n 6= 0,
Σ
(1)
12,t = Σ
(1)
21,t = m 6= 0, V (1)22,t = w 6= 0. Note that Σ(2)12,t = Σ(2)21,t so this Proposition
only shows the value of Σ
(2)
12,t.
Situation1, a(1)HRfn(1 +D)−Dmn = 0, P1na(1)(1 +D)− det Σ1t −Dwn 6= 0
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
Σ
(2)
12,t =
(2Ha(1)Rfm+det Σ
1
t )±
√
∆1
2a(1)HRf
V
(2)
22,t =
2a(1)mP1X1−(Dw−P1a(1)D)X21−(a2 det Σ1t+a(1)nw)P1
(P1na(1)+P1Da(1)n−det Σ1t−Dwn)
Σ
(2)
12,t =
(2Ha(1)Rfm+det Σ
1
t )±
√
∆1
2a(1)HRf
V
(2)
22,t =
2a(1)mP2X1−(Dw−P2a(1)D)X21−(a2 det Σ1t+a(1)nw)P2
(P2na(1)+P2Da(1)n−det Σ1t−Dwn)
if ∆1 = (2Ha
(1)Rfm+ det Σ
1
t )
2 + 4a(1)H2R2f (a
(2) det Σ1t + a
(1)nw) ≥ 0.
Situation 2, a(1)HRfn(1 +D)−Dmn 6= 0, P1na(1)(1 +D)− det Σ1t −Dwn = 0.Σ
(2)
12,t =
2P1a(1)m±
√
∆2(P1)
2D(w−P1a(1))
V
(2)
22,t =
(Ha(1)RfD−Dm)X21P1+(2Ha(1)Rfm+det Σ1t )X1P1−(a(2) det Σ1t+a(1)nw)HRf
(a(1)HRf (1+D)−Dm)n
if ∆2(P1) = 4P
2
1 (a
(1))2m2 − 4DP1(w − P1a(1))(a(2) det Σ1t + a(1)nw) ≥ 0.Σ
(2)
12,t =
2P1a(1)m±
√
∆2(P2)
2D(w−P1a(1))
V
(2)
22,t =
(Ha(1)RfD−Dm)X21P2+(2Ha(1)Rfm+det Σ1t )X1P2−(a(2) det Σ1t+a(1)nw)HRf
(a(1)HRf (1+D)−Dm)n
if ∆2(P2) = 4P
2
2 (a
(1))2m2 − 4DP2(w − P2a(1))(a(2) det Σ1t + a(1)nw) ≥ 0.
Situation 3 a(1)HRfn(1 +D)−Dmn 6= 0, P1na(1)(1 +D)− det Σ1t −Dwn 6= 0
Σ
(2)
12,t =
−(2Ha(1)Rfm+det Σ1t−2P2a(1)mWP2)+
√
∆3(P2)
2D((Ha(1)Rf−m)+(w−P2a(1))WP2)
V
(2)
22,t =
2a(1)mP2X1P2−D(w−P2a(1))X21P2−(a(2) det Σ1t+a(1)nw)P2
(P2na(1)(1+D)−det Σ1t−Dwn)
.
if ∆3(P2) =
(
2Ha(1)Rfm+ det Σ
1
t − 2P2a(1)mWP2
)2 ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
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Therefore, dynamic diﬀerence equations are

pct =
1
Rf
q
(2)
ct + p
(2)
s,t−1 + (A
(1)
12,t − A(1)22,t)q(1)st + (A12,t − A11,t)xcm+
(A22,t − A12,t)xsm + A11,tξct + A12,tξst
pst = p
(2)
s,t−1 + A12,tξct + A22,tξst
p
(2)
st =
1
A
(2)
22,t
(
p
(2)
s,t−1 − A(1)22,tq(1)st + A12,txcm + A22,txsm
)
− dt+1
(4.4.30)
with Σ
(2)
12,t and V
(2)
22,t are deﬁned in Proposition 8.
4.4.3 Special case with zero correlation
This subsection will consider a special case in which both investors (i = 1, 2) believe
that there is no conditional correlation of CAT bonds and stocks, and will explore
how such beliefs aﬀect the market.
If both investors think that there is no correlation between CAT bonds and stocks,
that is Σ
(1)
12,t = Σ
(2)
12,t = 0, by the deﬁnition of A12,t (4.4.7), A
(1)
12,t (4.4.9), the values of
A12,t, A
(1)
12,t and A
(2)
12,t (A
(2)
12,t = −A(1)12,t) are all equal to zero, that is
A12,t = A
(1)
12,t = A
(2)
12,t = 0.
The covariance matrices ofΣ
(1)
t and Σ
(2)
t become
Σ
(1)
t =
 V (1)11,t 0
0 V
(1)
22,t

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Σ
(2)
t =
 V (2)11,t 0
0 V
(2)
22,t
 .
So the determinant of Σ
(1)
t and Σ
(2)
t are simply
det Σ
(1)
t = V
(1)
11,tV
(1)
22,t,
det Σ
(2)
t = V
(2)
11,tV
(2)
22,t.
The determinant of det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t ) is
det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t ) = V
(1)
11,t
(
1 +
a(1)
a(2)
)(
V
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
)
,
with the assumption (see Subsection 4.4.1) that investors hold the same beliefs on
CAT bonds: V
(1)
11,t = V
(2)
11,t. Therefore, the formula of A22,t (4.4.8) can be written as
A22,t =
V
(2)
22,t det Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))V
(1)
22,t det Σ
(2)
t
a(2)Rf det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t )
=
V
(2)
22,tV
(1)
11,tV
(1)
22,t(1 +
a(1)
a(2)
)
a(2)RfV
(1)
11,t
(
1 + a
(1)
a(2)
)(
V
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
)
If a(1) 6= −a(2), A22,t can be written as
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A22,t =
1
Rf
(
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
+ a
(1)
V
(1)
22,t
) . (4.4.31)
Formula A
(1)
22,t (4.4.11) can be written as
A
(1)
22,t =
a(1)
a(2)
V
(1)
11,tV
(2)
22,t + (
a(1)
a(2)
)2V
(2)
11,tV
(2)
22,t
RfV
(1)
11,t
(
1 + a
(1)
a(2)
)(
V
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
)
=
a(1)
a(2)
V
(1)
11,tV
(2)
22,t
(
1 + a
(1)
a(2)
)
RfV
(1)
11,t
(
1 + a
(1)
a(2)
)(
V
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
)
=
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
Rf
(
V
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
) .
If a(1) 6= −a(2), A(1)22,t becomes
A
(1)
22,t =
1
a(2)Rf
(
V
(1)
22,t
V
(2)
22,t
+ a
(1)
a(2)
) . (4.4.32)
As the relation of A
(1)
22,t and A
(2)
22,t is A
(2)
22,t =
1
Rf
−A(1)22,t, so A(2)22,t can be derived based
on formula (4.4.32) as
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A
(2)
22,t =
1
Rf
−
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
Rf
(
V
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
)
=
V
(1)
22,t
Rf
(
V
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
)
=
1
Rf
(
1 + a
(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
V
(1)
22,t
) . (4.4.33)
The formula of A11,t (4.4.6) can be written as
A11,t =
V
(2)
11,t det Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))V
(1)
11,t det Σ
(2)
t
a(2)Rf det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t )
=
V
(2)
11,tV
(1)
11,t
(
V
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
)
a(2)RfV
(1)
11,t
(
1 + a
(1)
a(2)
)(
V
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
)
=
V
(2)
11,t
Rf (a(1) + a(2))
(4.4.34)
Based on the simpliﬁed results of A
(2)
22,t (4.4.33), A
(1)
22,t (4.4.32), A12,t = 0 and A22,t
(4.4.31), the perfect forecast for the stock price p
(2)
st (4.4.30) is
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p
(2)
st =
1
A
(2)
22,t
(
p
(2)
s,t−1 − A(1)22,tq(1)st + A12,txcm + A22,txsm
)
− dt+1,
=
1
A
(2)
22,t
(
p
(2)
s,t−1 − A(1)22,tq(1)st + A22,txsm
)
− dt+1,
= Rf
(
1 +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
V
(1)
22,t
)p(2)s,t−1 − q(1)st
a(2)Rf
(
V
(1)
22,t
V
(2)
22,t
+ a
(1)
a(2)
) + V (1)22,txsm
a(2)Rf
(
V
(1)
22,t
V
(2)
22,t
+ a
(1)
a(2)
)
− dt+1,
= Rf
(
1 +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
V
(1)
22,t
)
p
(2)
s,t−1 −
V
(2)
22,t
a(2)
.xsm +
q
(1)
st V
(2)
22,t
a(2)V
(1)
22,t
− dt+1,
=
1
a(2)
[
Rfp
(2)
s,t−1
(
a(1)
V
(2)
22,t
V
(1)
22,t
+ a(2)
)
− V (2)22,txsm + q(1)st
V
(2)
22,t
V
(1)
22,t
]
− dt+1,
and q
(2)
st is
q
(2)
st = p
(2)
st + dt+1
=
1
a(2)
[
Rfp
(2)
s,t−1
(
a(1)
V
(2)
22,t
V
(1)
22,t
+ a(2)
)
− V (2)22,txsm + q(1)st
V
(2)
22,t
V
(1)
22,t
]
.
So, the perfect forecast rule for the ﬁrst moment is simpliﬁed and only related to the
variance of stocks from both investors' beliefs. Under the assumption that investors
believe that there is no correlation of CAT bonds and stocks, it shows investor
i = 2's perfect forecast for the ﬁrst moment is no longer related to the variance of
CAT bonds.
After having the perfect forecast rule for the ﬁrst moment, the investor i = 2's
perfect beliefs for the conditional covariance and variance for the asset payoﬀ will be
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calculated. Under this assumption, the requirement (iii) (4.4.27) will always hold,
and condition (ii) (4.4.26) becomes
V
(2)
22,t−1 = (A22,t)
2.
By the deﬁnition of A22,t (4.4.8), the above formula can be written as
√
V
(2)
22,t−1 =
V
(2)
22,t det Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))V
(1)
22,t det Σ
(2)
t
a(2)Rf det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t )
.
Solving for V
(2)
22,t,
V
(2)
22,t =
V
(1)
22,t
√
V
(2)
22,t−1
V
(1)
11,tV
(1)
22,t+(
a(1)
a(2)
)V
(1)
22,tV
(2)
11,t
Rfa(2)
(
V
(1)
11,t+
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
11,t
) − a(1)
a(2)
√
V
(2)
22,t−1
,
=
a(2)
1
Rf
√
V
(2)
22,t−1
− a(1)
V
(1)
22,t
.
Compared with Proposition 8, this perfect forecast rule for the second moment is
simpliﬁed: only the investor i = 1's belief about the variance of stocks matters.
Proposition 9. Assume that investors hold the belief that there is no correlation of
the CAT bonds and stocks, mathematically the following equation holds
A12,t = A
(1)
12,t = A
(2)
12,t = 0.
The perfect rules for the ﬁrst moment and second moment are
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q
(2)
st =
1
a(2)
[
Rfp
(2)
s,t−1
(
a(1)
V
(2)
22,t
V
(1)
22,t
+ a(2)
)
− V (2)22,txsm + q(1)st
V
(2)
22,t
V
(1)
22,t
]
and
V
(2)
22,t =
a(2)
1
Rf
√
V
(2)
22,t−1
− a(1)
V
(1)
22,t
respectively.
Proof. See Apendix B.
By the assumption that A12,t = A
(1)
12,t = A
(2)
12,t = 0, the prices of CAT bonds
(4.4.12) and stocks (4.4.13) become

pct =
1
Rf
q
(2)
ct − A11,t(xcm − ξct)
pst = p
(2)
s,t−1 + A22,tξst.
By substituting A11,t (4.4.34) and A22,t (4.4.31) into the above joint formulas,

pct =
1
Rf
q
(2)
ct − V
(2)
11,t
Rf(a(1)+a(2))
(xcm − ξct)
pst = p
(2)
s,t−1 +
1
Rf
(
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
+ a
(1)
V
(1)
22,t
)ξst.
So, under the assumption that V
(1)
12,t = V
(2)
12,t = 0, the stochastic diﬀerence equations
in this system are shown below,
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
pct =
1
Rf
q
(2)
ct − V
(2)
11,t
Rf(a(1)+a(2))
(xcm − ξct)
pst = p
(2)
s,t−1 +
1
Rf
(
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
+ a
(1)
V
(1)
22,t
)ξst.
p
(2)
st =
1
a(2)
[
Rfp
(2)
s,t−1
(
a(1)
V
(2)
22,t
V
(1)
22,t
+ a(2)
)
− V (2)22,txsm + q(1)st V
(2)
22,t
V
(1)
22,t
]
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V
(2)
22,t =
a(2)
a(1)
V
(1)
22,t
√
V
(2)
22,t−1
(Rfa(1))−1V
(1)
11,t−
√
V
(2)
22,t−1
.
It shows that when investors hold belief that there is no correlation between stocks
and CAT bonds then the prices of stock and CAT bonds are no longer related to each
other. It shows how investors' beliefs drive price movements in the ﬁnancial market.
Each asset price is only related to investors' beliefs about this speciﬁc asset. It also
can be conﬁrmed by the objective conditional covariance that there is no correlation
between CAT bonds and stocks.
The objective conditional covariance between the payoﬀ of stocks and CAT bonds
(4.4.21) is
Covt−1(qct,qst) = −A12,tCovt−1[lt, ξct] = 0,
which shows that investors' beliefs regarding the covariance between stocks and CAT
bonds drives the real covariance in the maker in the same direction.
Proposition 10. If investors hold the same belief that there is no correlation between
stocks and CAT bonds, the covariance of stocks and CAT bonds in the real market
will be no longer correlated.
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This shows that investors' subjective beliefs change the prices of CAT bonds and
stocks and drive the market in the direction of investors' beliefs. This result implies
that the objective covariance matrix in the market is
Σt =
 V11,t 0
0 V22,t
 ,
which is the same as investors' believe.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigated CAT bonds in the agent-based CAPM with individuals
holding heterogeneous beliefs. The premium and coupon were determined. An ex-
ample showed how the SPV can apply the results of this thesis to determine the
coupon and premium before issuing the CAT bond. The notion of transferable in-
surance risk in an agent-based model was deﬁned. In each time period, investors have
diﬀerent beliefs about future payoﬀs. The concept of perceived Pareto superiority
was deﬁned. The interaction between two diﬀerent investors were investigated by
means of stochastic diﬀerence equations. Following Wenzelburger [148], the perfect
forecasting rule was derived.
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Chapter 5
Loss process with CAT bonds
This chapter aims to introduce the catastrophic loss process in Section 5.1, which
is commonly used in actuarial science and CAT bonds research such as by Aase
[1], Burneck et al. [36] and Ma and Ma [101]. Then Section 5.2 embeds this loss
process to CAT bonds to simulate the eﬀect of CAT bonds to the ﬁnancial market.
Subsection 5.2.1 simulates and discusses two ways how CAT bonds cover losses from
catastrophic events. Following the discussion in Subsection 5.2.1, Subsection 5.2.2
explores how investors' behaviour changes when CAT bonds are introduced into
the ﬁnancial market. Finally, the changes in market risk are illustrated in the last
subsection.
5.1 Prerequisites
This section introduces a typical process that is used to simulate insurance loss.1 It
consists of two main components. One is characterising incidence frequency, which is
1The main content of this section is from Cizek, P. el at. [46] and Shreve[133]
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usually modelled by the claim arrival process, and will be introduced in Subsection
5.1.1.2 As claims occur when incidents happen, the claim arriving process describes
the ﬂow of the catastrophic event. The second is used to describe the severity of loss
from the occurrence of an event. It is usually called loss distribution, or claim size
distribution, and will be introduced in Subsection 5.1.2. After providing a general
understanding of the claim arrival process and loss distribution, Subsection 5.1.3
introduces the aggregate claim loss process.3
5.1.1 Claim arrival processes
The claim arrival process depicts the number of claims occurring from certain catas-
trophic events over a time period. In other words, it depicts the number of the
occurring catastrophic events occurring over in a time period as claims happen when
a catastrophic event happens. Researchers Ma and Ma [101], Schmidt [129], Jiang
and Dassios [53] use a doubly stochastic Poisson process (or Cox Process) to describe
the ﬂow of claims related to catastrophic risk. This subsection introduces the Cox
process. The introduction of exponential random variable and homogeneous Poisson
process are used to provide an understanding of the Cox Process.
Firstly, we introduce the concept of the exponential distribution, which is used to
describe the time between two events for the homogeneous Poisson process.
Deﬁnition 6. [133][exponential random variable/exponential distribution] Deﬁne τ as
an exponential random variable (or τ has the exponential distribution) if its density
2Term 'claims' refer to insurance claims that are requested from the insurance policy holders to the insurance
company.
3 Note that notations used in this section are independent from the rest of the thesis.
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function is
f(t) =

λe−λt, t ≥ 0,
0, t < 0,
and the cumulative distribution function
F (t) = P{τ ≤ t} = 1− e−λt, t ≥ 0
where λ is a positive constant.
The mean of random variable is E[τ ] = 1
λ
4. One property of the exponential
distribution is memorylessness. This can be explained by the following example.
Example 6. [133][memorylessness property] Consider a restaurant that opens at time
0. The time waiting for the customers to arrive is exponentially distributed with
mean 1
λ
(λ is a positive constant). Suppose, no customer arrives during the time
interval [0, s], and after time t , the ﬁrst customer arrives. The probability that the
restaurant at time s will have to wait an additional t time units for the ﬁrst customer
to arrive is P{τ > t + s|τ > s} = P{τ > t} = e−λt. It shows that the probability of
waiting to have the ﬁrst customer at time s is the same as the probability of waiting
at time 0.
The mean 1
λ
means the average waiting time for customers to arrive. In other
4For a detailed calculation, see Shreve [133] p. 462.
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words, the customer arrives at an average rate λ per unit time. After understanding
the exponential distribution and its property, the following deﬁnition explains the
homogeneous Poisson process, which applies the property of exponential distribution
and is commonly used to model random events.
Deﬁnition 7. [133][Homogeneous Poisson Process] Considering a sequence {τ1, τ2, ...}
of independent exponential random variables to denote the inter-arrivals times be-
tween each event happenings. Deﬁne arrival times (or jump times) as
Tn =
n∑
k=1
τk. (5.1.1)
The Poisson Process N(t) counts the number of events by jumping one unit at each
arrival time Tn (n = 1, 2, ...). More precisely,
N(t) =

0 if 0 ≤ t < T1
1 if T1 ≤ t < T2
...
n if Tn ≤ t < Tn+1
...
By the property of exponential random variables, the expected time between each
jump is 1
λ
, and the jumps arrive at an average rate of λ per unit time. The positive
constant λ is called the intensity of the homogeneous Poisson process N(t).
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Figure 5.1.1: Customers arriving from 6 p.m. to 11 p.m.
The following example explains how the homogeneous Poisson process is used to
model the arrival of customers in a restaurant.
Example 7. Continuing with Example 6, the waiters in the restaurant count the
number of customers coming from time 6 p.m. to 11 p.m. Assuming the customers
comes into the restaurant with a constant average rate 3 per hour, then a process
that models the customer arriving from 6 p.m. to 11 p.m. can be illustrated in
Figure 5.1.1.
Understanding the homogeneous Poisson process will help to understand the Cox
process, which is a non-homogeneous Poisson process. Its intensity is a stochastic
process rather than a constant λ, so it is reasonable to apply it to model Poisson
process to describe catastrophic events, because the event does not come in a constant
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rate per time unit. The deﬁnition of Cox process is given below.
Deﬁnition 8. [53][Cox process] Deﬁne a stochastic process m(t)
m(t) =
∫ t
0
m(u)du <∞ almost surely.
The Poisson process is generated by using the process {m(t)} as its intensity
process is called the Cox process, where m(t) is called an intensity function.5
The following example is a Cox process that is used to model a catastrophic event.
Example 8. This example applies the intensity function generated by Burneck et
al. [36]. They apply the loss dataset from catastrophic events provided by Property
Claim Services6 and achieve an intensity function m(t) = 35.32+2.32 ·2pi ·sin(2pi(t−
0.2)). This example show the Cox process (Figure 5.1.2) that is used to describe
catastrophic events with intensity function m(t). It shows the ﬂow of catastrophic
events over 10 years.
5.1.2 Claim size distribution
After the introduction of the process that is used to model the ﬂow of catastrophic
events, this subsection introduces the severity of loss/claims for each incident. Claim
size distribution is used to describe the probability distribution of the claim size
5For a srick mathematic deﬁnition of the Cox Process, see Dassios and Jang [53]
6Property Claim Services (PCS) is the internationally recognized authority on insured property losses from catas-
trophes in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
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Figure 5.1.2: Example of a Cox process
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occurring in catastrophic events. The distribution of claims from catastrophes is
strongly skewed. Typical distributions are log-normal, Pareto, Burr, Weibull, and
Gamma distributions that have a heavy-tailed distribution.
A heavy-tailed distribution has a 'heavier tail' than an exponential distribution.
To explain heavy-tailed distribution, a function called complementary cumulative
distribution function (ccdf) is needed. The deﬁnition below deﬁnes ccdf.7
Deﬁnition 9. [46][Complementary cumulative distribution function] Deﬁning a ran-
dom variable x with cumulative distribution function (cdf)
F (x) = P{x ≤ X},
its complementary cumulative distribution function (ccdf) is deﬁned as
F¯ (x) = P{x > X} = 1− F (x).
So the ccdf is the probability that the value of a random variable x is larger than
a value X.
A heavy-tailed distribution has a 'heavier tail' than an exponential distribution.
It implies that the ccdf of a heavy-tailed distribution decays slower than the ccdf of
exponential distribution.
This implies that it has a higher probability of having a very large value. The
following example gives the comparison of a log-normal distribution and exponential
7For a strict mathematic deﬁnition, see Shreve [133].
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Figure 5.1.3: Example of a heavy- tailed distribution
The green dotted line denotes ccdf of log-normal distribution with µ = 3, σ = 1; the blue dotted
line denotes ccdf of log-normal distribution with µ = 3, σ = 1.
The red line is the ccdf of exponential distribution with the mean 3; The brown line is the ccdf of
exponential distribution with the mean 10.
distribution to show the log-normal distribution has the 'heavy tail' property.
Example 9. The log-normal distribution cdf of is given by
F (x) = Φ
(
log x− µ
σ
)
, y > 0.
The ccdf of exponential distribution is
F¯ (x) = e−λx,
Figure 5.1.3 shows that log-normal distribution is a heavy-tailed distribution be-
cause it has a heavier tail than the exponential distribution.
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5.1.3 Aggregate claim process
This subsection explains the aggregate claim loss, which is modelled by a compound
Poisson process. Subsection 5.1.1 shows that a Poisson process jumps at one unit each
time. The compound Poisson process allows for the jump size to be random. It is used
to model the aggregate claim loss from a series insured incidents. Researchers such
as Burneck et al. [36] and Ma and Ma [101] apply the compound doubly stochastic
Poisson process to describe the aggregate claim process related to catastrophic loss
LAt =

∑Nt
i=1 Zi Nt > 0
0 Nt = 0
,
where Nt is the claim arriving process with density m(t) and {Zi} is the sequence of
positive independent and identically distributed random variables with distribution
function F (z) = P (Zi < z). {Zi} denotes the amount of claims incurred by each
event in the time ﬂow {τi}, i = 1, 2, ...Nt.
Example 10. Applying the claim arrival process in Example (8) and assuming that the
claim size distribution is lognormal distributed with mean µ = 18.3806 and variance
σ = 1.1052, then an aggregate loss process can be plotted as shown in Figure 5.1.4.
5.2 The eﬀects of CAT bonds
The price formulas of CAT bonds and stocks derived in Subsection 4.4.1 show how
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Figure 5.1.4: An aggregate claim process
the catastrophic losses are transferred into the ﬁnancial market by means of CAT
bonds and aﬀect risky asset prices. That is

pct =
1
Rf
q
(2)
ct + A
(1)
12,tq
(1)
st + A
(2)
12,tq
(2)
st − A11,t(xcm − ξct)− A12,t (xsm − ξst) ,
pst = A
(1)
22,tq
(1)
st + A
(2)
22,tq
(2)
st − A12,t (xcm − ξct)− A22,t (xsm − ξst)
q
(1)
ct = q
(2)
ct = ct − Et(lt+1),
V
(1)
11,t = V
(2)
11,t = Vt(lt+1),
ct = lmax +RfVet (lt+1),
where Vet (lt+1) = 1Rf
[
Et[lt+1]− ρetCovet [lt+1, eref+t+1 ]
]
. This section will apply the loss
process introduced above to investigate the eﬀect of CAT bonds on the ﬁnancial
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market by a number of simulations. Subsection 5.2.1 illustrates how the catastrophic
losses are embedded in the CAT bonds in discrete multi-time periods. In addition,
two diﬀerent cases are discussed about what kind of loss a CAT bond contract can
cover. Subsection 5.2.2 shows how investors' demands for a risky asset changed after
CAT bonds were introduced. The ﬁnal subsection shows how the market risk changes
when CAT bonds are introduced.
5.2.1 Loss process of CAT bonds
This subsection simulates the loss process that CAT bonds bring into the ﬁnancial
market in a discrete multi-time period. Most research applies the Cox process,
introduced above to plot the loss of CAT bonds. However, from the reports on CAT
bonds published by ﬁnancial consultant companies [122], CAT bonds only cover the
loss from a severe catastrophic event. That is why the return rate on CAT bonds
is high and therefore attracts investors. This subsection will simulate CAT bond
losses in two situations. One is that CAT bonds cover the aggregate loss at each
time period. The second situation is that CAT bonds only cover the loss caused by
a certain event when its loss exceeds a certain level.
The ﬁrst case is illustrated in Figure 5.2.1. At each time period, once the aggregate
loss exceeds a certain value, CAT bonds will use the fund raised from investors to
cover the exceeded loss.
Figure 5.2.2 shows the situation in which CAT bonds only cover a speciﬁc loss
that exceeds a certain level at each time period. Unlike the ﬁrst scenario, Figure
5.2.2 simulates the losses occurred by each event rather than an aggregate loss of a
number of events at each time period. So as long as the loss occurred from a speciﬁc
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Figure 5.2.1: CAT bonds cover aggregate loss
event exceeds a certain level, the funds received by selling CAT bonds will be used
to cover this certain loss and then the CAT bond contract stops before maturity.
The following example shows that when a certain loss exceeds the threshold D,
the CAT bond contract stops.8
Example 11. Considering the second situation discussed above and setting the thresh-
old is set as D = 5×108, the CAT bonds cover the loss above D. The maximum loss
that CAT bonds are set to cover is Lmax = 100× 106. The time period for the CAT
bond contract is one year. Once a pre-agreed event happens, the loss reaches thresh-
8 Bond holders always get their payoﬀ at maturity. So even if any pre-agreed event happens before the maturity,
investors have to wait untill maturity to receive their reduced payoﬀ or principal back.
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Figure 5.2.2: CAT bonds cover a single loss
old D, and then the CAT bonds contract stops. (This means the CAT bond contract
only provides coverage to the (re-)insurance company for the ﬁrst pre-deﬁned event.)
Investors should wait until maturity to receive payoﬀs. Figure 5.2.3 shows once a
loss occurred from a single event reaches D, the loss process stops. This means these
three years all trigger the default term. The loss of CAT bonds at each maturity is
L1 = 5.761× 108 −D, L2 = 5.959× 108 −D, L3 = 5.845× 108 −D.
The following section will use the second scenario to calculate the eﬀect of the
insurance loss transferred by CAT bonds to the ﬁnancial market.
5.2.2 Investment behaviour
After identifying the loss that CAT bonds bring to the market at each time period,
this subsection shows the eﬀect of CAT bonds on investor i's behaviour. After
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Figure 5.2.3: CAT bonds cover loss exceeds 5× 108
theoretical study of the perfect forecast rule for investors, as deﬁned by Theorem 1,
the amount of risky asset demanded by investor i at time t is
x(i)∗ = x
(i)
eff (σ
(i)
∗ , pi
(i), Σ(i))
=
(Σ(i))−1pi(i)
〈pi(i), (ΣV (i))−1pi(i)〉 12 σ
(i)
∗ ,
= κ(i)σ(i)∗
where pi(i) = q(i) − Rfp is the expected vector of excess returns by investor i, ρ(i) =
〈pi(i), (V (i))−1pi(i)〉 12 is the price of risk holding by investor i in period t and the
parameter κ(i) is deﬁned as
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κ(i) =
(Σ(i))−1pi(i)
〈pi(i), (Σ(i))−1pi(i)〉 12 .
Figure 5.2.4 shows the investor's demand for stocks with the changes in their
willingness to consume risk when there are only two stocks in the market. Figure
5.2.5 shows the investor's demand for the same stocks and CAT bonds when CAT
bonds are introduced into the market. Comparing Figures 5.2.4 and 5.2.5, when CAT
bonds are introduced the demand for one particular stock decreases. Both ﬁgures
also illustrate how the demand changes according to the investor's willingness to
consume risk.
5.2.3 Market risk
This subsection plots the changes in market risk when CAT bonds are introduced
into the market.
The market risk is deﬁned as σmt =
√
< xm,Σtxm >. Figure 5.2.6 shows the
market risk without CAT bonds in a multi-period. When CAT bonds are introduced,
the market risk and its volatility increase dramatically as Figure 5.2.7 shows.
5.3 Conclusion
This chapter introduced aggregate loss process that is commonly used to depict
the aggregate loss from catastrophic events. A discussion on how CAT bonds cover
catastrophic loss at each time period was given, showing an appropriate way to embed
this loss process in CAT bonds. The eﬀect of CAT bonds on investors' demand for
a risky asset was simulated. When CAT bonds are introduced into the market, the
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Figure 5.2.4: Demand of stocks in the market with two stocks
Term 'coeﬃcient' refers to κ(i) and 'sigma' is the risk that investor is willingness to consume.
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Figure 5.2.5: Demand of CAT bonds and stocks in the market with CAT bonds
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Figure 5.2.6: Market risk without CAT bonds
Figure 5.2.7: Market risk with CAT bonds
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demand for other risky assets decreases dramatically. In addition, the changes of
market risk were simulated when CAT bonds are introduced into the market. The
introduction of CAT bonds not only increased the market risk but also increased its
volatility.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
This thesis provides a new and alternative approach for modeling CAT bonds by
using an agent-based CAPM. Investors' behaviour is analysed when CAT bonds are
introduced as innovations in a ﬁnancial market setting that comprises key features
of an insurance market. This framework allows for an analysis of the design of CAT
bonds and an exploration of the mechanism that transfers catastrophe risk from an
insurance market to a ﬁnancial market.
By incorporating elements of an insurance market into a ﬁnancial market, this
thesis ﬁlls a research gap identiﬁed by Wang [146], who points out that any valuation
of a CAT bond needs to consider both the insurance and the ﬁnancial market to
ensure a comprehensive analysis and thus a proper valuation of CAT bonds. This
thesis started from a traditional static CAPM, studied the introduction of a CAT
bond as a new asset added to existing investment opportunities in Chapter 2. The
existence and uniqueness of a CAPM equilibrium was established and hence the
equilibrium price of a CAT bond as an innovation was determined. The trading
conditions under which investors in the ﬁnancial market are willing to purchase
CAT bonds were discussed. Introducing the notion of Pareto superiority in terms
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of allocations of risk and return, it was shown that the optimal portfolio with CAT
bonds is preferred by an investor, if the corresponding risk-return allocation in the
new market with CAT bonds is Pareto superior to the allocation in the market
without CAT bonds. If one investor prefers to add CAT bonds to his portfolio, by
the two fund separation theorem, all investors will have CAT bonds in their portfolios
due to the assumption that investors hold homogeneous beliefs. More generally, this
thesis showed that if the slope of the capital market line (i.e. the market price of
risk) in the new market is steeper than it in the original market without innovations,
then the innovations are preferred and hence traded by investors in the ﬁnancial
market. Formal conditions that determine whether or not the market price of risk
with innovations is higher are developed. These ﬁndings are in accordance with Cass
and Citanna [38] and Elul [67], who show when it is possible to introduce a new asset
to make every agent better oﬀ. Based on the CAPM with innovations, the design of
CAT bonds was studied with regard to the premium that a (re-)insurance company
needs to pay, the amount of funds the issuer can raise, and the promised payoﬀ of a
CAT bond that ﬁnancial investors demand. In this setting, the price of a CAT bond
was determined as the equilibrium price of an innovation. Considering (re-)insurance
companies to be risk averse, the conditions under which a reinsurance company is
willing to reinsure catastrophe risk by using CAT bonds was developed. Together
with the conditions ensuring that investors are willing to purchase CAT bonds, these
conditions stipulate the issuing conditions of CAT bonds, i.e., the conditions under
which catastrophe risk is transferable from the insurance industry to the ﬁnancial
market via CAT bonds.
As the standard CAPM neither explains situations in which investors hold het-
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erogeneous beliefs nor how asset prices evolve over time, the thesis introduced CAT
bonds into an agent-based multi-period CAPM in Chapter 4. The design of CAT
bonds developed for the static CAPM was generalised for an agent-based CAPM with
investors holding heterogeneous beliefs. To do so, the notion of perceived Pareto su-
periority was introduced to describe the situation in which an investor's perceived
risk-return allocation in a market with CAT bonds has a higher utility than his per-
ceived risk-return allocation in the market without CAT bonds. If the risk-return
allocation in the new market is perceived Pareto superior to the market without
CAT bonds, CAT bonds are traded in the ﬁnancial market.
The issuing conditions for CAT bonds were generalised to the dynamic setting.
Stochastic diﬀerence equations that describe the co-evolution of stock and CAT bond
prices were developed and discussed. These equations are generally non-linear and
allow for a range of complex dynamic behaviours. As is common in agent-based
ﬁnance, it turns out that these prices are, in essence, driven by the way in which
investors form forecasts about the future evolution of the markets. As a special case,
a system which allows for one investor to have rational expectations was formulated,
generalising the notion of a perfect forecasting rule introduced in Wenzelburger [147].
The nature of the stochastic diﬀerence equations reveals that catastrophe risk will
correlate with the return of ﬁnancial assets as soon as investors hold heterogeneous
beliefs. In Chapter 5, a compound Poisson process that describes the aggregate
catastrophe claim loss is introduced. By embedding this loss process with CAT
bonds at each time period, the eﬀects of CAT bonds to investors' behaviour and the
market risk are simulated and discussed.
This thesis leaves some interesting topics to be explored in future research. The
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CAPM and the agent-based CAPM is based on the assumption that investors are
characterised by mean-variance preferences over future payoﬀs. However, the mean
and the variance may not describe the return process of CAT bonds accurately
enough. This is so, because the returns on CAT bonds are deﬁned as a promised
payoﬀ to investors minus the losses that are linked to natural disasters. These
losses are generally not normally distributed, so that the mean and variance describe
this loss process insuﬃciently. This fact suggests two directions to pursue in future
research. One direction could focus on how to transform the loss process so that it can
be evaluated by a mean and variance pattern. Wang [145], taking an actuarial science
viewpoint, ﬁnds that the traditional Sharpe ratio does not reﬂect the asset returns
that have skewed distributions. He provides a probability transformation, which can
extend the Sharpe ratio to evaluate risk with a skewed distribution. As the Sharpe
ratio is calculated as the expected excess return to standard deviation, it means that
Wang's transformation could improve the way in which the mean-variance pattern
evaluates catastrophe risk that has a skewed distribution. This might improve the
accuracy with which the return on a CAT bond could be evaluated by a mean-
variance pattern. Wang's method is important for possible empirical applications
and combining his transformation with the CAPM would be an interesting research
topic. The second research direction is to extend the agent-based CAPM to a model
that takes skewness as a third moment into account. In this way, the properties of
loss processes could be transferred more accurately into the ﬁnancial market, leading
to a more precise valuation of catastrophe risks.
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Appendix A
Proofs of Chapter 2
Proof. (Theorem 2) We brieﬂy review the proof in Wenzelburger [150]. By Theorem
1, the equilibrium condition for the asset market takes the form
φ(
√
〈pi∗,Σ−1pi∗〉)xeff(1) = xm. (A.0.1)
Taking standard deviations (A.0.1) implies
φ(ρ∗) =
√
〈xm,Σxm〉 = σm (A.0.2)
with ρ∗ :=
√〈pi∗,Σ−1pi∗〉. This means that in equilibrium, aggregate willingness to
assume risk φ(ρ∗) must be equal to the aggregate risk of the market. Vice versa, if
ρ∗ solves (A.0.2), then pi∗ =
ρ∗
σm
Σxm solves (A.0.1).
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Proof. (Proposition 2) Deﬁne x+e = (Σ
+)−1pi+ and write x+e =
(
xe
ze
)
with xe ∈ RK and
ze ∈ R. Using (2.3.1), we see that Σ+x+e = pi+ implies
pi = Σxe + zeb,
τ = 〈b, xe〉+ cze.
Solving for
(
xe
ze
)
, we get
xe = Σ
−1pi − ze Σ−1b ∈ RK (A.0.3)
ze =
τ − 〈b,Σ−1pi〉
c− 〈b,Σ−1b〉 ∈ R. (A.0.4)
Note that the denominator in (A.0.4) is positive because Σ+ is symmetric and positive
deﬁnite implying that
0 <
〈(−Σ−1b
1
)
,Σ+
(−Σ−1b
1
)〉
= c− 〈b,Σ−1b〉. (A.0.5)
Using (A.0.3) and (A.0.4), the market price of risk takes the form
(ρ+)2 = 〈x+e ,Σ+x+e 〉 = 〈x+e , pi+〉 = ρ2 + ze(τ − 〈b, σ−1pi〉)
= ρ2 + (τ−〈b,Σ
−1pi〉)2
c−〈b,Σ−1b〉 . (A.0.6)
It follows from (A.0.5), that the second term in (A.0.6) strictly positive whenever
τ 6= 〈b,Σ−1pi〉. This completes the proof.
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Appendix B
Proofs of Chapter 4
Proof. (Proposition 5) At equilibrium, investor i forms his own capital allocation line
(CAL) and has his perceived market price of risk ρ
(i)+
t (the slope of CAL). The market
price of risk in the market with CAT bonds is deﬁned as
ρ
(i)+
t = 〈pi(i)+t ,Σ(i)+t pi(i)+t 〉
1
2 .
In that formula, pi
(i)+
t is the expected excess return of investor i and deﬁned as
pi
(i)+
t = E
(i)
t (q
+
t+1)−Rfp+t =
 pi(i)ct
pi
(i)+
st
 .
with pi
(i)
ct denoting the investor's expected excess return from CAT bonds and pi
(i)+
st
the vector of the investor's expected excess return from stocks. For easier calculation,
ﬁrstly, let us calculate (ρ
(i)+
t )
2.
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(ρ
(i)+
t )
2 = 〈pi(i)+t ,Σ(i)+t pi(i)+t 〉
=
〈 pi(i)ct
pi
(i)+
st
 ,
 V (i)11,t Σ(i)12,t
Σ
(i)
21,t Σ
(i)
22,t
 pi(i)ct
pi
(i)+
st
〉
=
〈 pi(i)ct
pi
(i)+
st
 ,
 V (i)11,tpi(i)ct + Σ(i)12,tpi(i)+st
Σ
(i)
21,tpi
(i)
ct + Σ
(i)
22,tpi
(i)+
st
〉
=
〈
pi
(i)
ct ,
(
V
(i)
11,tpi
(i)
ct + Σ
(i)
12,tpi
(i)+
st
)〉
+
〈
pi
(i)+
st ,
(
Σ
(i)
21,tpi
(i)
ct + Σ
(i)
22,tpi
(i)+
st
)〉
= 〈pi(i)ct , V (i)11,tpi(i)ct 〉+ 〈pi(i)ct ,Σ(i)12,tpi(i)+st 〉+ 〈pi(i)+st ,Σ21,tpi(i)ct 〉+ 〈pi(i)+st ,Σ(i)22,tpi(i)+st 〉
where 〈pi(i)ct ,Σ(i)12,tpi(i)+st 〉 = 〈pi(i)+st ,Σ(i)21,tpi(i)ct 〉. This is because pi(i)ct is a scalar, so the
above formula can be rewritten as
(ρ
(i)+
t )
2 = 〈pi(i)ct , V (i)11,tpi(i)ct 〉+ 2〈pi(i)ct ,Σ(i)12,tpi(i)+st 〉+ 〈pi(i)+st ,Σ(i)22,tpi(i)+st 〉.
In order to have (ρt)
2 ((ρt)
2 = 〈pi(i)t ,Σ(i)t pi(i)t 〉), substituting formulas Et(q(i)+s,t+1) =
Et(q
(i)
s,t+1) + ζ
(i)
t , and Σ
(i)
22,t = Σ
(i)
t into the above formula. The last part equals
〈pii+st , V i22,tpi(i)+st 〉 =
〈
pi
(i)
t + (ζ
(i)
t −Rf ςt),Σ(i)t
(
pi
(i)
t + (ζ
(i)
t −Rf ςt)
)〉
=
〈
pi
(i)
t + (ζ
(i)
t −Rf ςt),Σ(i)t pi(i)t + Σ(i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)
〉
= 〈pi(i)t ,Σ(i)t pi(i)t 〉+〈pi(i)t ,Σ(i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)〉+〈(ζ(i)t −Rf ςt),Σ(i)t pi(i)t 〉+〈(ζ(i)t −Rf ςt),Σ(i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)〉.
As 〈pi(i)t ,Σ(i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)〉 = 〈(ζ(i)t −Rf ςt),Σ(i)t pi(i)t 〉, this formula can be written as
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〈pi(i)+st ,Σ(i)22,tpi(i)+st 〉 = 〈pi(i)t ,Σ(i)t pi(i)t 〉+2〈pi(i)t ,Σ(i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)〉+〈(ζ(i)t −Rf ςt),Σ(i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)〉.
As 〈pi(i)t ,Σ(i)t pi(i)t 〉 = (ρ(i)t )2, replacing the term 〈pi(i)t ,Σ(i)t pi(i)t 〉, it gives
〈pi(i)+st ,Σ(i)22,tpi(i)+st 〉 = (ρ(i)t )2 + 2〈pi(i)t ,Σ(i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)〉+ 〈(ζ(i)t −Rf ςt),Σ(i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)〉.
So we derives the formula including (ρ
(i)+
t )
2 and (ρ
(i)
t )
2, that is
(ρ
(i)+
t )
2 = (ρ
(i)
t )
2 + 〈pi(i)ct , V (i)11,tpi(i)ct 〉+ 2〈pi(i)ct ,Σ(i)12,tpi(i)+st 〉+ 2〈pi(i)t ,Σ(i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)〉
+〈(ζ(i)t −Rf ςt),Σ(i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)〉
As 〈pi(i)ct , V (i)11,tpi(i)ct 〉 ≥ 0, so as long as the remaining part is larger than zero, that is
2〈pi(i)ct ,Σ(i)12,tpi(i)+st 〉+ 2〈pi(i)t ,Σ(i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)〉+ 〈(ζ(i)t −Rf ςt),Σ(i)t (ζ(i)t −Rf ςt)〉 ≥ 0.
then the perceived market price of risk in the market with CAT bonds is larger than
in the market without CAT bonds, that is
ρ
(i)+
t > ρ
(i)
t .
Proof. (Proposition 8). To discover the existence of V
(2)
22,t from the following formulas:
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
− Σ
(2)
12,t−1
Covt−1[lt,ξct]
=
Σ
(2)
12,t detΣ
(1)
t +(a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(1)
12,t detΣ
(2)
t
a2Rf det(Σ
(1)
t +(a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t )
(i)
±
√
V
(2)
22,t−1 −
(
Σ
(2)
12,t−1
Covt−1[lt,ξct]
)2
=
V
(2)
22,t detΣ
(1)
t +(a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(1)
22,t detΣ
(2)
t
a(2)Rf det(Σ
(1)
t +(a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t )
(ii)
(B.0.1)
To solve this function and get result of Σ
(2)
12,t and V
(2)
22,t, the determinant of det(Σ
(1)
t +
(a(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t ) and detΣ
(2)
t are needed. By the deﬁnition of determinant, det(Σ
(1)
t +
(a(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t ) equals to
det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t ) =
(
V
(1)
11,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
11,t
)(
Σ
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
)
−
(
Σ
(1)
12,t +
a(1)
a(2)
Σ
(2)
12,t
)(
Σ
(1)
21,t +
a(1)
a(2)
Σ
(2)
21,t
)
and detΣ
(2)
t is
detΣ
(2)
t = V
(2)
11,tV
(2)
22,t −Σ(2)12,tΣ(2)21,t.
To make this calculation easier to read, set (a(1)/a(2)) = D, V
(2)
22,t = Y > 0, Σ
(2)
12,t =
Σ
(2)
21,t = X > 0, V
(1)
11,t = V
(2)
11,t = n 6= 0, Σ(1)12,t = Σ(1)21,t = m 6= 0, Σ(1)22,t = w 6= 0. So
det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t ) = (n+Dn) (w +DY )− (m+DX) (m+DX)
= nw + nDY +Dnw +D2nY −m2 −D2X2 − 2mDX
= detΣ
(1)
t +D(nY + nw +DnY −DX2 − 2mX)
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and
detΣ
(2)
t = nY −X2.
Set − Σ
(2)
12,t−1
Covt−1[lt,ξct]
= A12,t = H,
√
V
(2)
22,t−1 +H2 = P1 and −
√
V
(2)
22,t−1 +H2 = P2, so
the function (B.0.1) can be expressed as

H =
X detΣ
(1)
t +Dm(nY−X2)
a2Rf (detΣ
(1)
t +nDY+Dnw+D
2nY−D2X2−2mDX) (i)
P1 =
Y detΣ
(1)
t +Dw(nY−X2)
a2(detΣ
(1)
t +nDY+Dnw+D
2nY−D2X2−2mDX) (ii)
(B.0.2)
and

H =
X detΣ
(1)
t +Dm(nY−X2)
a2Rf (detΣ
(1)
t +nDY+Dnw+D
2nY−D2X2−2mDX) (i)
P2 =
Y detΣ
(1)
t +Dw(nY−X2)
a2(detΣ
(1)
t +nDY+Dnw+D
2nY−D2X2−2mDX) (ii).
(B.0.3)
Now solve the simultaneous equations (B.0.2). For the ﬁrst equation (i) from
(B.0.2), multiply a2Rf (detΣ
(1)
t + nDY +Dnw +D
2nY −D2X2 − 2mDX) at both
sides, then
Ha2Rf (detΣ
(1)
t + nDY +Dnw +D
2nY −D2X2 − 2mDX) = X detΣ(1)t +Dm(nY −X2)
Ha2Rf detΣ
(1)
t +Ha
2RfnDY+Ha
2RfDnw+Ha
2RfD
2nY−Ha2RfD2X2−2Ha2RfmDX =
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X detΣ
(1)
t +DmnY −DmX2
As a(2)D = a(2) a
(1)
a(2)
= a(1), this formula can be written as
(Ha(2)Rf detΣ
(1)
t + a
(1)HRfnw) + a
(1)HRfnY + a
(1)HRfDnY −Ha(1)RfDX2
−2Ha(1)RfmX −DmnY −X detΣ(1)t +DmX2 = 0
HRf (a
(2) detΣ
(1)
t +a
(1)nw)+Y
(
a(1)HRfn(1 +D)−Dmn
)
= (Ha(1)RfD−Dm)X2
+(2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ
(1)
t )X
Y (a(1)HRfn(1 +D)−Dmn) = (Ha(1)RfD −Dm)X2 + (2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ(1)t )X
−(Ha(2)Rf detΣ(1)t + a(1)HRfnw).
The second formula from (B.0.2) can be rewritten as
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(Pna(1)+PDa(1)n−detΣ(1)t −Dwn)Y = 2Pa(1)mX−(Dw−Pa(1)D)X2−(Pa(2) detΣ(1)t +a(1)Pnw).
So the problem of solving simultaneous equations (B.0.2) is transferred into solving
the following simultaneous equations

(a(1)HRfn(1 +D)−Dmn)Y = (Ha(1)Rf −m)DX2 + (2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ(1)t )X
−HRf (a(2) detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw) (i)
(P1na
(1)(1 +D)− detΣ(1)t −Dwn)Y = 2P1a(1)mX − (w − Pa(1))DX2
−P1(a(2) detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw) (ii)
(B.0.4)
There are four possible situations to solve these simultaneous equations (B.0.4):
Situation 1, a(1)HRfn(1+D)−Dmn = 0 and P1na(1)(1+D)−detΣ(1)t −Dwn = 0.
In this case, Y can be an arbitrary number, which is not suitable to this case so this
situation is discarded.
Situation 2, a(1)HRfn(1 +D)−Dmn = 0, P1na(1)(1 +D)− detΣ(1)t −Dwn 6= 0.
Consider the ﬁrst condition. If a(1)HRfn(1 +D)−Dmn = 0, that is
a(1)HRfn(1 +D)−Dmn = 0.
Cancel n (as n 6= 0) from both sides,
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a(1)HRf (1 +D)−Dm = 0
a(1)HRfD −Dm = −a(1)HRf .
Then the ﬁrst formula from (B.0.4) can be written as
(Ha(1)RfD −Dm)X2 + (2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ(1)t )X − (Ha(2)Rf detΣ(1)t + a(1)HRfnw) = 0
a(1)HRfX
2 − (2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ(1)t )X +HRf(a(2) detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw) = 0.
So it becomes a quadratic equation in one unknown variableX. If
∆1 = (2Ha
(1)Rfm+ detΣ
(1)
t )
2 + 4a(1)H2R2f (a
(2) detΣ
(1)
t + a
(1)nw) ≥ 0,
then there are two solutions of X1,

X1 =
(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t )+
√
∆1
2a(1)HRf
X2 =
(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t )−
√
∆1
2a(1)HRf
. (B.0.5)
Now consider the second condition, to see if there are any constraints on the
solution of X.
If P1na
(1) +P1Da
(1)n−detΣ(1)t −Dwn 6= 0, then the second formula from (B.0.4)
is
1If ∆1 = 0, X1 = X2.
160
YP1 =
2a(1)mP1X − (Dw − P1a(1)D)X2 − (a2 detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw)P
(P1na(1) + P1Da(1)n− detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
.
If ∆1 ≥ 0, by substituting the results of X1and X2 respectively, there are two
results of Y
Y1P1 =
2a(1)mP1X1 − (Dw − P1a(1)D)X21 − (a2 detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw)P1
(P1na(1) + P1Da(1)n− detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
Y2P1 =
2a(1)mP1X2 − (Dw − P1a(1)D)X22 − (a2 detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw)P1
(P1na(1) + P1Da(1)n− detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
.
Similarly, equation (B.0.3) will obtain similar results. To conclude, all of the results
are

X1 =
(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t )+
√
∆1
2a(1)HRf
Y1P1 =
2a(1)mP1X1−(Dw−P1a(1)D)X21−(a2 detΣ(1)t +a(1)nw)P1
(P1na(1)+P1Da(1)n−detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
X2 =
(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t )−
√
∆1
2a(1)HRf
Y2P1 =
2a(1)mP1X2−(Dw−P1a(1)D)X22−(a2 detΣ(1)t +a(1)nw)P1
(P1na(1)+P1Da(1)n−detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
X1 =
(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t )+
√
∆1
2a(1)HRf
Y1P2 =
2a(1)mP2X1−(Dw−P2a(1)D)X21−(a2 detΣ(1)t +a(1)nw)P2
(P2na(1)+P2Da(1)n−detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
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
X2 =
(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t )−
√
∆1
2a(1)HRf
Y2P2 =
2a(1)mP2X2−(Dw−P2a(1)D)X22−(a2 detΣ(1)t +a(1)nw)P2
(P2na(1)+P2Da(1)n−detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
.
Situation 3, a(1)HRfn(1 +D)−Dmn 6= 0, P1na(1)(1 +D)− detΣ(1)t −Dwn = 0.
Consider the ﬁrst condition, a(1)HRfn(1 + D) −Dmn 6= 0, then a formula of Y
expressed by X can be derived as
Y =
(Ha(1)RfD −Dm)X2 + (2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ(1)t )X − (a(2) detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw)HRf
(a(1)HRf + a(1)HRfD −Dm)n .
(B.0.6)
Consider the second condition, P1na
(1)(1+D)−detΣ(1)t −Dwn = 0, then the second
formula from (B.0.4) becomes a quadratic equation in one unknown variable X:
(Dw − P1a(1)D)X2 − 2P1a(1)mX + (P1a2 detΣ(1)t + a(1)Pnw) = 0
If
∆2(P1) = 4P
2
1 (a
(1))2m2 − 4(Dw − P1a(1)D)(P1a2 detΣ(1)t + a(1)Pnw) ≥ 0
then
X1P1 =
2P1a
(1)m+
√
∆2(P1)
2D(w − P1a(1))
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X2P1 =
2P1a
(1)m−√∆2(P1)
2D(w − P1a(1)) .
So according to the formula of Y expressed by X (B.0.6), the results of X and Y are

X1P1 =
2P1a(1)m+
√
∆2(P1)
2D(w−P1a(1))
YX1P1 =
(Ha(1)RfD−Dm)X21P1+(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t )X1P1−(a(2) detΣ(1)t +a(1)nw)HRf
(a(1)HRf+a(1)HRfD−Dm)n
and

X2P1 =
2P1a(1)m−
√
∆2(P1)
2D(w−P1a(1))
YX2P1 =
(Ha(1)RfD−Dm)X22P1+(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t )X2P1−(a(2) detΣ(1)t +a(1)nw)HRf
(a(1)HRf+a(1)HRfD−Dm)n
Similarly, from formula (B.0.3), the results are

X1P2 =
2P1a(1)m+
√
∆2(P2)
2D(w−P1a(1))
YX1P2 =
(Ha(1)RfD−Dm)X21P2+(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t )X1P2−(a(2) detΣ(1)t +a(1)nw)HRf
(a(1)HRf+a(1)HRfD−Dm)n
and

X2P2 =
2P2a(1)m−
√
∆2(P2)
2D(w−P2a(1))
YX2P2 =
(Ha(1)RfD−Dm)X22P2+(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t )X2P2−(a(2) detΣ(1)t +a(1)nw)HRf
(a(1)HRf+a(1)HRfD−Dm)n .
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Situation 4, a(1)HRfn(1 +D)−Dmn 6= 0, P1na(1)(1 +D)− detΣ(1)t −Dwn 6= 0.
Under this situation, a formula of Y expressed by X can be derived from the ﬁrst
formulas from (B.0.4), that is
Y =
(Ha(1)RfD −Dm)X2 + (2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ(1)t )X − (a(2) detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw)HRf
(a(1)HRf + a(1)HRfD −Dm)n .
(B.0.7)
Similarly, the second formula from (B.0.4) can derive a formula of Y expressed by X
Y =
2a(1)mP1X − (Dw − P1a(1)D)X2 − (a2 detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw)P1
(P1na(1) + P1Da(1)n− detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
. (B.0.8)
Then by (B.0.6)=(B.0.8) to solve X:
(Ha(1)RfD −Dm)X2 + (2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ(1)t )X − (a(2) detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw)HRf
(a(1)HRf + a(1)HRfD −Dm)n =
2a(1)mP1X − (w − P1a(1))DX2 − (a2 detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw)P1
(P1na(1)(1 +D)− detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
(
(Ha(1)RfD −Dm)X2 + (2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ(1)t )X − (a(2) detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw)HRf
)
=
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(a(1)HRf (1 +D)−Dm)n
(P1na(1)(1 +D)− detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
(
2P1a
(1)mX − (w − P1a(1))DX2 − (a2 detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw)P1
)
Set
(a(1)HRf (1+D)−Dm)n
(P1na(1)(1+D)−detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
= WP1, then this formula becomes
(
(Ha(1)RfD −Dm)X2 + (2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ(1)t )X − (a(2) detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw)HRf
)
=
2P1a
(1)mWP1X − (w − P1a(1))DWP1X2 − (a2 detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw)P1WP1
(
(Ha(1)Rf −m)DX2 + (2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ(1)t )X − (a(2) detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw)HRf
)
−2P1a(1)mWP1X + (w − P1a(1))DWP1X2 + (a2 detΣ(1)t + a(1)nw)P1WP1 = 0
(
(Ha(1)Rf −m) + (w − Pa(1))WP1
)
DX2+
(
2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ
(1)
t − 2P1a(1)mWP1
)
X
−
(
(a(2) detΣ
(1)
t + a
(1)nw)HRf + (a
2 detΣ
(1)
t + a
(1)nw)P1WP1
)
= 0
If
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∆3(P1) =
(
2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ
(1)
t − 2P1a(1)mWP1
)2
+4D
(
Ha(1)Rf −m+ (w − P1a(1))WP1
)
(
(a(2) detΣ
(1)
t + a
(1)nw)HRf + (a
2 detΣ
(1)
t + a
(1)nw)P1WP1
)
≥ 0,
then the solutions of X are
X1P1 =
−
(
2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ
(1)
t − 2P1a(1)mWP1
)
+
√
∆3(P1)
2D ((Ha(1)Rf −m) + (w − P1a(1))WP1)
X2P1 =
−
(
(2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ
(1)
t )− 2P1a(1)mWP1
)
−√∆3(P1)
2D ((Ha(1)Rf −m) + (w − P1a(1))WP1) .
As there are two expressions of Y , the possible results are

X1P1 =
−
(
2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t −2P1a(1)mWP1
)
+
√
∆3(P1)
2D((Ha(1)Rf−m)+(w−P1a(1))WP1)
YX1P1 =
2a(1)mP1X1P1−(Dw−P1a(1)D)X21P1−(a(2) detΣ
(1)
t +a
(1)nw)P1
(P1na(1)+P1Da(1)n−detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
or Y
′
X1P1 =
(Ha(1)RfD−Dm)X21P1+(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t )X1P1−(a(2) detΣ(1)t +a(1)nw)HRf
(a(1)HRf+a(1)HRfD−Dm)n
X2P1 =
−
(
(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t )−2P1a(1)mWP1
)
−
√
∆3(P1)
2D((Ha(1)Rf−m)+(w−P1a(1))WP1)
YX2P1 =
2a(1)mP1X2P1−(Dw−P1aD)X22P1−(a2 detΣ
(1)
t +a
(1)nw)P1
(P1na(1)+P1Da(1)n−detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
or Y
′
X2P1 =
(Ha(1)RfD−Dm)X22P1+(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t )X2P1−(a(2) detΣ(1)t +a(1)nw)HRf
(a(1)HRf+a(1)HRfD−Dm)n .
Similarly, to solve simultaneous equations (B.0.3), set
(a(1)HRf (1+D)−Dm)n
(P2na(1)(1+D)−detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
=
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WP2 and if
∆3(P2) =
(
2Ha(1)Rfm+ detΣ
(1)
t − 2P2a(1)mWP2
)2
+4D
(
Ha(1)Rf −m+ (w − P2a(1))WP2
)
(
(a(2) detΣ
(1)
t + a
(1)nw)HRf + (a
2 detΣ
(1)
t + a
(1)nw)P2WP2
)
≥ 0
then

X1P2 =
−
(
2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t −2P2a(1)mWP2
)
+
√
∆3(P2)
2D((Ha(1)Rf−m)+(w−P2a(1))WP2)
YX1P2 =
2a(1)mP2X1P2−(Dw−P2a(1)D)X21P2−(a2 detΣ
(1)
t +a
(1)nw)P2
(P2na(1)+P2Da(1)n−detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
or Y
′
X1P2 =
(Ha(1)RfD−Dm)(X1P2)2+(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ(1)t )X1P2−(a(2) detΣ(1)t +a(1)nw)HRf
(a(1)HRf+a(1)HRfD−Dm)n
X2P2 =
−
(
(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t )−2P2a(1)mWP2
)
−
√
∆3(P2)
2D((Ha(1)Rf−m)+(w−P2a(1))WP2)
YX2P2 =
2a(1)mP2X2P2−(Dw−P2aD)X 22P2−(a2 detΣ
(1)
t +a
(1)nw)P2
(P2na(1)+P2Da(1)n−detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
or Y
′
X2P2 =
(Ha(1)RfD−Dm)(X2P2)2+(2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ(1)t )X2P2−(a(2) detΣ(1)t +a(1)nw)HRf
(a(1)HRf+a(1)HRfD−Dm)n .
By checking, only when X = X1P2, result YX1P2 = Y
′
X1P2, so under situation 4
the result is

X1P2 =
−
(
2Ha(1)Rfm+detΣ
(1)
t −2P2a(1)mWP2
)
+
√
∆3(P2)
2D((Ha(1)Rf−m)+(w−P2a(1))WP2)
YX1P2 =
2a(1)mP2X1P2−(Dw−P2a(1)D)X21P2−(a(2) detΣ
(1)
t +a
(1)nw)P2
(P2na(1)(1+D)−detΣ(1)t −Dwn)
.
167
Proof. (Proposition 9) After having the perfect forecast rule for the ﬁrst moment, the
investor i = 2's perfect beliefs for the conditional covariance and variance for the
asset payoﬀ are going to be calculated. Under this assumption, requirement (iii)
(4.4.27) will always hold and condition (ii) (4.4.26) becomes
V
(2)
22,t−1 = (A22,t)
2.
By the deﬁnition of A22,t (4.4.8), the above formula can be written as
√
V
(2)
22,t−1 =
V
(2)
22,t det Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))V
(1)
22,t det Σ
(2)
t
a(2)Rf det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t )
.
Substituting
det(Σ
(1)
t + (a
(1)/a(2))Σ
(2)
t ) =
(
V
(1)
11,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
11,t
)
det
(
V
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
)
,
det Σ
(2)
t = V
(2)
11,t det(V
(2)
22,t)
into the above formula, it gives
√
V
(2)
22,t−1
(
V
(1)
11,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
11,t
)
det
(
V
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
)
a(2)Rf
= V
(2)
22,t det Σ
(1)
t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(1)
22,tV
(2)
11,t detV
(2)
22,t.
Solving for V
(2)
22,t,
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√
V
(2)
22,t−1
(
V
(1)
11,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
11,t
)
det
(
V
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
)
a(2)Rf−(a
(1)
a(2)
)V
(1)
22,tV
(2)
11,t detV
(2)
22,t = V
(2)
22,t detV
1
t ,
as det Σ
(1)
t = V
(1)
11,tV
(1)
22,t > 0, so it becomes
(√
V
(2)
22,t−1
(
V
(1)
11,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
11,t
)
det
(
V
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
)
a(2)Rf − (a
(1)
a(2)
)V
(1)
22,tV
(2)
11,t det(V
(2)
22,t)
)
(det Σ
(1)
t )
−1 = V (2)22,t,
√
V
(2)
22,t−1
(
V
(1)
11,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
11,t
)
det
(
V
(1)
22,t +
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
22,t
)
a(2)Rf (det Σ
(1)
t )
−1
−(a
(1)
a(2)
)V
(1)
22,tV
(2)
11,t det(V
(2)
22,t)(det Σ
(1)
t )
−1 = V (2)22,t,
Solving for V
(2)
22,t,
V
(2)
22,t =
V
(1)
22,t
√
V 222,t−1
det Σ
(1)
t +(
a(1)
a(2)
)V
(1)
22,tV
(2)
11,t
Rfa(2)
(
V
(1)
11,t+
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
11,t
) − a(1)
a(2)
√
V
(2)
22,t−1
.
By substituting det Σ
(1)
t into the above formula, it gives the perfect forecasting rule
for the second moments:
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V
(2)
22,t =
V
(1)
22,t
√
V
(2)
22,t−1
V
(1)
11,tV
(1)
22,t+(
a(1)
a(2)
)V
(1)
22,tV
(2)
11,t
Rfa(2)
(
V
(1)
11,t+
a(1)
a(2)
V
(2)
11,t
) − a(1)
a(2)
√
V
(2)
22,t−1
,
=
a(2)
1
Rf
√
V
(2)
22,t−1
− a(1)
V
(1)
22,t
.
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